GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

Faculty Scholarship

2016

Fall 2016 Supplement to Brauneis & Schechter, Copyright: A
Contemporary Approach
Robert Brauneis
The George Washington University Law School, rbraun@law.gwu.edu

Roger E. Schechter

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Brauneis, Robert and Schechter, Roger E., "Fall 2016 Supplement to Brauneis & Schechter, Copyright: A
Contemporary Approach" (2016). GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works. 1219.
https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications/1219

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact spagel@law.gwu.edu.

COPYRIGHT:
A Contemporary Approach
Robert Brauneis
Roger E. Schechter

Fall 2016 Cumulative Supplement

Fall 2016 Supplement

2

Table of Recent Cases
This table provides easy access to references to cases decided since July of 2015
– internal document cross-reference links are in blue

Scope of Protection




DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2015) – Batmobile protectable as character
VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 2016 WL 3090780 (9th Cir.) – (principal case) de minimis
exception to copyright infringement also applicable to sound recordings (disagrees with
Sixth Circuit)
Home Design Services, Inc. v. Turner Heritage Homes Inc., 2016 WL 3361479 (11th Cir. 2016). – in the
context of architectural works, distinguishing between expression and idea is a question of
law for the court, not a question of fact for the jury (one judge dissenting)

Functionality



Bikram’s Yoga College of India, L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, LLC, 803 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 2015) –
sequence of yoga poses functional and therefore not protected by copyright
Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2015) – cheerleading uniforms
include copyrightable designs severable from functional features; certiorari granted by the
Supreme Court

Fair Use




Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 302 (2d Cir. 2015) (principal case) – Google Books
project qualifies as fair use
Keeling v. Hars, 809 F.3d 43, 45 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 2016 WL 1703348 (Sup. Ct. 2016) –
copyright is not forfeited in work that makes unauthorized fair use of another work
Katz v. Google Inc., 802 F.3d 1178, 1180 (11th Cir. 2015) – use of uncomplimentary photograph in
critical blog posts is fair use

Secondary Liability – § 512 Safe Harbor





Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, 2016 WL 3349368 (2d Cir. June 16, 2016) – § 512 safe harbor
applies to pre-1972 sound recordings protected by common-law copyright
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2015), opinion amended and superseded on denial
of rehearing, 815 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2016) – to avoid liability for making a material
misrepresentation, copyright holder must consider fair use before filing § 512 takedown
notice
BMG Rights Management (US) LLC v. Cox Communications, Inc., 2015 WL 7756130 (E.D. Va.) –
defendant did not reasonably implement a policy of terminating service to repeat infringers,
and therefore was not protected by § 512 safe harbor

Visual Artists Rights Act


Cheffins v. Stewart, 2016 WL 3190914 (9th Cir. 2016) – school bus covered with wooden
structure resembling a Spanish galleon was a work of “applied art” that did not qualify for
protection under VARA
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State-Law Protection of Pre-1972 Sound Recordings
 Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 821 F.3d 265 (2d Cir. 2016); Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM
Radio, Inc., 2016 WL 3546433 (11th Cir. June 29, 2016) – Second and Eleventh Circuits certify
to New York and Florida state courts, respectively, question of whether state-law protection
of pre-1972 sound recordings include public performance right
 ABS Entertainment, Inc. v. CBS Corp., No. 2:15-cv-06257-PA-AGR (C.D. Cal. May 30, 2016) –
remastering of pre-1972 sound recording places it solely under protection of federal law

Preemption of State Law



Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s, Inc., 2016 WL 1464229 (C.D. Cal., April 11, 2016) – California
Resale Royalty Act is preempted by first sale doctrine of the U.S. Copyright Act
Dryer v. National Football League, 814 F.3d 938 (8th Cir. 2016) – Copyright Act preempts right of
publicity action by football players appearing in National Football League videos

Remedies


Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 28 (1st Cir. 2016) – profits of infringer too
speculative and therefore not recoverable for use of photograph in sex trafficking

Attorneys Fees


Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S.Ct. 1979 (2016) (principal case) – objective
reasonableness of prevailing party’s position is one factor that courts should consider in
deciding whether to grant attorneys fees (whereas courts should not consider whether the
lawsuit meaningfully clarified copyright law) but courts should recognize that they can
consider other factors as well
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Table of Contents
Hyperlinked Cross-References to Inserts in Casebook Outline
This Table of Contents provides links to all inserts, showing where they are located within
casebook Chapters – links are in blue (or red for principal cases)

Chapter 1 Introductions
A. The Current Legal Framework
p. 8 – Insert above “B. Theoretical Frameworks”
C. The International Context of U.S. Copyright Law
p. 32 – Replace the paragraph on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) with
the following

Chapter 2 The Basic Hurdles of Copyright Protection
p. 70 – Replace Note 1 with the following:
p. 96 – insert the following after “Language Note: Distinguishing Between Derivative
Works, Collective Works, and Compilations”:
C. “Work of Authorship” and the Enumerated Categories Thereof: Independent
Limitations on Copyrightable Subject Matter?

Garcia v. Google, Inc.
Chapter 3 Fundamental Exceptions to Copyright Protection
B. Abstraction and “Ideas”
p. 143 – insert after note 8:
C. Utility and Functionality
1. Introduction
p. 158 – insert the following after note 5
p. 176 – insert the following before “5. Useful Articles”

4A. Application Programming Interfaces
5. Useful Articles
p. 189 – insert the following after note 2:
6. Architectural Works

5

COPYRIGHT : A Contemporary Approach

Insert on p. 194, after photograph of Olympic Tower and Freedom Tower
Chapter 4 Proving Infringement of the Reproduction Right
A. The Elements of a Case of Copyright Infringement
p. 206 – insert the following after note 6:
Chapter 5 Fair Use
A. The Three Supreme Court Cases
p. 292 – Replace Note 3 with the following:
p. 326 – Insert after Note 2
B. Some Applications
p. 343 - insert the following before note 3
p. 344 - insert the following before “Copyright in the Real World: Documentary
Filmmakers and the Fair Use Best Practices Project”:
Insert on p. 347, after the end of the “Copyright in the Real World” box:

Authors Guild v. Google, Inc.
p. 355 – Insert after Note 2
Chapter 6 Enforcement and Protection Strategies
A. Direct Infringement
Page 376 – insert after note 2
B. Secondary Liability: An Introduction
p. 384 - insert the following before “Copyright in the Real World: A Trip to the
Copy Shop”:
E. Shielding and Recruiting New Gatekeepers: the Treatment of Online Service
Providers in Section 512
pp. 410-425 - replace the District Court opinion in Viacom International Inc. v. YouTube,
Inc. and the accompanying notes with:

Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc
p. 428 – add the following paragraph to Note 11 “Six Strikes and You’re Out”
p. 449 – delete the material after the first paragraph in Unlocking Your Mobile
Phone and substitute the following
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Chapter 7: The 1909 Act Framework and Its Partial Persistence: Of Publication, Notice,
Deposit and Registration
p. 505 main volume – delete the district court opinion in Alaska Stock v.
Houghton Mifflin and substitute the following:

Alaska Stock, LLC v. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Pub . Co.
Insert after the end of note 2 on page 534:
Chapter 8: Initial Ownership of Copyright
p. 558 – add the following at the bottom of the page

Greene v. Ablon
Chapter 10: Copyright Duration and Related Limitations on Transfer
p. 764: Add the following to the end of Note 2
pp. 777-778: Replace note 1 with the following
Chapter 11: The Reproduction, Distribution, and Adaptation Rights, and the Visual Artists
Rights Act
p. 785 – insert at the end of the list of statutory licenses for which the Copyright
Royalty Board sets rates
B. The Right of Distribution to the Public
1. The Meaning of “Distribution to the Public”

p. 803 – insert after note 3
2. Qualifying for the Protection of the First Sale Doctrine

p. 813 – insert after note 5
3. The Scope of the § 109 Exception

p. 819: Replace Note 3 with the following
4. Importation

pp. 820-830 – replace the opinion in Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’Anza
Research International, Inc. and the notes thereafter with the following
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
D. Music and the First Three Exclusive Rights
2. Section 114(b) and Sampling
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p. 843 – substitute for the fourth sentence in the second paragraph
pp. 857-867 – replace the opinion in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films and
the notes following that opinion with the following

VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone
E. Protecting Integrity and Attribution: “Moral Rights” and the Visual Artists
Rights Act
p. 881 – Insert After Note 1
p. 891 – add the following before Note 2 “Does VARA Protect Artists or Copies of
Works of Art?
Chapter 12: Public Performance and Display Rights
A. When is A Performance or Display “Public”?
p. 904 – insert after note 5
p. 905 – insert the following after note 7
p. 905 – replace the current note 9 with the following
p. 906 – insert after the end of note 10

American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.
D. Performing Rights Organizations
p. 946 – insert after Note 3
p. 960 – insert before “Epilogue: What is the Future of the Exclusive Rights?”
F. State-Law Public Performance Rights for pre-1972 Sound Recordings
Chapter 13: Remedies
A. Damages: Compensation and Restitution
1. Actual Damages

p. 968 – insert after Note 3
2. Profits
p. 980 – Insert after Note 3
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C. Attorneys’ Fees
p. 994-1000 – Replace Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West Publishing Co. and the
accompanying notes with the following

Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Chapter 14: Invoking Judicial Power: Jurisdiction, Venue, Standing, Limitations, Preemption,
Choice of Law and Related Issues
B. Plaintiff Issues: Standing, Registration and Recordation
p. 1037 – an update to “Copyright in the Real World: A Copyright Litigation
Entrepreneur Runs Up Against Standing Rules”
D. Limitation on Actions and General Equitable Defenses
p. 1060 – insert after end of note 6
p. 1072 – replace Note 2 with the following
F. Preemption
p. 1072 – replace Note 2 with the following
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Brief Guide to Supplement Inserts
Because this Cumulative Supplement is a long document containing several years of
updates, we thought it would be useful to provide a brief guide to the inserts that it contains,
particularly highlighting the inserts that are intended to replace materials in the main volume,
and the inserts providing new material that is substantial enough to require accommodation in
reading assignments and class time.
Chapter 1 Introductions
The two inserts for this chapter – a description of the Restatement of Copyright project and an
update on copyright treaties – are not long and can likely be assigned with the material in the casebook
that they supplement.

Chapter 2 The Basic Hurdles of Copyright Protection
The main insert of this chapter is an entirely new section of Chapter 2 that explores
whether the concept of “work of authorship,” and the categories of works of authorship
enumerated in § 102, are limitations on copyrightable subject matter independent of the
requirements of fixation and originality. The principal case in this new section is Garcia v. Google;
the majority and dissenting opinions in that case occupy 14 pages, and the notes after the case
occupy 7 more pages. Thus, this section could easily be the reading for a 50-minute class
session, and maybe even a 75-minute class session.
Chapter 3 Fundamental Exceptions to Copyright Protection
Most of the inserts for this chapter are relatively short updates about new cases. The one
somewhat longer insert is a four-and-a-half page note on Application Programming Interfaces
(APIs) that includes a discussion of the Google v. Oracle case. There are also two new
“Copyright in the Real World” features – one on copyright and yoga, and one on copyright in
public sculptures.
Chapter 4 Proving Infringement of the Reproduction Right
There is only one short insert for this chapter, which is on the topic of disposing of the
issue of substantial similarity on a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.
Chapter 5 Fair Use
The most substantial insert for this chapter is the new principal case of Authors Guild v.
Google. The Second Circuit opinion represents a recent summation of the doctrine of
transformative use by the man who coined that term, Judge Pierre Leval. Most syllabi would
likely substitute this case for Perfect 10 v. Amazon case in the main volume, and not include them
both. Another more substantial insert is a new note to be added on p. 343 after the Princeton
University Press case, on the Georgia State Intranet litigation – a more modern version of the

Fall 2016 Supplement

10

“course packs” at issue in Princeton University Press.
Chapter 6 Enforcement and Protection Strategies
The most prominent insert for this chapter is the Second Circuit opinion in Viacom
International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., on the § 512 ISP safe harbors, which should replace the District
Court opinion in the same case that is in the main volume of the casebook. This insert includes
substantially revised and expanded notes after the Viacom opinion; together, the opinion and
notes provide 31 pages of reading, likely sufficient material for at least a 75-minute class. The
other notes are reasonably brief updates, including an update to the “Copyright in the Real
World” feature on “Unlocking Your Mobile Phone” on page 449.
Chapter 7: The 1909 Act Framework and Its Partial Persistence: Of Publication, Notice, Deposit and
Registration
The only major insert for this chapter is the replacement of the District Court opinion in the
Alaska Stock case with the Ninth Circuit’s opinion reversing the District Court. The District
Court opinion was dramatic, because it invalidated Alaska Stock’s registrations on the ground
that the registration applications contained neither the names of the authors nor the titles of
most of the photographs being registered. The Ninth Circuit holds that the registrations are
valid in spite of that lack of information. The result is somewhat less dramatic, and some
professors may therefore choose to skip this case. Others may think that it continues to provide
a good prompt for discussion of why we should or should not encourage registration, and what
the goals of a registration system should be.
Chapter 8: Initial Ownership of Copyright
The principal case added in this chapter is Greene v. Ablon. Greene is a case about joint
authorship. In addition to applying the standards for determining whether someone is a joint
author, it explores the relationship between derivative works and joint authorship (because one
of the co-authors wrote a book of which the co-authored work at issue is derivative), and it also
gets into the details of an action for an accounting between co-owners, which none of the other
cases does. It therefore is not really a substitute for any of the existing cases in the casebook.
However, at least one of us has been inclined to use Greene in place of Gaiman v. Macfarlane. Gaiman
may be a little trickier and slipperier than it’s worth, because it involves Judge Posner opining
that contributions by joint authors don’t always have to be independently copyrightable in a
case in which the contributions probably were independently copyrightable, and it is also
framed as a dispute over who owns copyright, not in works, but in characters.
Chapter 9: Transactions
There are no inserts for Chapter 9.
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Chapter 10: Copyright Duration and Related Limitations on Transfer
There are two brief inserts for Chapter 10, including an updated replacement note on SameSex Couples and Terminations of Transfers.
Chapter 11: The Reproduction, Distribution, and Adaptation Rights, and the Visual Artists Rights Act
There are two new principal cases in the inserts for Chapter 11, each intended to replace
a case in the casebook. The first, for the part of the chapter about importation and the
distribution right, is Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, the Supreme Court case holding that copyright
is subject to international exhaustion. That is intended to replace the Supreme Court’s earlier
opinion in Quality King Distributors, which is on p. 820 of the main volume. The second is in the
part of the chapter discussing music and the first three exclusive rights. The Ninth Circuit’s
opinion in VMG Salsoul v. Ciccone is intended to replace the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Bridgeport
Music. Inc. v. Dimension Films, on p. 857 of the main volume. The Sixth Circuit had held that
infringement of sound recordings was not subject to a de minimis exception; the Ninth Circuit
holds the opposite, but with a dissent.
The insert for p. 813 has additional notes on “digital first sale” cases, including the ReDigi
case in the U.S. and the Usedsoft case in Germany. The insert for p. 819 covers the cases that held
that the California Resale Royalty Act is unconstitutional. And the inserts for pp. 881 and 891
cover recent VARA cases.
Chapter 12: Public Performance and Display Rights
The new principal case in Chapter 12 is ABC v. Aereo, the 2014 Supreme Court case that holds
that Aereo’s service, which provided over-the-air television programming to subscribers via the
Internet, involved public performances. This is a factually and legally complicated case, and the
edited majority and dissenting opinions take up 20 pages, with another 5 pages of notes. You
may find it difficult to cover the Fermata and Cablevision cases in the main volume, and then Aereo
in the supplement. One alternative would be to skip Cablevision, which like Aereo is a Transmit
Clause case, and cover Fermata, a relatively simple case which makes the point that a
performance in a “private” club can still be a public performance within the meaning of the
Copyright Act because the members of the club are not merely a family and its circle of friends,
and then Aereo. Alternatively, if you are confident that students will understand the point made
in Fermata without a full case discussion, then you could cover Cablevision and Fermata, and focus
the entire discussion of public performance on the most complicated and most economically
significant performances, namely, transmissions. It is likely that you will have already covered
the facts of Cablevision when discussing fixation, and so the facts shouldn’t take as long the
second time around.
The second most substantial insert for Chapter 12 is a new five-page part, 12.F., on state-law
public performance rights in pre-1972 sound recordings. There has been a lot of litigation in that
area over the last several years, and developments continued in 2016 and 2016. There are also
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two new “Copyright in the Real World” features, including an especially topical feature on use
of music by political campaigns, and a feature on cable and satellite TV payment for distribution
of broadcast programs, and there are a number of brief updates in other areas.
Chapter 13: Remedies
The new principal case for this chapter is the Supreme Court’s 2016 opinion in Kirtsaeng v.
John Wiley & Sons – its decision on attorneys’ fees in that case, after its 2014 decision on the issue
of importation and copyright exhaustion. It is a relatively short opinion – 7 pages – followed by
three pages of notes, and it intended to replace the case on attorneys’ fees in the main volume,
the Second Circuit’s decision in Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publishing Co. Two brief notes about
other new cases round out the inserts for this chapter.
Chapter 14: Invoking Judicial Power: Jurisdiction, Venue, Standing, Limitations, Preemption, Choice of Law
and Related Issues
The inserts for this chapter consist of three relatively brief updates. The most substantial
is a note on the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Petrella v. MGM that the equitable defense of
laches cannot apply during the Copyright Act’s three-year statutory limitations period. There is
also an updated note on Copyright Act preemption of state-law rights of publicity, and a very
brief update to the “Copyright in the Real World” feature on copyright trolls and standing.

13
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Chapter 1 Introductions
A. The Current Legal Framework
p. 8 – Insert above “B. Theoretical Frameworks”
3. Judge-Made Copyright Law and a Restatement of the
Law of Copyright.
Although copyright law has been governed by a federal
statutory scheme since 1790, many copyright doctrines cannot be
found anywhere in the statutory text. Rather, they have been
developed over time by courts, just as the law has in traditional
“common law” areas such as contracts or torts. For example, the basic
standard for copyright infringement, “substantial similarity,” has been
developed by courts and never codified. Similarly, the standards for
secondary liability for copyright infringement have been developed by
courts and cannot be found anywhere in the Copyright Act. Until
1976, the doctrine of “fair use” had also been developed entirely by
courts; only in the Copyright Act of 1976 was it explicitly mentioned
in a statutory provision, and the legislative history of that provision
suggests that Congress anticipated that courts would continue to
develop the doctrine. Thus, copyright law has always had, and
continues to have, important areas of doctrine subject to common law
development.
Many fields of law that have an important common-law
component have been the subject of “Restatements of the Law,”
published by the American Law Institute, which attempt to organize
doctrine that has been developed in many individual judicial opinions
over long periods of time. Copyright, being primarily statutory in
nature, has never been covered by a Restatement. However, in 2014,
Professor Ann Bartow of Pace Law School proposed a Restatement of
the Law of Copyright, see, Ann Bartow, A Restatement of Copyright Law as
More Independent and Stable Treatise, 79 Brook. L. Rev. 457 (2014). In early
2015 the ALI accepted the suggestion and designated Professor
Christopher Jon Sprigman of NYU to serve as Reporter (or principal
author). Four other full-time academics were named as Associate
Reporters, and a large group of other ALI members, including judges,
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government officials and practicing attorneys have been designated as
Advisers. The various trade associations for the major copyright
industries, such as the Motion Picture Association of America, the
Recording Industry Associate of America, National Press
Photographers Association, and The Authors Guild all have
representation on the Advisory Committee, as do companies such as
Google, Microsoft, IBM and Time Warner.
Many have criticized the more recent Restatements as being
more prescriptive than descriptive. See, e.g., Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S.Ct.
1042 (2015) (Scalia, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The
object of the original Restatements was ‘to present an orderly
statement of the general common law.’ Restatement of Conflict of Laws,
Introduction, p. viii (1934). Over time, the Restatements' authors have
abandoned the mission of describing the law, and have chosen instead
to set forth their aspirations for what the law ought to be. . . . [I]t
cannot safely be assumed, without further inquiry, that a Restatement
provision describes rather than revises current law.”). Some have
already expressed the concern that this will be the case with the
forthcoming Restatement of Copyright. See, e.g., Glenn G. Lammi, Will
The American Law Institute 'Restate' Or Try To Rewrite U.S. Copyright Law?
Forbes,
April
28,
2015,
(http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2015/04/28/will-the-american-lawinstitute-restate-or-try-to-rewrite-u-s-copyright-law/). It will likely
be several years before work on this new Restatement is complete and
it will only be in the early years of the next decade that we will learn
whether courts find it helpful. In the interim, Congress may
undertake a general revision of the copyright statute, making the
status of the project even more complicated. Nonetheless, those of
you who may practice copyright law would be well advised to be on
the lookout for the new Restatement.

C. The International Context of U.S. Copyright Law
p. 32 – Replace the paragraph on the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement (ACTA) with the following:
The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)
(concluded 2011, not yet in force). In spite of its name, ACTA
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includes copyright as well as trademark provisions. Those provisions
do not affect substantive copyright law, however, but rather focus on
enforcement issues. ACTA would be administered independently of
any existing international organization. As of this writing, it has been
signed by 31 states, including the European Union, but ratified by only
one, Japan. Article 40 of ACTA provides that it will enter into force
when six states have ratified it. Whether six states ever will ratify it is
currently in doubt. Many nongovernmental organizations have
opposed ACTA. In early 2012, there were widespread protests against
ACTA in many European cities, and beginning on January 21 – two
days after the Google and Wikipedia blackouts protesting the Stop
Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Protect IP Act (PIPA) in the United
States – there were denial-of-service attacks on a number of Polish
government websites after Poland announced that it would sign
ACTA. Opposition was directed both to the secrecy of the ACTA
negotiations, and to the substantive provisions of the treaty, which
opponents feared would threaten freedom of expression and privacy.
On July 4, 2012, the European Parliament declined to consent to
ACTA, effectively rejecting it, and halting progress on ratification.
The Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances
(concluded 2012, not yet in force) The WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), concluded in 1996, covered only purely
aural performances fixed in phonograms (fixations of sound without
any visual accompaniment), because negotiators couldn’t agree on
provisions regarding performances that became part of audiovisual
works. Fourteen years later, on June 26, 2012, a treaty covering
audiovisual performances was concluded in Beijing. The Beijing
Treaty on Audiovisual Performances is modeled on the WPPT, and
most of the provisions are the same. For example, both treaties
obligate parties to grant four kinds of economic rights in fixed
performances, namely, rights of reproduction, distribution, rental, and
making available, and three kinds of economic rights in unfixed
performances, namely, the right of broadcasting (except in the case of
rebroadcasting), the right of communication to the public (except
where the performance in a broadcast performance), and the right of
fixation.
Both the WPPT and the Beijing Treaty obligate parties to grant
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moral rights to performers, but the Beijing Treaty is accompanied by
an agreed statement that indicates that “modifications of a
performance that are made in the normal course of exploitation of the
performance, such as editing, compression, dubbing, or formatting, in
existing or new media or formats, and that are made in the course of a
use authorized by the performer, would not in themselves amount to
modifications” that would infringe a performer’s right to integrity.
Both the WPPT and the Beijing Treaty obligate parties to protect
against the circumvention of technological measures, but the Beijing
Treaty is accompanied by an agreed statement that indicates that
parties “to ensure that a beneficiary may enjoy limitations and
exceptions provided in that Contracting Party's national law [and that
are allowed by the Beijing Treaty] where technological measures have
been applied to an audiovisual performance and the beneficiary has
legal access to that performance . . .”
The Beijing Treaty has not yet entered into force; it will enter
into force three months after 30 eligible parties have deposited their
instruments of ratification or accession. See Beijing Treaty, Article 26.
The Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published
Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or
Otherwise Print Disabled (concluded 2013; not yet in force) On
June 27, 2013, a treaty negotiated under the auspices of WIPO and
popularly known as the “Marrakesh VIP Treaty” was concluded in
Marrakesh, Morocco. It is notable as the first treaty ever to require an
exception to or limitation on copyright, as opposed to requiring
minimum standards of protection. The need underlying the treaty is
acute. The World Health Organization has estimated that there are
about 285 million visually impaired people in the world 90% of whom
live in developing countries. See World Health Organization, Visual
Impairment and Blindness, Fact Sheet No. 282, available at
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs282/en/ (last visited
May 12, 2014). Only about 5% of books are published in formats
accessible to the visually impaired. See Judith Sullivan, Study on
Copyright Limitations and Exceptions for the Visually Impaired,
WIPO Document SCCR/15/7 (February 20, 2007), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_15/sccr_15_7.doc
(last visited May 12, 2014).
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Although some wanted the treaty to cover audiovisual works,
the treaty as concluded covers only works consisting of “text, notation
and/or related illustrations” – essentially, print works – that are
published or otherwise made publicly available in any media. See
Marrakesh VIP Treaty, Art.2(a). The treaty defines its beneficiaries as
persons who are blind; who have visual impairments or perceptual or
reading disabilities that render them unable to read printed works to
the same degree as those who don’t have such impairments or
disabilities; or who are otherwise unable, due to physical disabilities,
to hold or manipulate books or focus or move their eyes to the extent
that would be normally acceptable for reading. Marrakesh VIP Treaty,
Article 3.
The treaty has two main operative provisions. The first
requires parties to adopt limitations and exceptions to copyright, as
further defined in the treaty, to facilitate access by treaty beneficiaries
to formats of works that are accessible to them. Marrakesh VIP
Treaty, Article 4. The second requires parties to allow cross-border
exchange of accessible-format copies, so that an accessible-format
copy made in one country could be sent to and used in another
country. Marrakesh VIP Treaty, Article 5. Importantly, “accessible
format” is understood to include, not only formats that are specialized
for visually impaired use, such as braille, and audio generated by
synthetic voice technology, but also commercially available
audiobooks. The treaty has not yet entered into force; it will enter into
force three months after 20 eligible parties have deposited their
instruments of ratification or accession. See Marrakesh VIP Treaty,
Article 18.
Opinion among WIPO members on whether there should be
other treaties requiring exceptions and limitations is sharply divided.
WIPO’s Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights has
had some discussion about possible exceptions and limitations to
benefit libraries, archives, and educational and research institutions,
but little progress has been made in those discussions.
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Chapter 2 The Basic Hurdles of Copyright Protection
p. 70 – Replace Note 1 with the following:
1. Words and Short Phrases: Not Original? The Prunté case
repeatedly invokes the principle that single words and short
phrases cannot be protected by copyright. In most cases, this
principle can be easily explained: words and short phrases are
usually not “original” – they either were not independently created,
or lack the modicum of creativity required for copyright protection.
The titles of books and movies also typically fall under this rule. See,
e.g., Becker v. Loew’s, Inc, 133 F.2d 889, 891 (7th Cir. 1943) (book
title We Who Are Young not infringed by use of identical title for
movie because “it is well settled that the copyright of a book or play
does not give the copyright owner the exclusive right to the use of
the title”). Yet is it inevitably the case that words and short phrases
lack a modicum of creativity? If the phrase “fire in the hole” is
insufficiently creative to sustain a copyright, what about the phrase
“E.T. phone home” or “Look! . . . Up in the sky! . . . It’s a bird! . . . It’s
a plane! . . . It’s Superman!”? What about neologisms – newly
created words – that manage to capture some phenomenon that
previously had no name? Consider words like “heteroflexible,”
http://www.wordspy.com/index.php?word=heteroflexible,
“misogynoir,”
http://www.wordspy.com/index.php?word=misogynoir,
or
“procaffeinating,”
http://www.wordspy.com/index.php?word=procaffinating . Can
we really say that these newly coined words do not exhibit even a
modicum of creativity? We will consider an alternative rationale –
that the words, although creative, do not amount to “works of
authorship” – below in Chapter II.C.

p. 96 – insert the following after “Language Note: Distinguishing
Between Derivative Works, Collective Works, and Compilations”:

C. “Work of Authorship” and the Enumerated Categories
Thereof: Independent Limitations on Copyrightable Subject
Matter?
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Section 102(a) begins by stating that “copyright subsists . . . in
original works of authorship, fixed in a tangible medium of expression
. . . .” So far, we have considered §102(a) as if it can be reduced to two
requirements: fixation and originality. And indeed, most courts focus
on these two requirements. Yet § 102(a) also recognizes protection
only for “works,” and lists eight specific categories of works that are
protected. To what extent does that language further limit the scope
of copyrightable subject matter?

Garcia v. Google, Inc.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 2015
(on rehearing en banc)
786 F.3d 783
McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:
In this case, a heartfelt plea for personal protection is
juxtaposed with the limits of copyright law and fundamental
principles of free speech. The appeal teaches a simple lesson—a weak
copyright claim cannot justify censorship in the guise of authorship.
By all accounts, Cindy Lee Garcia was bamboozled when a
movie producer transformed her five-second acting performance into
part of a blasphemous video proclamation against the Prophet
Mohammed. The producer—now in jail on unrelated matters—
uploaded a trailer of the film, Innocence of Muslims, to YouTube. Millions
of viewers soon watched it online, according to Garcia. News outlets
credited the film as a source of violence in the Middle East. Garcia
received death threats.
Asserting that she holds a copyright interest in her fleeting
performance, Garcia sought a preliminary injunction requiring Google
to remove the film from all of its platforms, including YouTube. The
district court denied the injunction, finding that Garcia did not
establish likely success on the merits for her copyright claim. Nor did
she demonstrate that the injunction would prevent any alleged harm
in light of the film’s five-month presence on the Internet. A divided
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panel of our court reversed, labeled her copyright claim as “fairly
debatable,” but then entered a mandatory injunction requiring Google
to remove the film. That injunction was later limited to versions of the
film featuring Garcia’s performance.
As Garcia characterizes it, “the main issue in this case involves
the vicious frenzy against Ms. Garcia that the Film caused among
certain radical elements of the Muslim community.” We are
sympathetic to her plight. Nonetheless, the claim against Google is
grounded in copyright law, not privacy, emotional distress, or tort
law, and Garcia seeks to impose speech restrictions under copyright
laws meant to foster rather than repress free expression. Garcia’s
theory can be likened to “copyright cherry picking,” which would
enable any contributor from a costume designer down to an extra or
best boy to claim copyright in random bits and pieces of a unitary
motion picture without satisfying the requirements of the Copyright
Act. Putting aside the rhetoric of Hollywood hijinks and the dissent’s
dramatics, this case must be decided on the law.
In light of the Copyright Act’s requirements of an “original
work[ ] of authorship fixed in any tangible medium,” 17 U.S.C. §
102(a), the mismatch between Garcia’s copyright claim and the relief
sought, and the Copyright Office’s rejection of Garcia’s application for
a copyright in her brief performance, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Garcia’s request for the
preliminary injunction. As a consequence, the panel’s mandatory
injunction against Google was unjustified and is dissolved upon
publication of this opinion.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In July 2011, Cindy Lee Garcia responded to a casting call for a
film titled Desert Warrior, an action-adventure thriller set in ancient
Arabia. Garcia was cast in a cameo role, for which she earned $500.
She received and reviewed a few pages of script. Acting under a
professional director hired to oversee production, Garcia spoke two
sentences: “Is George crazy? Our daughter is but a child?” Her role was
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to deliver those lines and to “seem[ ] concerned.”
Garcia later discovered that writer-director Mark Basseley
Youssef (a.k.a. Nakoula Basseley Nakoula or Sam Bacile) had a
different film in mind: an anti-Islam polemic renamed Innocence of
Muslims. The film, featuring a crude production, depicts the Prophet
Mohammed as, among other things, a murderer, pedophile, and
homosexual. Film producers dubbed over Garcia’s lines and replaced
them with a voice asking, “Is your Mohammed a child molester?”
Garcia appears on screen for only five seconds.
Almost a year after the casting call, in June 2012, Youssef
uploaded a 13–minute–and–51–second trailer of Innocence of Muslims to
YouTube, the video-sharing website owned by Google, Inc ., which
boasts a global audience of more than one billion visitors per month.
After it was translated into Arabic, the film fomented outrage across
the Middle East, and media reports linked it to numerous violent
protests. The film also has been a subject of political controversy over
its purported connection to the September 11, 2012, attack on the
United States Consulate in Benghazi, Libya.
Shortly after the Benghazi attack, an Egyptian cleric issued a
fatwa against anyone associated with Innocence of Muslims, calling upon
the “Muslim Youth in America[ ] and Europe” to “kill the director, the
producer[,] and the actors and everyone who helped and promoted
this film.” Garcia received multiple death threats.
. . . [Garcia] filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Central District of California and . . . named Google and Youssef as
codefendants. Garcia alleged copyright infringement against both
defendants and revived her state law claims against Youssef for fraud,
unfair business practices, libel, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
Garcia then moved for a temporary restraining order and for an
order to show cause on a preliminary injunction—but only on the
copyright claim. She sought to bar Google from hosting Innocence of
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Muslims on YouTube or any other Google-run website.
On November 30, 2012, the district court denied Garcia’s
motion for a preliminary injunction. * * *
A divided panel of our court reversed. * * *.
* * *
We granted rehearing en banc. Garcia v. Google, Inc., 771 F.3d 647
(9th Cir.2014).
ANALYSIS
Garcia sued under a slew of legal theories, but she moved for a
preliminary injunction on just one of them: the copyright claim.
Hence, copyright is the only basis for the appeal. * * *
A. COPYRIGHT
The central question is whether the law and facts clearly favor
Garcia’s claim to a copyright in her five-second acting performance as
it appears in Innocence of Muslims. The answer is no. This conclusion
does not mean that a plaintiff like Garcia is without options or that
she couldn’t have sought an injunction against different parties or on
other legal theories, like the right of publicity and defamation.
Under the Copyright Act, “[c]opyright protection subsists ... in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression ... [including] motion pictures.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). That
fixation must be done “by or under the authority of the author.” 17
U.S.C. § 101. Benchmarked against this statutory standard, the law
does not clearly favor Garcia’s position.
The statute purposefully left “works of authorship” undefined
to provide for some flexibility. See 1 Nimmer on Copyright § 2.03.
Nevertheless, several other provisions provide useful guidance. An
audiovisual work is one that consists of “a series of related images
which are intrinsically intended to be shown” by machines or other
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electronic equipment, plus “accompanying sounds.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. In
turn, a “motion picture” is an “audiovisual work[ ] consisting of a
series of related images which, when shown in succession, impart an
impression of motion, together with accompanying sounds, if any.” Id.
These two definitions embody the work here: Innocence of Muslims is an
audiovisual work that is categorized as a motion picture and is
derivative of the script. Garcia is the author of none of this and makes
no copyright claim to the film or to the script.6 Instead, Garcia claims
that her five-second performance itself merits copyright protection.
In the face of this statutory scheme, it comes as no surprise
that during this litigation, the Copyright Office found that Garcia’s
performance was not a copyrightable work when it rejected her
copyright application. The Copyright Office
Go Online
explained that its “longstanding practices do
To see the entire
not allow a copyright claim by an individual Copyright Office letter
actor or actress in his or her performance rejecting Ms. Garcia’s
contained within a motion picture.” Thus, application to register a
claim of copyright in her
“[f]or copyright registration purposes, a
performance, click here.
motion picture is a single integrated work. . .
. Assuming Ms. Garcia’s contribution was
limited to her acting performance, we cannot register her performance
apart from the motion picture.”
We credit this expert opinion of the Copyright Office—the
office charged with administration and enforcement of the copyright
laws and registration. * * *
In analyzing whether the law clearly favors Garcia,
Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir.2000), provides a useful
foundation. There, we examined the meaning of “work” as the first
step in analyzing joint authorship of the movie Malcolm X. The
In another odd twist, one of Garcia’s primary objections rests on the words falsely
attributed to her via dubbing. But she cannot claim copyright in words she neither
authored nor spoke. That leaves Garcia with a legitimate and serious beef, though not
one that can be vindicated under the rubric of copyright.
6

Fall 2016 Supplement

24

Copyright Act provides that when a work is “prepared by two or more
authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into
inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole,” the work
becomes a “joint work” with two or more authors. 17 U.S.C. § 101
(emphasis added). Garcia unequivocally disclaims joint authorship of
the film.
In Aalmuhammed, we concluded that defining a “work” based
upon “some minimal level of creativity or originality ... would be too
broad and indeterminate to be useful.” Our animating concern was
that this definition of “work” would fragment copyright protection for
the unitary film Malcolm X into many little pieces:
So many people might qualify as an “author” if the
question were limited to whether they made a
substantial creative contribution that that test
would not distinguish one from another. Everyone
from the producer and director to casting director,
costumer, hairstylist, and “best boy” gets listed in
the movie credits because all of their creative
contributions really do matter.
Id.
Garcia’s theory of copyright law would result in the legal
morass we warned against in Aalmuhammed—splintering a movie into
many different “works,” even in the absence of an independent
fixation. Simply put, as Google claimed, it “make[s] Swiss cheese of
copyrights.”
Take, for example, films with a large cast—the proverbial “cast
of thousands”—such as Ben–Hur or Lord of the Rings. The silent epic Ben–
Hur advertised a cast of 125,000 people. In the Lord of the Rings trilogy,
20,000 extras tramped around Middle–Earth alongside Frodo Baggins
(played by Elijah Wood). Treating every acting performance as an
independent work would not only be a logistical and financial
nightmare, it would turn cast of thousands into a new mantra:
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copyright of thousands.
The dissent spins speculative hypotheticals about copyright
protection for book chapters, movie outtakes, baseball games, and Jimi
Hendrix concerts.. This hyperbole sounds a false alarm. Substituting
moral outrage and colorful language for legal analysis, the dissent
mixes and matches copyright concepts such as collective works,
derivative works, the requirement of fixation, and sound recordings.
The statutory definitions and their application counsel precision, not
convolution. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103, 114, 201. The citation to Effects
Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir.1990) (Kozinski, J.), is
particularly puzzling. There, neither party disputed the plaintiff’s
copyright, and the plaintiff independently fixed the special-effects
footage and licensed it to the filmmakers.
The reality is that contracts and the work-made-for-hire
doctrine govern much of the big-budget Hollywood performance and
production world. See 1 Nimmer on Copyright § 6.07[B][2]. Absent
these formalities, courts have looked to implied licenses. See Effects
Assocs., 908 F.2d at 559–60. Indeed, the district court found that Garcia
granted Youssef just such an implied license to incorporate her
performance into the film. But these legal niceties do not necessarily
dictate whether something is protected by copyright, and licensing
has its limitations. As filmmakers warn, low-budget films rarely use
licenses. Even if filmmakers diligently obtain licenses for everyone on
set, the contracts are not a panacea. Third-party content distributors,
like YouTube and Netflix, won’t have easy access to the licenses;
litigants may dispute their terms and scope; and actors and other
content contributors can terminate licenses after thirty five years. See
17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3). Untangling the complex, difficult-to-access, and
often phantom chain of title to tens, hundreds, or even thousands of
standalone copyrights is a task that could tie the distribution chain in
knots. And filming group scenes like a public parade, or the 1963
March on Washington, would pose a huge burden if each of the
thousands of marchers could claim an independent copyright.
Garcia’s copyright claim faces yet another statutory barrier:
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She never fixed her acting performance in a tangible medium, as
required by 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of
expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under
the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it
to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period
of more than transitory duration.”) (emphasis added). According to
the Supreme Court, “the author is the party who actually creates the
work, that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible
expression entitled to copyright protection.” Cmty. for Creative Non–
Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737, 109 S.Ct. 2166, 104 L.Ed.2d 811 (1989).
Garcia did nothing of the sort.13
For better or for worse, Youssef and his crew “fixed” Garcia’s
performance in the tangible medium, whether in physical film or in
digital form. However one might characterize Garcia’s performance,
she played no role in fixation. On top of this, Garcia claims that she
never agreed to the film’s ultimate rendition or how she was portrayed
in Innocence of Muslims, so she can hardly argue that the film or her
cameo in it was fixed “by or under [her] authority.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.
In sum, the district court committed no error in its copyright
analysis. Issuance of the mandatory preliminary injunction requires
more than a possible or fairly debatable claim; it requires a showing
that the law “clearly favor [s]” Garcia. See Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1320.
Because neither the Copyright Act nor the Copyright Office’s
interpretation supports Garcia’s claim, this is a hurdle she cannot
clear.
****
CONCLUSION
The Copyright Office draws a distinction between acting performances like Garcia’s,
which are intended to be an inseparable part of an integrated film, and standalone works
that are separately fixed and incorporated into a film. We in no way foreclose copyright
protection for the latter—any “discrete work in itself that is later incorporated into a
motion picture,” as the Copyright Office put it. See Effects Assocs., 908 F.2d at 558–59
(recognizing independent copyrightability of special effects footage incorporated into
film).
13
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At this stage of the proceedings, we have no reason to question
Garcia’s claims that she was duped by an unscrupulous filmmaker and
has suffered greatly from her disastrous association with the Innocence
of Muslims film. Nonetheless, the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it denied Garcia’s motion for a preliminary injunction
under the copyright laws.
AFFIRMED.
****
KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Garcia’s dramatic performance met all of the requirements for
copyright protection: It was copyrightable subject matter, it was
original and it was fixed at the moment it was recorded. So what
happened to the copyright? At times, the majority says that Garcia’s
performance was not copyrightable at all. And at other times, it seems
to say that Garcia just didn’t do enough to gain a copyright in the
scene. Either way, the majority is wrong and makes a total mess of
copyright law, right here in the Hollywood Circuit. In its haste to take
internet service providers off the hook for infringement, the court
today robs performers and other creative talent of rights Congress
gave them. I won’t be a party to it.
I
Youssef handed Garcia a script. Garcia performed it. Youssef
recorded Garcia’s performance on video and saved the clip. Until
today, I understood that the rights in such a performance are
determined according to elementary copyright principles: An “original
work[ ] of authorship,” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), requires only copyrightable
subject matter and a “minimal degree of creativity.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 113 L.Ed.2d 358
(1991). The work is “fixed” when it is “sufficiently permanent or stable
to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated
for a period of more than transitory duration.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. And at
that moment, the “author or authors of the work” instantly and
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automatically acquire a copyright interest in it. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a). This
isn’t exactly String Theory; more like Copyright 101.
Garcia’s performance met these minimal requirements; the
majority doesn’t contend otherwise. The majority nevertheless holds
that Garcia’s performance isn’t a “work,” apparently because it was
created during the production of a later-assembled film, Innocence of
Muslims.. But if you say something is not a work, it means that it isn’t
copyrightable by anyone. Under the majority’s definition of “work,” no
one (not even Youssef) can claim a copyright in any part of Garcia’s
performance, even though it was recorded several months before
Innocence of Muslims was assembled. Instead, Innocence of Muslims—the
ultimate film—is the only thing that can be a “work.” If this is what
my colleagues are saying, they are casting doubt on the
copyrightability of vast swaths of material created during production
of a film or other composite work.
The implications are daunting. If Garcia’s scene is not a work,
then every take of every scene of, say, Lord of the Rings is not a work, and
thus not protected by copyright, unless and until the clips become
part of the final movie. If some dastardly crew member were to run off
with a copy of the Battle of Morannon, the dastard would be free to
display it for profit until it was made part of the final movie. And, of
course, the take-outs, the alternative scenes, the special effects never
used, all of those things would be fair game because none of these
things would be “works” under the majority’s definition. And what
about a draft chapter of a novel? Is there no copyright in the draft
chapter unless it gets included in the published book? Or if part of the
draft gets included, is there no copyright in the rest of it?
This is a remarkable proposition, for which the majority
provides remarkably little authority. Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227
(9th Cir.2000), the only case that the majority cites, says just the
opposite. In Aalmuhammed, we considered a claim by a contributor to
the movie Malcolm X that he was a joint author of the entire movie.
Everyone in Aalmuhammed agreed that the relevant “work” was Malcolm
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X. The only question was whether the contributor was a joint author
of that work. We went out of our way to emphasize that joint
authorship of a movie is a “different question” from whether a
contribution to the movie can be a “work” under section 102(a). And
we clearly stated that a contribution to a movie can be copyrightable
(and thus can be a “work”).
The majority’s newfangled definition of “work” is directly
contrary to a quarter-century-old precedent that has never been
questioned, Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir.1990).
There, we held that a company that created special effects footage
during film production retained a copyright interest in the footage
even though it became part of the film. The majority tries to
distinguish Effects Associates by arguing that the footage there was a
“standalone work[ ] that [was] separately fixed and incorporated into
a film.” But Garcia’s performance was also “separately fixed and
incorporated into” Innocence of Muslims. Why then are the seven shots
“featuring great gobs of alien yogurt oozing out of a defunct factory”
interspersed in The Stuff, any more a “standalone work” than Garcia’s
performance? Youssef wasn’t required to use any part of Garcia’s
performance in the film; he could have sold the video clip to someone
else. The clip might not have had much commercial value, but neither
did the special effects scenes in Effects Associates. Nothing in the
Copyright Act says that special effects scenes are “works” entitled to
copyright protection but other scenes are not. And what about scenes
that have actors and special effects? Are those scenes entitled to
copyright protection (as in Effects Associates ), or are they denied
copyright protection like Garcia’s scene?
II
A.
The majority also seems to hold that Garcia is not entitled to
copyright protection because she is not an author of the recorded
scene. According to the majority, Garcia can’t be an author of her own
scene because she “played no role in [her performance’s] fixation.”.
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But a performer need not operate the recording equipment to
be an author of his own performance. See H.R.Rep. No. 94–1476, at 56
(1976); S.Rep. No. 94–473, at 53–54 (1975); see also 1 Nimmer on Copyright
§ 2.10[A][3] at 2–178.4 to 2–178.5. Without Garcia’s performance, all
that existed was a script. To convert the script into a video, there
needed to be both an actor physically performing it and filmmakers
recording the performance. Both kinds of activities can result in
copyrightable expression. See 1 Nimmer on Copyright § 2.09[F] at 2–165 to
2–171 (discussing Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir.1986)). Garcia’s performance had at least
“some minimal degree of creativity” apart from the script and Youssef’s
direction.. One’s “[p]ersonality always contains something unique. It
expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade
of art has in it something which is one man’s alone.” Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250, 23 S.Ct. 298, 47 L.Ed. 460
(1903). To dispute this is to claim that Gone With the Wind would be the
same movie if Rhett Butler were played by Peter Lorre.
Actors usually sign away their rights when contracting to do a
movie, but Garcia didn’t and she wasn’t Youssef’s employee. I’d
therefore find that Garcia acquired a copyright in her performance the
moment it was fixed. When dealing with material created during
production of a film or other composite work, the absence of a
contract always complicates things. See Effects Associates, 908 F.2d at
556 (“Moviemakers do lunch, not contracts.”). Without a contract the
parties are left with whatever rights the copyright law gives them. It’s
not our job to take away from performers rights Congress gave them.
Did Jimi Hendrix acquire no copyright in the recordings of his
concerts because he didn’t run the recorder in addition to playing the
guitar? Garcia may not be as talented as Hendrix—who is?—but she’s
no less entitled to the protections of the Copyright Act.
B.
* * *
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The Copyright Office’s position is thus inconsistent at best.
And, in any event, neither the Copyright Office’s reasoning nor the
authority it relies on in its letter to Garcia fare any better than the
majority’s. The Copyright Office would refuse copyright registration
to an actor like Garcia because “an actor or an actress in a motion
picture is either a joint author in the entire work or, as most often is
the case, is not an author at all by virtue of a work made for hire
agreement.” However, Garcia isn’t a joint author of the entire movie
and didn’t sign any agreements. She doesn’t fit into either category.
Like the majority, the Copyright Office would wish this problem away
by refusing registration unless the copyright claimant personally
recorded his performance. But nothing in the legislative history relied
on by the Copyright Office (which concerned joint authorship of an
entire film) suggests that a non-employee doesn’t retain any copyright
interest in a video clip of his acting performance because it’s recorded
by the film’s producer..
III
The harm the majority fears would result from recognizing
performers’ copyright claims in their fixed, original expression is
overstated. The vast majority of copyright claims by performers in
their contributions are defeated by a contract and the work for hire
doctrine. See 1 Nimmer on Copyright § 6.07 [B][2] at 6–28 to 6–29; 2
William F. Patry, Patry on Copyright § 5:17 (2010). And most of the
performers that fall through the cracks would be found to have given
an implied license to the film’s producers to use the contribution in
the ultimate film. See Effects Associates, 908 F.2d at 558. Very few
performers would be left to sue at all, and the ones that remain would
have to find suing worth their while. They wouldn’t be able to claim
the valuable rights of joint authorship of the movie, such as an
undivided share in the movie or the right to exploit the movie for
themselves. See 1 Nimmer on Copyright § 6.08 at 6–34 to 636. Rather, their
copyright claims would be limited to the original expression they
created. See Aalmuhammed, 202 F.3d at 1232; Effects Associates, 908 F.2d at
559. Which is why filmmaking hasn’t ground to a halt even though we
held a quarter-century ago that “where a non-employee contributes to
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a book or movie, ... the exclusive rights of copyright ownership vest in
the creator of the contribution, unless there is a written agreement to
the contrary.” Effects Associates, 908 F.2d at 557.
* * * {M}ovie producers, publishers and distributors will
always claim that the sky is falling in cases that might recognize an
individual contributor’s copyright interest in material he created.2
They will always say, as Google says here, that holding in the
contributor’s favor will make “Swiss cheese” of copyrights.
But under our copyright law, the creators of original,
copyrightable material automatically acquire a copyright interest in the
material as soon as it is fixed. There’s no exception for material created
during production of a film or other composite work. When modern
works, such as films or plays, are produced, contributors will often
create separate, copyrightable works as part of the process. Our
copyright law says that the copyright interests in this material vest
initially with its creators, who will then have leverage to obtain
compensation by contract. The answer to the “Swiss cheese” bugbear
isn’t for courts to limit who can acquire copyrights in order to make
life simpler for producers and internet service providers. It’s for the

Notice Posted By You Tube After Panel Decision Found
in Favor of Garcia and Ordered Video “Taken Down”

parties to allocate their rights by contract. See Effects Associates, 908
F.2d at 557. Google makes oodles of dollars by enabling its users to
upload almost any video without pre-screening for potential copyright
infringement. Google’s business model, * * * assumes the risk that a
user’s upload infringes someone else’s copyright, and that it may have
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to take corrective action if a copyright holder comes forward.
The majority credits the doomsday claims at the expense of
property rights that Congress created. Its new standard artificially
shrinks authorial rights by holding that a performer must personally
record his creative expression in order to retain any copyright interest
in it, speculating that a contrary rule might curb filmmaking and
burden the internet. But our injunction has been in place for over a
year; reports of the internet’s demise have been greatly exaggerated.
For the reasons stated here and in the majority opinion in Garcia v.
Google, Inc., 766 F.3d 929, 933–36 (9th Cir.2014), I conclude that
Garcia’s copyright claim is likely to succeed. I’d also find that Garcia
has made an ample showing of irreparable harm. It’s her life that’s at
stake.
Notes and Questions
1. “Coming Attractions”. Garcia alludes to several concepts that we
will be encountering somewhat further on, particularly in Chapter
8, where we take up the topics of “works made for hire” and “joint
works” in some detail, and in Chapter 9 where we look at copyright
transactions. The Effects Associates case, which Judge Kozinski cites
repeatedly (and which he authored) can be found on page 623 of
the main volume. Don’t worry overly much about the details of
these issues at this point – just focus on whether and when one
copyrighted work (say, a movie) may contain within it other works
(say, the performance of an actress) that are owned by others.
2. Counting Works Part One: Scenes and Drafts and Final
Assembled Products. In dissent, Judge Kozinski states that the
majority takes the position that only the final, released version of a
motion picture could count as a “work” protected by copyright, and
none of the individual scenes, created through making audiovisual
recordings at different times, could count as “works” at the times
that they were fixed. Assuming that is what the majority opinion
states, could that be right? Or does each scene become a protected
audiovisual work at the time of recording, and is a motion picture
that is composed of many scenes in effect a compilation, and in
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most cases also a derivative work, to the extent that the recorded
sounds and images were later altered through dubbing, the
addition of music, visual special effects, and so on? Consider the
definition of “created” in § 101 of the Copyright Act:
A work is “created” when it is fixed in a copy or
phonorecord for the first time; where a work is prepared
over a period of time, the portion of it that has been fixed
at any particular time constitutes the work as of that
time, and where the work has been prepared in different
versions, each version constitutes a separate work.
17 U.S.C. § 101. Does that definition answer the question?
Does the majority opinion really say what the dissent states
that it says? Or it is enough to say that, at the time a scene is
recorded, there is a work that comes into being, but only one work:
an audiovisual work with whatever sounds and images it contains,
some of which may be attributable to people acting, and some not?
3. Counting Works Part Two: Is Only One Work Created Per Act
of Fixation? Is it always true that every time a fixation is made,
only one integrated work is created, and none of the components of
that work gain separate copyright? Suppose that I formulate a
short, 15-minute lecture on copyright in my head, but I don’t write
it down. Before I give that lecture, a student asks if she can make a
video recording of me lecturing, so that she can watch it again later
in case she has missed anything I’ve said. I agree to have her record
the lecture. She records it. She makes sure that certain lights are on
the room and that others are not, with the aim of producing a
particular visual effect. She zooms in on me for some moments and
backs out to a wide angle at others. Sometimes she pans to the
audience for their (no doubt, stunned or slack jawed) reaction. The
lecture ends. What are now the best rules as to who gets to control
the use of, and potentially gain income from, the recorded lecture?
If there has only been a single audiovisual work created under
the circumstances just described, then the traditional choices
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would be to deem the student and me to be joint owners of that
work, or to deem one or the other of us to be the sole owner. As you
will learn below in Chapter 8, if the student and I were considered
to be joint owners, then either of us would have the right to use and
economically exploit that work, and to make and use derivative
works, subject to a duty to account to the other author for net
income received. The student could rent the video, or transcribe
the lecture and sell it, as long as I get half of the net profits; and I
could do the same.
Is that the right result here? If, instead, the student is the sole
owner of the audiovisual work, where does that leave me? Do I
simply have some remedy under contract law if the student uses it
for any purpose other than studying, because my contribution was
necessary to making the video and the student agreed that it would
be used only for studying? Or should we say that I am now the
author and sole owner of copyright in a literary work – the words
of the lecture – that I created, and that has now been fixed under
my authority in the video? (If a third party transcribed the lecture
from the video and sold it, would I be able to sue him for copyright
infringement or not?) Note that Copyright Office regulations allow
for a single registration application for a sound recording and for a
recorded literary, dramatic, or musical work if the sound recording
and the literary, dramatic, or musical work are embodied in the
same phonorecord, and if the claimant for both is the same. See 37 §
202.3(b)(1)(iv). Does that suggest that two works might be
created simultaneously in one fixation?
4. Are Performances Different Than Certain Other Creations?
Does it matter that Ms. Garcia’s contribution to the audiovisual
work was a performance of sentences that someone else had
written, rather than of sentences that she had created but not
previously fixed? What makes a performance different than the
creation of words or music? Words could be written down
independently of an audiovisual recording; music also could be
notated independently of a recording. We are used to seeing words
and music written down independently of recordings, and used to
calling the creators of words and music authors. Can the nuances
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of a performance be notated independently of a recording? If they
cannot, is that a good reason for saying that a performance is not an
independent work, but is only a component of the work fixed by
the recording? Have the contributions of performers been
marginalized, and should they be better recognized, or would
granting performers copyright result in too many coordination
problems?
5. The Garcia Rule and Directors. Not long after the Ninth Circuit’s
en banc decision in Garcia, the Second Circuit confronted a fairly
similar claim in 16 Casa Duse, Llc v. Merkin, 2015 WL 3937947, (2d
Cir. 2015). The plaintiff, a film production company owned by
Robert Krakovski, obtained the rights to make a movie from the
author of a screenplay. He then recruited Alex Merkin to work as
the film’s director, along with a cast and crew of about thirty.
Everyone in the cast and crew executed a contract stipulating that
they were contributing to a work made for hire except Merkin,
who refused to do so despite numerous requests. Merkin
ultimately claimed that he had a copyright interest in his
contribution to the film as director and that if Krakovski exhibited
the film at film festivals Merkin would claim infringement.
Krakovski moved first and sought a declaratory judgment of noninfringement.
The Second Circuit, relying in part on Garcia, affirmed a ruling
that Merkin did not have any copyright interest in the film. The
court noted that “[m]otion pictures, like “pantomimes,” and
“dramatic works,”, are works that may be expected to contain
contributions from multiple individuals. . . . But the Act lists none
of the constituent parts of any of these kinds of works as ‘works of
authorship.’ This uniform absence of explicit protection suggests
that non-freestanding contributions to works of authorship are not
ordinarily themselves works of authorship. . . . While issues of
‘coownership’ of a copyright may arise in the motion picture
context, the question of separate contributions meriting separate
copyrights as ‘works’ ordinarily would not, unless the motion
picture incorporates separate, freestanding pieces that
independently constitute ‘works of authorship.’”
If the
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contributions of a director or an actor are not “freestanding” and
thus not works of authorship, and thus not eligible for their own
separate copyrights, what portions of a motion picture might meet
this test? The musical score? A 4-minute piece of computer
generated animation in an otherwise live-action movie?
6. Fixation Revisited. Assuming that Ms. Garcia’s performance
would be separately copyrightable, do you think that the majority
or the dissent has the better position on whether that performance
is properly “fixed” within the meaning of §§ 102 and 101 of the
Copyright Act? Does it matter that Ms. Garcia did not operate the
camera herself, if she knew that the camera was recording her
performance and that the creation of the recording was the entire
purpose of staging the performance? If copyright subsists in a work
at the moment of fixation, does it matter that sometime after
fixation, Youssef or others altered the work by changing the
soundtrack?
7. Is the list of types of copyrightable works in § 102 exhaustive?
Consider the list of eight categories of copyrightable works, which
§ 102(a) introduces with the clause “Works of authorship include
the following categories.” Should that introduction be read to
exclude other categories from protection? As always, it is a good
idea to look at the definitions in § 101 – what does it say about the
term “including”? The House Report to the 1976 Act also explicitly
states that the categories “do not necessarily exhaust the scope of
‘original works of authorship’ that the bill is intended to protect.”
See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 53 (1976). In 2012, however, the
Copyright Office issued a policy statement concluding that the
eight categories are indeed exclusive: “The flexibility granted to the
courts is limited to the scope of the categories designated by
Congress in section 102(a). Congress did not delegate authority to
the courts to create new categories of authorship.” See Registration
of Claims to Copyright, 77 Fed. Reg. 37605, 37607 (June 22, 2012).
Hence, “unless a compilation of materials results a work of
authorship that falls within one or more of the eight categories of
authorship listed in section 102(a) of title 17, the Office will refuse
registration in such a claim.”
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In a case involving a sequence of yoga poses that we will
discuss further in Part C of this chapter below, the Central District
of California agreed, holding that the yoga sequence was not
copyrightable because it did not fall into one of the eight categories.
See Bikram’s College of Yoga L.P. v. Evolation Yoga LLC, 2012 WL
6548505, *3 (C.D.Cal.). On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit
upheld the District Court’s judgment only on the ground that the
yoga sequence was an “idea” rather than “expression”; it
emphasized the breadth of section 102(a), noting that “[t]he beauty
of this section is that it allows for the possibility that the term
‘original work of authorship’ may, as it has, evolve and encompass
new forms of expression that, like choreography, are not easily
reduced to neat definitions.” Bikram’s Yoga College of India, L.P. v.
Evolation Yoga, LLC, 803 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 2015).
Even if, contrary to the Copyright Office’s policy statement,
the eight categories are not exclusive, notice the subtlety of House
Report’s statement that the categories “do not necessarily exhaust
the scope” of copyrightable works. That formulation may suggest
the semantic limitations of a term as abstract as “works of
authorship.” In considering whether something outside of the
listed categories should receive copyright protection, courts may
have to reason by analogy from the existing, more concrete
categories, rather than ask directly whether that something is a
“work of authorship.”
Suppose, for example, that there were a machine that, either
mechanically or through nerve or brain stimulation, could induce
very complex sequences of the sensation of touch – first a slight
pinch to the left big toe combined with a rubbing sensation on the
right forearm, then a tickle to the center of the back, and so on.
Further suppose that, by adjusting complicated settings on the
machine, someone created a ten-minute-long sequence of tactile
sensations. How would you consider whether such a sequence
should be protected as a “work of authorship”?
8. Words and Short Phrases: Too Small to Be “Works of
Authorship”? We explored above in Chapter II.B. the possibility
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that words and short phrases are not copyrightable because they
lack creativity, but we questioned the reach of that explanation. An
alternative textual rationale for denying protection to words and
short phrases, even if creative, would be that they are not “works of
authorship.” One position would be that to be a work, creative
expression has to exhibit a certain minimum size, which really
amounts to a minimum complexity. Paradigmatically, at least, a
copyrightable work is a creation that can be appreciated and hence
can be commercially marketed on its own – a song or a book, not
fragments of melody or text. Before the Copyright Act of 1976,
formalities such as registration before publication, or publication
with proper notice, tended to ensure that most works for which
federal copyright protection was claimed were independently
marketable. Can you see why? The removal of such formalities has
put more pressure on the definition of “work.” It may be that
deeming a single word or a short phrase a “work” protectable by
copyright would not create any greater incentive to coin new
words and short phrases, and would also place too great a burden
on freedom of speech.
For some further discussion, see Justin
Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74
Fordham L. Rev. 575 (2005).

Chapter 3 Fundamental Exceptions to Copyright Protection
B. Abstraction and “Ideas”
p. 143 – insert after note 8:
9. Making the World Safe for Batmobile Merchandising: The
Ninth Circuit Broadly Protects the “Character” of a Car. A man
by the name of Mark Towle made fullGo Online
size, drivable replicas of two cars: the car
To see profile views of all
that appeared in the 1966 television series
of the cars that ever
Batman, and the car that appeared in the
served as Batmobiles,
click here.
1989 motion picture Batman. DC Comics
sued Mr. Towle for copyright
infringement. However, DC Comics did not design either of the
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cars in question, nor, apparently, did it receive any assignment of
copyright in the car designs from the designers. That’s because DC
Comics is a comic-book publisher, which publishes, among other
things, the Batman series of comic books; it licensed the rights to
make the television show and movie to production companies, and
those companies arranged for the car designs. If DC Comics was
neither an author nor an assignee of copyright in either of the car
designs, how could it sue for infringement? Its theory was that it
created and was the copyright owner of the “character” of the
Batmobile, and that both of the car designs, whatever their
differences, were recognizable instantiations of the Batmobile
character, and hence fell within the scope of its copyright.

The Batmobile as it appeared in
a 1943 comic book
in which DC Comics owns
copyright

In DC Comics v. Towle, 802 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2015), the Ninth
Circuit agreed with DC Comics. The court held that the Batmobile
had “maintained distinct physical and conceptual qualities since its
first appearance in the comic books in 1941.” Id. at 1021. As for
physical characteristics, the Batmobile “is almost always bat-like in
appearance, with a bat-themed front end, bat wings extending from
the top or back of the car, exaggerated fenders, a curved
windshield, and bat emblems on the vehicle.” Id. As for conceptual
characteristics, the Batmobile has “consistent character traits and
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attributes,” id., which is to say, it behaves consistently in the comic
books, television shows, and movies. For example, it is described in
the comic books as waiting “[l]ike an impatient steed straining at
the reins . . . shiver[ing] as its super-charged motor throbs with
energy” before it “tears after the fleeing hoodlums” an instant later.”
Id. “Equally important, the Batmobile always contains the most upto-date weaponry and technology.” Id. at 1022. Although the court
acknowledged that the Batmobile does not always physically
appear the same, it stated that “a consistent appearance is not as
significant in our analysis as consistent character traits and
attributes.” Id. The court thus concluded that the Batmobile was a
character protected by copyright. Did Towle infringe that
copyright?
“Because Towle produced a three-dimensional
expression of the entire Batmobile character as it appeared in the
1966 and 1989 productions, and the Batmobile character in each of
those productions was derived from DC’s underlying work, we
conclude that Towle’s replicas necessarily copied some aspects of
DC’s underlying works.” Id. at 1025.

The 1966 Batmobile of which Towle made a replica
Do you see any weaknesses in this line of argument? First,
while it may make sense to consider sufficiently
anthropomorphized objects as characters – a Thomas the Tank
Engine, or a Herbie the Love Bug – does it make sense to consider
as characters even those objects that do not speak, or interact with
other characters in ways we recognize as social? Second, note that
because the court concludes that Towle copied “the entire
Batmobile character as it appeared in the 1966 and 1989
productions,” it decides that it does not have to engage in any
point-by-point comparison of Towle’s cars and DC Comics’s comic
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books – “Towle’s replicas necessarily copy some aspects [and we
don’t have to tell you which ones] of DC’s underlying works.” But
could Towle possibly have copied “the entire Batmobile character” by
constructing a car? The court suggests that the way that the
Batmobile behaves in the comic books, TV shows, and movies is even
more important than the way that it looks. That behavior can be
depicted in literary and audiovisual works, but can an actual,
ordinary car, without self-driving technology or any other means of
moving or operating itself, exhibit the behavior that is such an
important part of the Batmobile character? Even as to the elements
of the Batmobile character that straddle the categories of physical
appearance and behavior, did Towle engage in complete copying?
Do you think that Towle’s replicas contained “the most up-to-date
weaponry and technology?” All in all, it is possible that the court
took some short cuts in analysis?

The 1989 Batmobile of which Towle made a replica
10. Can a Character Have One Foot in Copyright, and the Other in
the Public Domain? Arthur Conan Doyle wrote 56 stories and 4
novels featuring the character Sherlock Holmes over a span of 40
years. Forty-six of the stories, and all four of the novels were
published before 1923, and therefore, as we will explore further
below in Chapter 10, have fallen into the public domain. The last
ten of the stories, published between 1923 and 1927, are still under
copyright. Suppose that you want to publish a new story featuring
Sherlock Holmes. Do you have to obtain permission from Conan

43

COPYRIGHT : A Contemporary Approach

Doyle’s heirs? In Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 2014 WL 2726187
(7th Cir., June 16, 2014), the Seventh Circuit held that other authors
were free to write new Sherlock Holmes stories as long as they did
not use features of the character that were only introduced in the
stories that were still under copyright. Thus, for example, because
Sherlock Holmes only came to like dogs in the last ten stories, other
authors are free to write stories about a dog-hating Holmes (or a
Holmes whose attitude towards dogs is not explored), but not
about a dog-loving Holmes. See id. at *6. Does that represent a good
compromise to protect both the public domain and works still
under copyright? Suppose that I wrote a new Holmes story in
which nothing had changed about Holmes, except that I depict him
as liking the color blue. Should I now have an exclusive right
lasting until 70 years after my death over a single feature of a
character I did not create?

C. Utility and Functionality
p. 158 – insert the following after note 5:
6. Are some entire categories of works of authorship excluded
from copyright protection due to their utility? Recall that we
explored above in Chapter II.C. the issue of whether copyright
protection is limited to the eight categories of works of authorship
enumerated in § 102(a) of the Copyright Act. Courts have on
occasion appeared to deny protection to some unenumerated
categories of works due to their utility. Thus, for example, in Eltra
Corp. v. Ringer, 579 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1978), the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the refusal of the Register of
Copyrights to register claims of copyright in typefaces, because the
“sole intrinsic function of [a typeface] is its utility [in legibly
conveying text],” id. at 297 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1978)),
and hence a typeface “is an industrial design in which the design
cannot exist independently and separately as a work of art.” Id. at
297; see 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(e) (“Typeface as typeface” not registrable).
Similarly, before the addition of “architectural works” as a separate
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category of copyrightable works of authorship in 1990, see
Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Act of Dec. 1, 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 701, 104 Stat. 5089, habitable structures were
considered not to be copyrightable due to their intrinsic usefulness.
See, e.g., Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895, 898-899 (5th Cir.
1972).
Copyright in the Real World:
When Garurasana Follows Utkatasana
Some of you are likely practitioners of yoga. Yoga originated in
ancient India as a school of Hindu philosophy, but has become popular
in the United States and other countries as a system of physical
exercise, involving breathing, meditation, and sequences of poses
called “asanas” – bodily positions that increase strength, flexibility,
and balance. Imagine that you are in a yoga studio in a group working
through such a sequence of poses. In walks a process server to serve
you a complaint claiming that the plaintiff owns copyright in the
sequence of poses as a choreographic work, and alleging that you have
infringed that copyright by publicly performing that sequence. Could
you be held liable for infringement?
In the early 2000s, a yoga teacher and author named Bikram
Choudhury began asserting that yoga instructors needed a license
from him to teach “Bikram Yoga” (a term in which he asserted
trademark rights), which he defined to include a specific sequence of
26 yoga asanas, as well as any other
Go Online
sequence that was “substantially
similar” to his 26-asana sequence. To view the 26-asana
sequence as presented on the
Choudhury acknowledged that each Bikram Yoga website, click
individual asana was in the public here.
domain, having existed for centuries,
but claimed copyright in the sequence. He registered a claim of
copyright in a book teaching that sequence in 1979.
The issue whether the 26-asana sequence was copyrightable first
came to a head in a suit filed against Choudhury by a group called
Open Source Yoga Unity, seeking among other things a declaration
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that Choudhury did not possess a valid copyright in the sequence. In
2005, Judge Phyllis Hamilton of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California wrote an opinion denying Open Source
Yoga Unity’s motion for summary judgment in that suit. Judge
Hamilton found that there was “a dispute of fact on the issue of
whether sufficient creativity exists in the Bikram yoga routine so that
copyright protection attaches.” Open Source Yoga Unity v. Choudhury,
2005 WL 756558, *4 (N.D.Cal.). Although she did not directly
consider whether copyright in the sequence was barred due to its
functionality, she did note that “Choudhury claim[ed] that he
arranged the asanas in a manner that was both aesthetically pleasing
and in a way that he believes is best designed to improve the
practitioner's health.” The parties then settled.
More recently, Choudhury’s copyright claims have been less
favorably assessed. First, in June 2012, the Copyright Office issued a
Policy Statement that challenged claims of copyright to a sequence of
exercises both on copyrightable subject matter and functionality
grounds. As for the latter, the Copyright Office took the position that
“a selection, coordination, or arrangement of exercise movements, such
as a compilation of yoga poses, may be precluded from registration as a
functional system or process in cases where the particular movements
and the order in which they are to be performed are said to result in
improvements in one’s health or physical or mental condition” – even
in cases in which such a system was aesthetically appealing.
Registration of Claims to Copyright, 77 Fed.Reg. 37605, 37607 (June
22, 2012).
Second, in a lawsuit filed by Choudhury and his company against
another company and its employees that were teaching the 26-asana
sequence without Choudhury’s authorization, the Central District of
California granted the defendants’ motion for partial summary
judgment on the issue of copyright infringement. See Bikram’s College of
Yoga L.P. v. Evolation Yoga LLC, 2012 WL 6548505, *3 (C.D.Cal.). On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the sequence was
an unprotectible “idea.” “Choudhury . . . attempts to secure copyright
protection for a healing art: a system designed to yield physical
benefits and a sense of well-being. Simply put, this attempt is
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precluded by copyright’s idea/expression dichotomy, codified by
Section 102(b).” Bikram’s Yoga College of India, L.P. v. Evolation Yoga, LLC,
803 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 2015).
What do you think? Should designers of asana sequences like
Choudhury be able to claim copyright protection, or are the
sequences, as practiced in yoga classes, functional under § 102(b)?
(One might also ask, does a yoga class, which has no conventional
audience, constitute a “public performance,” particularly since the
other participants are probably trying to keep their balance rather
than looking at you?). What other contexts might pose the same
issue? Aerobics classes? The calisthenics routines used by college or
professional football coaches?
p. 176 – insert the following before “5. Useful Articles”
4A. Application Programming Interfaces
If user interfaces provide the means by which human beings
can interact with computers and computer software, “application
programming interfaces,” or APIs, provide the means by which
different computer programs can
Go Online
interact with each other. For
example, operating systems like To see a list of 100 mashups using
Microsoft Windows 8 or Apple Google maps click here. To view the
OS X Mountain Lion have a home page for the Google Maps API,
which contains some links to
specified series of commands and
interesting applications that have
a
command
syntax
that been built using it, click here. To see
application programs like Adobe a directory of hundreds of web-based
Reader or Real Player can use to APIs at Programmable Web, click
control the services that the here; to see a list of popular mashups
created using APIs, also at
operating
systems
provide.
Programmable Web, click here
Saving a file to a hard drive may
be a complicated task, involving an assessment of where the hard drive
has free space, a division of the file up into multiple pieces to save it in
different free sectors, and so on, but the operating system takes care of
that complicated task. If a programmer who is writing an application
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program wants it to save some data to a computer’s hard drive at a
defined point, however, the programmer only needs to know the
appropriate way to invoke the operating system through its API – that
is, to insert a command that will tell the operating system to save the
data – and the operating system will do the rest.
Application programming interfaces can define, not only how
applications interact with operating systems, but how one application
can interact with another. With the growth of the Internet, APIs
have proliferated, as creators of web-based applications have sought to
make them available to other web-based applications. For example,
Google has published an API for Google Maps that enables web
developers to integrate Google Maps into their websites in complex
and sophisticated ways. APIs facilitate in the creation of “mashups,”
services that combine data, functionality, or presentation from two or
more web-based applications.
Some companies make APIs freely available to all who wish to
use them. For instance, Microsoft makes the API of its Windows
operating systems available, because the availability of lots of Widows
compatible applications makes it more likely that people will use
Windows. Other API developers, however, limit access to their APIs.
That leads to the question whether APIs are protected by copyright
law.
In Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2014), cert. denied, 2015 WL 2473490 (June 29, 2015), the Federal
Circuit, applying Ninth Circuit law, held that the application
programming interface associated with
Go Online
the Java programming language was
copyrightable, overturning a District To see the application
programming interface speciCourt decision. The Java language and fication for Standard Edition
platform was first released by Sun 6 of the Java platform, click
Microsystems, Inc. in 1996; Oracle here. To see the package
Corporation bought Sun in 2010 and index for the Android
renamed it Oracle America, Inc. In application programming
interface, click here.
2007, Google announced its Android
platform for mobile devices. The Android platform used Java and the
Java API, without the permission of Sun or Oracle America.
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Oracle America conceded that Google was free to write
programs in Java – that the basic components of the computer
language itself were not copyrightable. Over the years, however, Sun
and others had written many programs in Java that implemented
frequently-used functions. These programs are known as “methods.”
For example, one such method – a very simple one – is named “max”; it
compares two numbers and produces as a result the larger of them.
Sun decided which of these methods would officially become part of
the Java platform. It named each of the accepted methods, organized
them into coherent packages, and released them as part of Java.
Someone writing a program in Java can now take advantage of these
methods. Rather than writing code from scratch to perform every
function needed, a programmer can simply “call” an existing method
by inserting its name in a program in the proper context. All of the
names of the methods that are an official part of Java, as organized into
groups of “classes” and “packages,” together with the syntax for
invoking them, constitute the Java application programming interface.
(Properly speaking, the API does not include the pre-written methods
themselves, but only the means of interacting with them.) As of 2008,
Java had 166 packages containing over 600 classes and over 6000
individual methods.
When Google decided to use part of the Java API in its Android
platform, it had programmers rewrite all of the methods themselves
from scratch. However, it made sure that each method performed
exactly the same function that it did as part of the original Java
platform, and it copied the names of the methods (the “declaring code”
for invoking each method in a computer program) and the way that
the methods were organized into classes and packages. Oracle
America sued Google, alleging that that copying amounted to
infringement of Oracle America’s copyright. The District Court held
that neither the names of the methods nor their organization into
classes and packages was copyrightable. See Oracle America, Inc. v. Google,
Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
As to that issue of copyrightability, the Federal Circuit reversed.
First, it held that the names of the methods were not rendered
uncopyrightable by the merger doctrine. There were a variety of
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expressions Oracle could have used as names. For example, instead of
naming the method that found the larger of two numbers
“Math.max,” Oracle could have named it “Math.maximum” or
“Arith.larger.” Because alternatives to the expressions were available,
the expressions did not merge into the ideas of the methods. Secondly,
the method names or declaring code were not uncopyrightable
because they were names or short phrases. There is no independent
doctrine barring copyright for words or short phrases, held the court:
“the relevant question for copyrightability purposes is not whether the
work at issue contains short phrases—as literary works often do—
but, rather, whether those phrases are creative.” Oracle America, 750
F.3d at 1362. Moreover, noted the court, Oracle was seeking to
copyright, not just a single word or phrase, but the entire structure of
all of the declaring code. The fact that the structure could be broken
up into short phrases did not make it uncopyrightable, any more than
the fact that Charles Dickens’s “A Tale of Two Cities” could be broken
up into short phrases (“It was the best of times, it was the worst of
times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness . . .”) does
not render the novel uncopyrightable. Id. at 1363.
Third, the structure, sequence and organization of packages and
classes of methods was not an uncopyrightable “system” or “method of
operation” under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). The court held that the First
Circuit’s decision in Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc.,
49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir.1995) [see pp. 175-176 in the Casebook] that the
menu command hierarchy in the spreadsheet program Lotus 1-2-3 was
uncopyrightable under § 102(b) was both distinguishable on its facts
and inconsistent with Ninth Circuit law. The latter holding was more
significant; the Federal Circuit held that, so long as the structure,
sequence and organization of the java methods, classes and packages
was “original and creative, and that the declaring code could have been
written and organized in any number of ways and still have achieved
the same functions, . . . Section 102(b) does not bar the packages from
copyright protection just because they also perform functions.” Oracle
America, 750 F.3d at 1368. Finally, whether the declaring code was
copied for reasons of “interoperability” might be a factor in a decision
regarding fair use (which had yet to be made in this case), but was not
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relevant to copyrightability. Id. at 1368-1372.
Some thoughts. Oracle estimates that there are about 9 million
programmers in the world who develop software based on the Java
language. See http://oracle.com.edgesuite.net/timeline/java/. Because
the cost for a programmer to switch to a completely new
programming language is substantial, if Oracle can stop others from
building platforms that are similar to the Java platform, it can charge
an enormous price for licensing that platform. Should copyright law
give Oracle the power to leverage the skill base and switching costs of
9 million programmers? Whatever your answer to that question,
consider how different protecting a language and a module structure
is from protecting a work like “The Tale of Two Cities.” Do the
livelihoods of 9 million people depend upon using “The Tale of Two
Cities” on a daily basis to make new and useful programs? Is there any
other instance in which copyright law has been used to leverage the
skills and switching costs of millions of people?
The Oracle America court seems to reject the “words and short
phrases” doctrine as an independent limit on copyrightability. Are
there reasons why we might not want to protect words and short
phrases even if they are creative? Should a person who comes up with
a
catchy
neologism
–
say,
“binge
viewing,”
see
http://wordspy.com/words/bingeviewing.asp – be able to sue others
who use it without her permission? The Oracle America court also
suggests that a work that performs a useful function will not be
deemed uncopyrightable under § 102(b) as long as there are alternative
ways of performing that function. Should a round-shaped cup be
copyrightable if an oval-shaped cup would also work as a drinking
vessel?

5. Useful Articles
p. 189 – insert the following after note 2:
2A. Clothing and its “Decorative Function.” In late 2012, the U.S.
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the District Court’s
rejection of a copyright infringement claim involving a dress –
holding that no element of the allegedly infringed dress was
physically or conceptually severable from the dress as a functional
item of clothing. “Clothing,” the court stated, “in addition to
covering the body, serves a ‘decorative
See It
function,’ so that the decorative
To see two views of Jovani
elements of clothing are generally
Fashion Prom Dress Style
‘intrinsic’ to the overall function,
No. 154416, at issue in the
rather than separable from it.” Jovani
cited case, click here. For
our recommendation of a
Fashion, Ltd. v. Fiesta Fashions, 2012 WL
matching outfit for the
4856412, **2 (2d Cir.) (quoting
prom date of a young lady
Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie's Costume Co.,
wearing the Jovani dress,
891 F.2d 452, 455 (2d Cir. 1989). In
click here.
this case, “the artistic judgment exercised in applying sequins and
crystals to the dress's bodice and in using ruched satin at the waist
and layers of tulle in the skirt does not invoke in the viewer a
concept other than that of clothing . . . . Rather, these design
elements are used precisely to enhance the functionality of the
dress as clothing for a special occasion.” Id.
Does the logic of “decorative function” sweep too broadly?
Take the case of wrapping paper for gifts. Surely it too serves a
“decorative function,” as well as perhaps the function of protecting
the wrapped item. Suppose that a company manufactured a special
gift wrap that was in fact cloth with sequins of selected sizes
applied in different shades of blue and green to create a dappled
effect, exactly as Jovani Fashion did with the bodice of its Style No.
154416. If another company copied that cloth verbatim, would an
infringement suit be lost on grounds of either insufficient
originality or lack of conceptual severability? What if a twodimensional version of the dappled color pattern were printed on
paper?
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Fiesta’s Allegedly Infringing
Design

2.B. Cheerleading Headed to the Supreme Court. Varsity Brands
designs, manufactures and sells cheerleading uniforms. So does
Star Athletica. Varsity sued Star, claiming that Star copied five of
Varsity designs, infringing Varsity’s copyright in those designs. In
Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 2014 WL 819422 (W.D.
Tenn.), the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Tennessee held that the uniform designs were not copyrightable,
taking inspiration from the Jovani case discussed in the note above.
“A cheerleading uniform,” held the court, “loses its utilitarian
function as a cheerleading uniform when it lacks all design and is
merely a blank canvas. . . . [A] blank silhouette of a purported
‘cheerleading uniform’ without team colors, stripes, chevrons, and
similar designs typically associated with sports in general, and
cheerleading in particular, is not recognizable as a cheerleading
uniform.” Id. at *8. Thus, “as a matter of law, the design of
cheerleading uniforms has merged with the utilitarian function
they serve.” Id.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed. Varsity Brands, Inc. v.
Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2015). The cheerleading
uniforms, held the court, are pictorial, graphic and sculptural
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works within the meaning of the Copyright Act, and they are also
useful articles: they “have ‘an intrinsic utilitarian function,’ namely
to ‘cover the body, wick away moisture, and withstand the rigors of
athletic movements.’” Id. at 489. Thus, they are copyrightable only
to the extent that they incorporate features that are physically and
conceptually severable from the utilitarian aspects of the article. Id.
at 489-490. However, the Court held, the features of the uniforms
that “identify the wearer as a cheerleader and a member of a
cheerleading team” are not utilitarian, because they merely “convey
information” within the meaning of the Copyright Act’s definition
of “useful article” in 17 U.S.C. § 101. Id. at 490. Similarly, held the
court – specifically rejecting the Jovani court’s analysis – the
decorative features of cheerleading uniforms are not functional; if
decoration were considered to be a functional element of pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works, then virtually none of those works,
even paintings of Mondrian, would be copyrightable, because they
can almost all be said to serve decorative functions. Id. Because
Varsity’s uniforms incorporated graphic designs – “the arrangement
of stripes, chevrons, zigzags, and color-blocking” – that were not
“functional” in the proper definition of that term and that were
conceptually severable from the uniforms, the uniforms were
copyrightable. Id. at 491-492.
Star Athletica, having thus lost in the Sixth Circuit, petitioned
the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. On May 2, 2016, the
Supreme Court granted that writ, limited to the question of “What
is the appropriate test to determine when a feature of a useful
article is protectable under § 101 of the Copyright Act?” Star
Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 136 S.Ct 1823 (2016). Thus, as of
this writing, we can expect some guidance from the Court on
useful articles within the coming year.
Insert on p. 194, after photograph of Olympic Tower and Freedom
Tower
Home Design Services, Inc. v. Turner Heritage Homes Inc., 2016 WL 3361479
(11th Cir. 2016). Home Design sued Turner for infringing its copyright
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on an architectural floor plan designated HDS- 2089. These were for a
house based on what is known as a “four-three-split” plan, which is a
four-bedroom, three-bathroom house with a “master” bedroom or
suite on one end and three more bedrooms on the other. The
defendant’s plans had numerous similarities to those of the plaintiff,
including the basic room layout. A jury trial resulted in a verdict for
plaintiff, but the trial judge threw out that verdict and granted
defendants judgment N.O.V.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed. It observed:
[F]loor plans are subject to the “fundamental axiom that
copyright protection does not extend to ideas but only to
particular expressions of ideas.”
Although HDS-2089 and the Turner plans share the same
general layout, this is only because both sets of plans follow
the customary four–three split style, as well as the attendant
industry standards. Kevin Alter, Home Design's own expert,
conceded on cross-examination that HDS-2089's splitbedroom arrangement aligns with industry standards, as does
the contiguity of the dining room, breakfast nook, and kitchen.
Alter further characterized HDS-2089 as neither “unusual” nor
“radically different [from] the many things that are on the
market.” No one, including Home Design, owns a copyright to
the idea of a four–three split style, nor to the industry
standards that architects regularly heed to achieve such a split.
In reaching this conclusion, the court held that that the ideaexpression question in the context of architectural works was a
question of law for the court a not a question of fact for the jury,
following its earlier decision in Intervest Construction, Inc. v. Canterbury
Estate Homes, Inc., 554 F.3d 914, 920 (11th Cir. 2008). In a concurring
opinion Judge Rosenbaum took issue with the approach of treating
the issue as one of law. She said
I think that Intervest represents a wrong turn in our
Circuit's
copyright
jurisprudence.
Specifically, Intervest holds that judges are necessarily
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better able than juries to resolve whether the “average
lay observer” would find “substantial similarity”
between two architectural works. But we ask juries to
answer this same question in all kinds of other
copyright cases. Because I do not see a basis for
exempting copyright cases involving architectural
works from jury trials simply because the question of
“substantial similarity” may be close, I respectfully
disagree with Intervest and would steer clear of its
holding, were we not bound by it.
Do you think architectural works pose special issues making
the idea-expression problem more difficult for juries than is the
case with literary or musical works? Do you think this is an
issue on which expert testimony could be helpful, or would
that only make things even more confusing for the jury? We
will consider the role of experts in infringement litigation
further on in the chapter on infringement, but we thought this
was a nice place to get you thinking about it.
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Copyright in the Real World: Why Isn’t the Statue of Portlandia
More Famous?

The sculpture “Portlandia” as it appears
in the motion picture “Body of Evidence”
In the early 1980s, the City of Portland commissioned sculptor
Raymond Kaskey to create a sculpture to be placed over the main
entrance of a new civic building. Kaskey created “Portlandia,” a female
figure that allegorically represents the city. On October 6, 1985, the
six-and-a-half ton Portlandia was unveiled as the second-largest
hammered-copper sculpture in the United States – only the Statue of
Liberty is larger. Yet although Portlandia has now been dramatically
perched above 5th Street in downtown Portland for more than three
decades, it has not become an icon of the city. Copyright law may
explain why. Although Kaskey was paid $228,000 in public funds to
create Portlandia, and reportedly another $100,000 in private
donations, he retained copyright in the sculpture, conveying title only
to the shaped copper itself – in copyright terms, the copy.
If Portlandia were a building, photos and drawings of it could
be made and distributed without Kaskey’s consent. Section 120 of the
Copyright Act provides:
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The copyright in an architectural work that has been
constructed does not include the right to prevent the
making, distributing, or public display of pictures,
paintings,
photographs,
or
other
pictorial
representations of the work, if the building in which
the work is embodied is located in or ordinarily visible
from a public place.
17 U.S.C. § 120. However, the Section 120 exception does not apply to
sculptures. Therefore, anyone who wants to make anything other
than a fair use of a pictorial representation of Portlandia must seek a
license from Kaskey. (We presume that tourist snapshots of the
statue to be shown to the folks back home would count as fair uses
under § 107 of the Copyright Act, covered in Chapter 5.)
Kaskey has licensed only a few uses. The original cut of the
1993 movie “Body of Evidence,” filmed in Portland and starring, among
others, Madonna, featured a scene in which Madonna walked down
5th Street, with the Portlandia statue visible in the background.
Kaskey sued. In settling the case, the producers agreed to delete the
scene from the final cut of the movie, retaining only a four-second shot
of the sculpture without any people in it, and to pay Kaskey an
undisclosed sum of money. The opening credits of the television show
“Portlandia” sometimes feature a one-second shot of the sculpture, but
that use reportedly required long negotiations with Kaskey. Needless
to say, visitors to Portland cannot buy t-shirts or other memorabilia
featuring images of Portlandia.
Michael Kaskey is not the only sculptor to have filed
infringement lawsuits involving depictions of public sculpture. In
1982, Jack Mackie created “Dancers’ Series: Steps” on a sidewalk in the
Capitol Hill neighborhood of Seattle. That sculpture consists of eight
sets of inlaid bronze shoeprints that illustrate social dances such as
the tango and the mamba. Like Kaskey’s Portlandia, Mackie’s
“Dancers Series: Steps” was financed with a combination of public and
private funds. Mackie retained copyright in the sculpture, and filed at
has least two infringement lawsuits. One resulted in a judgment
against the Seattle Symphony for including a photo of one of the sets
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of steps in a concert season brochure; the issue of damages in that case
went all the way up to the Ninth Circuit, see Mackie v. Rieser, 296
F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2002). Another resulted in a settlement with
photographer Mike Hipple. The creators of another public sculpture
in Seattle, the “Fremont Troll,” have reportedly filed a number of
infringement lawsuits over published photographs of the sculptures,
reaching settlements with People and Sunset magazines and the
University of Washington Daily. Arturo Di Modica, sculptor of
“Charging Bull,” a sculpture prominently displayed in a plaza near
Wall Street in Manhattan, has sued Random House, Walmart, and
others for pictorially representing the sculpture. (Oddly enough, Di
Modica placed his 7,100 lb. sculpture on city property without the
city’s permission; the city removed the sculpture, and put it back only
after public outcry at the removal.)
What do you think copyright policy should be with regard to
sculptures placed in public areas? The United Kingdom, Canada, and
Australia all have exceptions in their copyright laws for twodimensional depictions of public sculptures. See Copyright, Designs
and Patents Act 1988 c. 3, § 62 (UK); Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.
32.2(1) (Canada); and Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 65 (Australia).
Should the United States adopt such an exception? Or would that
raise the cost of commissioning public sculptures, because sculptors
would demand more money knowing that they could not control twodimensional depictions? Some creators of public sculptures do not
want their creations to be commercialized, and will not license
promotional or advertising use of images of the sculptures at any cost.
Should we defer to those wishes, or is that kind of continuing artistic
control incompatible with the open, civic nature of public sculpture?
Of course, public agencies can always demand that sculptors convey
the copyright to their sculptures as well as the sculptures themselves,
and can then freely license use of them. Should that be the solution?
Or will many public agencies lack adequate copyright counsel, and
therefore not consider demanding transfer of copyright?
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Chapter 4 Proving Infringement of the Reproduction Right
A. The Elements of a Case of Copyright Infringement
p. 206 – insert the following after note 6:
7. Disposing of a Substantial Similarity Argument on a Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim: “Nikita” and “Natasha.” In
2012, a man by the name of Guy
Go Online
Hobbs sued the fabulously successful
composers Elton John and Bernie To read the “Nikita” and
Taupin, as well as a music publishing “Natasha” lyrics, and listen to
company that had published some of a sound recording of
their songs, Big Pig Music, Ltd., “Nikita,” courtesy of the
Columbia/USC Music
alleging that the lyrics to John and Copyright Infringement
Taupin’s 1985 song “Nikita” infringed Resource, click here.
the lyrics of his 1982 unpublished but
registered song “Natasha.” (Hobbs had sent “Natasha” to a number
of publishers, including Big Pig, unsuccessfully trying to interest
them in publishing it, which was how he alleged that John and
Taupin gained access it.) The District Court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed. Hobbs alleged six similarities between
the lyrics of the two songs:
(1) A theme of impossible love between a Western man and a
Communist woman during the Cold War;
(2) References to events that never happened;
(3) Descriptions of the beloved’s light eyes;
(4) References to written correspondence to the beloved;
(5) Repetition of the beloved’s name, the word ‘‘never,’’ the phrase
‘‘to hold you,’’ the phrase ‘‘I need you,’’ and some form of the
phrase ‘‘you will never know;’’ and
(6) A title which is a one-word, phonetically-similar title consisting
of a three-syllable female 5 Russian name, both beginning with
the letter ‘‘N’’ and ending with the letter ‘‘A.’’
Hobbs v. John, 722 F.3d 1089, 1094 (7th Cir. 2013). The Court of
Appeals held that the first four alleged similarities were similarities
of ideas only, and that the way that the ideas were expressed in
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each song’s lyrics was different. Id. at 1095. While the fifth and
sixth similarities were “present at the level of expression, they are
also rudimentary, commonplace, standard, or unavoidable in
popular love songs.” Id. at 1096. Thus, the court concluded, “as a
matter of law ‘Natasha’ and ‘Nikita’ are not ‘substantially similar’
because they do not ‘share enough unique features to give rise to a
breach of the duty not to copy another’s work.’” Id. (quoting Peters
v. West, Peters, 692 F.3d 629, 633–34 (7th Cir. 2012).
Does this disposition on a motion to dismiss represent a
welcome change-of-pace for beleaguered successful creators whose
money makes them targets of extremely dubious lawsuits filed by
unknowns? Or does it deny plaintiffs their days in court? Suppose
that the alleged similarities between “Nikita” and “Natasha” were
not in the lyrics, but in the music. Do you think that the court
would be as confident in sorting musical similarities into ideas and
expression, and in identifying musical features that are
commonplace?

Chapter 5 Fair Use
B. The Three Supreme Court Cases
p. 292 – Replace Note 3 with the following:
3. Commercial Skipping: Early Attempts. VTRs have now been
replaced by DVRs, and DVRs allow viewers to skip commercials
more easily. One popular aid to commercial skipping is the 30second skip button, available on many DVRs, including most TiVo
models, and on the Windows Media Center remote control.
ReplayTV, an early TiVo competitor, built an even more radical
technology into its 4000 and 5000 series DVRs. Those DVRs
automatically detected “black screens” that most television
broadcasters used to separate commercials from their
programming, and used them to skip over commercials entirely,
without the viewer even having to press a skip button. However, in
October of 2001, television broadcasters and production companies
sued ReplayTV and its owner SonicBlue, arguing that the
“AutoSkip” feature “attacks the fundamental economic
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underpinnings of free television and basic nonbroadcast services.”
Complaint at 5, Paramount Pictures Corporation v. ReplayTV, Inc., No.
2:01 CV o9358 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2001), available at
http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/
Paramount_v_ReplayTV/20011031_ complaint.pdf. Although there
was never a ruling in the case, litigation costs appear essentially to
have forced the company out of business.
4. Commercial Skipping Revisited: Dish Network and the Hopper.
More recently, a television broadcast
Go Online
network came up against a bettercapitalized promoter of commercial On the off chance that
skipping: the satellite TV company Dish you might have missed
Network, which is the third-largest pay it, you can see a 30
second commercial for
television service provider in the United the Hopper by clicking
States. In March 2012, Dish Network here.
released to its customers a set-top
device with DVR and video-on-demand capabilities that it called
the “Hopper.” The Hopper enables subscribers to use a service
called “Prime Time Anytime,” which allows them to record shows
on one or more channels simultaneously during “prime time”
periods as set by Dish Network. Two months later, Dish Network
started offering an “AutoHop” feature on the Hopper for television
shows that were part of the “Prime Time Anytime” service. Unlike
the Replay TV DVRs, which could detect “black screens” to skip
commercials, the “AutoHop” feature depends on having Dish
Network employees watch the shows and electronically mark the
beginning and end of commercials. Those electronic markings are
then made available to Dish Network subscribers who are using a
Hopper and who had decided to record particular “Prime Time
Anytime” shows; the Hopper can detect the marks and thus skip
the commercials.
The Hopper generated several lawsuits. In May 2012, Dish sued
ABC, CBS, and NBC, seeking a declaratory judgment that the
AutoHop feature would not subject Dish to liability for copyright
infringement; Fox, CBS, and NBC filed another suit against Dish,
alleging that the AutoHop feature would subject Dish to
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infringement liability. Disney, the parent company of ABC, settled
with Dish in March 2014. Under the terms of the settlement, Dish
agreed to disable the AutoHop feature for the first 72 hours after
particular shows were first broadcast; Disney agreed to give Dish
the rights to stream some content on demand, including on the
Internet, and the parties also agreed to a framework for delivering
targeted ads. See David Lieberman, UPDATE, Dish and Disney
Finalize Output Deal that Ends Their Ad-Hopper Dispute,
Deadline Hollywood, March 3, 2014; Greg Avery, Dish Network,
Disney end Hopper lawsuit, reach landmark pact, Denver Business
Journal, March 4, 2014.
Meanwhile, back in 2012, Fox moved for a preliminary
injunction against Dish, which the District Court denied. See Fox
Broadcasting Co. v. Dish Network, LLC, 905 F.Supp.2d 1088
(C.D.Cal.2012). In July 2013, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial
of the preliminary injunction. See Fox Broadcasting Co. v. Dish Network,
LLC, 747 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2013); in a brief opinion, it again
affirmed the District Court’s denial of a preliminary injunction in
July 2014. See Fox Broadcasting Co. v. Dish Network, LLC, 2014 WL
3398107 (9th Cir. 2014) Like the District Court, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the user, not Dish Network, made the copies of
Prime Time Anytime shows, and thus that Dish Network could not
be directly liable for copyright infringement. See Fox Broadcasting, 747
F.3d at 1067-68. (We consider the distinction between direct and
indirect infringement in greater detail below in Chapter 6.) The
Ninth Circuit then concluded that the making of copies of
television shows by individual subscribers was likely covered by
the § 107 fair use privilege. The presence of the Autohop feature
meant that subscribers were likely to be making copies for the
purpose of commercial-skipping, as well as time-shifting.
However, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Court that
“commercial-skipping does not implicate Fox's copyright interest
because Fox owns the copyrights to the television programs, not to
the ads aired in the commercial breaks.” Id. at 1068. “Thus, any
analysis of the market harm should exclude consideration of
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AutoHop because ad-skipping does not implicate Fox's copyright
interests.” Id.
Because broadcast television networks are unlikely ever to
own copyright in the commercials that they air to generate revenue,
the court’s logic practically renders commercial-skipping features
immune from any copyright liability, and thus threatens to
undermine a dominant broadcast TV revenue model. But does that
logic hold water? Suppose that a television broadcaster did own
copyright in the commercials it broadcasted. Should it be able to
sue viewers for not making copies of works in which it owns
copyright? Could Fox sue you if you fast forward through the
songs in Glee to watch the dramatic portions of the show? Or in
determining whether making a copy of a broadcast – activity that is
prima facie infringing – is fair use, should we consider whether the
purpose of the copying is to change the viewer experience in a way
that undermines the broadcast revenue model?
This may also be a good moment to recall that copyright is not
the only field of law that may be available to a party like Fox in the
face of commercial skipping devices. Bear in mind that Dish
Network is allowed to retransmit Fox's copyrighted programming
pursuant to a contract. That contract contains a copyright license
provision, of course, and a reciprocal provision for significant
payments in return for the privilege of retransmission. Could Fox
simply add a provision to the contract forbidding Dish to include
commercial-skipping features in its DVRs as a condition of the
copyright license? There actually was such a provision in the
contract between the parties, but it only applied to “video on
demand” programming, and the court concluded that the Hopper
was not a true “video on demand service.”
Note also that there is a common law tort known as
“interference with prospective economic advantage.” One common
statement of the elements of this claim requires the plaintiff to
prove: (1) his reasonable expectation of entering into a valid
business relationship; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the
plaintiff’s expectancy; (3) purposeful interference by the defendant
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that prevents the plaintiff’s legitimate expectancy from ripening
into a valid business relationship; and (4) damages to the plaintiff
resulting from such interference.” Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill.
2d 460, 483-84, 693 N.E.2d 358, 370 (1998). Could Fox argue that
it has a reasonable expectation of selling commercial time to
advertisers in the future, that Dish knows about that, and is
purposefully interfering in a way that will prevent advertisers from
choosing to do business with Fox in the future?
p. 294 – insert the following at the end of note 6, “Slingboxes and
Cloud Services”
Apple, Amazon and Google have all introduced “cloud services,” which
enable users to upload their own files, including music files, and then
access those files from anywhere they can get an Internet connection.
Although Amazon and Google both started their services before
negotiating agreements with record companies, all three companies
now apparently have agreements with the major record companies,
and do not store separate copies of sound recording files when they
match licensed sound recordings. However, at least Apple will allow
users to upload any file, whether it matches a licensed sound recording
or not; if it doesn’t, Apple will store a separate copy of the file for each
user that uploads it. See Paul Reznikoff, "Breaking: Apple Will Allow
ANY Song to be Uploaded Into Apple Music…," Digital Music News,
Thursday, June 16, 2015
p. 326 – Insert after Note 2
2A. Parodist as Plaintiff. In looking at parody through the lens of
the fair use doctrine we have been assuming that the parodist will be a
defendant using fair use as a “shield” against infringement claims
asserted by the copyright owner of the original work. That was
certainly the situation in the Campbell case. But what if the parodist
wants to use the parody as a “sword” and sue someone else for
infringing the parody? Does s/he have a valid copyright interest in the
parody sufficient to justify such a claim? The parody, of course, is a
derivative work, since it is based upon and reworks the underlying
material that it ridicules, but it is an unauthorized derivative work.
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Should that affect the parodist ability to bring suit? In Keeling v. Hars,
809 F.3d 43, 45 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 2016 WL 1703348 (Sup. Ct.
2016), Jamie Keeling had prepared a parody stage adaptation of the
movie Point Break, which she called Point Break Live. Her parody used
dialogue from the original movie, but added jokes, humorous props
and audience participation to lambaste the original. She subsequently
licensed Eve Hars to stage a production of her parody-play, but when
the term of that license expired Hars, believing that Keeling did not
have a valid copyright, continued to perform the play. Keeling, of
course, sued, and she prevailed in both the district court and the
Second Circuit, the court holding that when “ a work employs
preexisting copyrighted material lawfully—as in the case of a ‘fair
use’—nothing in the statute prohibits the extension of the
“independent” copyright protection promised by Section 103.”

B. Some Applications
p. 343 - insert the following before note 3
2A. The Georgia State University Intranet Case. In May 2012, the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia issued a

COPYRIGHT : A Contemporary Approach

67

massive 350-page opinion in the litigation involving Georgia State
University intranet distribution of excerpts from academic press
books. See Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F.Supp.2d 1190
(N.D. Ga. 2012) It is fair to say that both the District Court’s
general analysis and its specific holdings with respect to 74
instances of alleged infringement were quite favorable to Georgia
State. As for the latter, the court held that 69 of the 74 allegedly
infringing uses were noninfringing fair uses, and thus that only five
uses exceeded the boundaries of fair use and were deemed
infringements. In late 2014, however, the Eleventh Circuit issued
an opinion on appeal that reversed the District Court ruling and
remanded for further proceedings. See Cambridge University Press
v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014).
The District Court and the Eleventh Circuit had contrasting
approaches to the following components of fair use analysis:


Balancing the Four Fair Use Factors. The District Court appeared
to take an arithmetical approach to the four fair use factors,
weighing each factor equally: if three of the factors weighed in
favor of fair use, then the use was fair, whereas if three of them
weighed against, the use was unfair. The Court of Appeals
held that it was error to take such an approach: “a given factor
may be more or less important in determining whether a
particular use should be considered fair under the specific
circumstances of the case.” Pattons, 769 F.3d at 1260. It noted in
particular that the resolution of one factor can influence the
weight given to another – for example, “[b]ecause Defendants’
use is non-transformative and fulfills the educational purposes
that Plaintiffs, at least in part, market their works for, the
threat of market substitution here is great and thus the fourth
factor looms large in the overall fair use analysis.” Patton, 769
F3d at 1275.



The Purpose and Character of the Use. The Court of Appeals agreed
with the District Court that because the use was for nonprofit
educational purposes, the the first factor weighed in favor of
fair use. The Court of Appeals specifically found that the use
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was nontransformative, but held that the first factor still
weighed in favor of fair use because of the nonprofit
educational character of the use. Both courts distinguished the
Michigan Document Services case on the ground that the latter
involved a for-profit copyshop, while Georgia State operated
its own intranet. Suppose that Georgia State decided that,
copyright issues aside, it made more sense to have the
university’s intranet hosted on the servers of a for-profit
company like Amazon.com, rather than to own and operate its
own servers. Would and should that make a difference in fair
use analysis? Can you imagine structuring intranet service
arrangements between universities and for-profit companies in
ways that might be more or less likely weigh against fair use?
The Nature of the Copyrighted Work. The District Court held that
although none of the excerpts in question was fictional, they
were “intended to inform and educate,” and this characteristic
weighed in favor of fair use. Becker, 863 F. Supp. at 1225. The
Court of Appeals disagreed. “Where the excerpts of Plaintiffs’
works contained evaluative, analytical, or subjectively
descriptive material that surpasses the bare facts necessary to
communicate information, or derives from the author’s
experiences or opinions, the District Court should have held
that the second factor was neutral, or even weighed against fair
use in cases of excerpts that were dominated by such material.”
Patton, 769 F.3d at 1270. However, the Court of Appeals also
concluded that the second factor was relatively unimportant in
this case. Id.
The Amount of the Portion Used. The District Court decided to
develop some rules of thumb respecting the portion of a work
used, which could be applied given the other circumstances of
the case (nonprofit educational use, and so one). The Court
decided that it would be a permissible fair use to copy up to
10% of a book with ten or fewer chapters, or up to one full
chapter of a book with more than ten chapters. Becker, 863 F.
Supp. at 1243 In determining percentages, the court agreed
with defendants that front and back matter – tables of
contents, indices, prefaces, and the like – should be counted as
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part of the total number of pages in the book. Id. at 1229-1230.
Although some of the books were collections of stand-alone
chapters written by different authors, the court ruled that that
would not affect the calculation, in part because plaintiffs had
made that argument too late. Id. at 1230.
The Court of Appeals held that this approach was in
error. “The District Court should have analyzed each instance
of alleged copying individually, considering the quantity and
the quality of the material taken—including whether the
material taken constituted the heart of the work—and
whether that taking was excessive in light of the educational
purpose of the use and the threat of market substitution.”
Patton, 769 F.3d at 1275. Does the District Court’s adoption of
rules of thumb suggest how difficult it is as a practical matter
to apply fair use analysis to hundreds or thousands of
individual uses? Does a District Court judge really have to time
to read hundreds of complete works, portions of which were
placed on a University intranet, to decide whether each
portion did or did not constitute the heart of the work from
which it was taken? Will fair use adjudication break down in
an era of ridiculously easy copying-and-pasting of excerpts?


The Effect on the Potential Market for the Work. Both courts put a
great deal of weight on whether licenses to distribute excerpts
digitally through intranets were available at the time the
defendants made their allegedly infringing uses. As the Court
of Appeals put it, ‘[i]f a publisher makes licenses available for
some uses but not for others, this indicates that the publisher
has likely made a reasoned decision not to enter the licensing
market for those uses, which implies that the value of that
market is minimal.” Id. at 1278. Suppose that a publisher
decided to license photocopied excerpts, but not digital
distribution, because it was afraid that copies of the digital
excerpts would be further distributed on an unlicensed basis.
Should it have to face the consequence of losing all control over
and revenue from educational distribution because it will then
be deemed fair use?
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A screen shot of page from Georgia State’s “Electronic
Reserves” system. The creature reading the book is
“Pounce,” the mascot of the GSU Panthers.

p. 344 - insert the following before “Copyright in the Real World:
Documentary Filmmakers and the Fair Use Best Practices Project”:
5. Degrees of Commerciality? In each of the fair use cases presented
above, the issue of whether a use is commercial seems to be
approached on an “either/or” basis: either the use is commercial, or
it is nonprofit or personal. Is there room in the analysis for degrees
of commerciality? Consider the fair use
See It
analysis in the case of Seltzer v. Green Day,
Inc., No. CV 10-2103 PSG (PLAx) (C.D. To see “Scream Icon,”
Cal., filed March 23, 2010).
Seltzer click here. To see the
official video of “East
concerned the use of a drawing called
Jesus Nowhere” in
“Scream Icon,” created by artist Derek which the modified
Seltzer. Another artist, working with the “Scream Icon” appears,
band Green Day, modified the drawing in click here.
a number of ways, most prominently by
superimposing red brush strokes in the shape of a cross on it. The
result was then projected as a prominent stage backdrop during
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live performances (and on the official video) of Green Day’s song
“East Jesus Nowhere.” Seltzer sued for copyright infringement.
The court not only granted Green Day’s motion for summary
judgment on its fair use defense, but ordered Seltzer to pay Green
Day’s attorney’s fees. See Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 2011 WL 5834626
(C.D. Cal). As for Seltzer’s contention that the commercial nature
of Green Day’s use weighed against fair use, the court stated:
“Although Plaintiff is correct that Defendants profited from the
concert tour, the commercial significance of Defendants’ use of
Scream Icon is minimal, if not negligible. The Scream Icon image was
not used on any merchandise, ticket stubs, or advertisements, and
Plaintiff presents no evidence otherwise showing that Defendants
used Scream Icon to directly promote Green Day’s concert tours or
increase concert sales.” Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., No. CV 10-2103
PSG (PLAx) (C.D. Cal., August 18, 2011). Suppose at every Green
Day concert, recordings by other popular bands were played before
the show and during intermission, unannounced and unlicensed.
Would that be a “negligibly commercial” public performance of
those recordings?
6. The Use of Scientific Articles as Prior Art in Patent Prosecution.
In American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994),
a case mentioned in Michigan Document Services, the Second Circuit
held that Texaco’s photocopying of scientific articles for internal
distribution and archiving was not fair use. Suppose that the firm
copying scientific articles was not a petroleum company, but a law
firm, and it was doing so to fulfill its clients’ legal duty to submit
“prior art” when prosecuting a patent application – would that be a
fair use?
In 2012, the American Institute of Physics and John Wiley &
Sons filed four infringement lawsuits against law firms for such
copying. Originally, they alleged that submitting copies of
scientific articles to the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office without
permission of the owners of copyright in those articles amounted to
copyright infringement.
Later, they dropped that specific
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allegation, but argued that any other copying or distribution by the
law firm, other than the actual submission to the PTO, constituted
infringement. Should a law firm have to pay a licensing fee when it
is copying scientific articles in connection with patent prosecution?
Two of the cases settled before any decision on the merits. In the
other two cases, the courts held that the law firm’s uses qualified as
fair uses. See American Inst. of Physics v. Winstead PC, 2013 WL 6242843
(N.D. Tex.); American Inst. of Physics v. Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner,
P.A., 2013 WL 4666330 (D. Minn.). Key to the courts’ decisions was
their findings that the law firms’ use of the articles was a
transformative use. As the Winstead court put it:
The original function of [academic] articles is to provide
scientists, researchers, teachers, students, and other
interested persons information to keep abreast of current
developments in a particular field . . . . However, once a
reader seeks to patent an invention, the reader must
present copies to the USPTO informing it of the state of
industry at the time of the application . . . . At this point,
the [article] is transformed from an item of expressive
content to evidence of the facts within it; the expressive
content becomes merely incidental.
Winstead, 2013 WL 6242843, at *5. Suppose that my political
opponent states that he believes in creationism, but once wrote
a book called “In Defense of Darwinism.” I make 10,000 copies
of his book and send them to voters who will be choosing
between me and him in the next election. If he sues me for
copyright infringement, should I have a defense of fair use?
What might distinguish my case from the law firm patent
prosecution case?
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Insert on p. 347, after the end of the “Copyright in the Real
World” box:

Authors Guild v. Google, Inc.
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 2015
804 F.3d 302
LEVAL, Circuit Judge:
BACKGROUND
I. Plaintiffs
The author-plaintiffs are Jim Bouton, author of Ball Four; Betty Miles,
author of The Trouble with Thirteen; and Joseph Goulden, author of The
Superlawyers: The Small and Powerful World of the Great Washington Law Firms.
Each of them has a legal or beneficial ownership in the copyright for
his or her book. Their books have been scanned without their
permission by Google, which made them available to Internet users for
search and snippet view on Google’s website.
II. Google Books and the Google Library Project
Google’s Library Project, which began in 2004, involves bi-lateral
agreements between Google and a number of the world’s major
research libraries. Under these agreements, the participating libraries
select books from their collections to submit to Google for inclusion in
the project. Google makes a digital scan of each book, extracts a
machine-readable text, and creates an index of the machine-readable
text of each book. Google retains the original scanned image of each
book, in part so as to improve the accuracy of the machine-readable
texts and indices as image-to-text conversion technologies improve.
Since 2004, Google has scanned, rendered machine-readable, and
indexed more than 20 million books, including both copyrighted
works and works in the public domain. The vast majority of the books
are non-fiction, and most are out of print. All of the digital information
created by Google in the process is stored on servers protected by the
same security systems Google uses to shield its own confidential
information.
The digital corpus created by the scanning of these millions of books
enables the Google Books search engine. Members of the public who
access the Google Books website can enter search words or terms of
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their own choice, receiving in response a list of all books in the
database in which those terms appear, as well as the number of times
the term appears in each book. A brief description of each book,
entitled “About the Book,” gives some rudimentary additional
information, including a list of the words and terms that appear with
most frequency in the book. It sometimes provides links to buy the
book online and identifies libraries where the book can be found. The
search tool permits a researcher to identify those books, out of
millions, that do, as well as those that do not, use the terms selected
by the researcher. Google notes that this identifying information
instantaneously supplied would otherwise not be obtainable in
lifetimes of searching.
No advertising is displayed to a user of the search function. Nor does
Google receive payment by reason of the searcher’s use of Google’s link
to purchase the book.
The search engine also makes possible new forms of research, known
as “text mining” and “data mining.” Google’s “ngrams” research tool
draws on the Google Library Project corpus to furnish statistical
information to Internet users about the frequency of word and phrase
usage over centuries. This tool permits users to discern fluctuations of
interest in a particular subject over time and space by showing
increases and decreases in the frequency of reference and usage in
different periods and different linguistic regions. It also allows
researchers to comb over the tens of millions of books Google has
scanned in order to examine “word frequencies, syntactic patterns,
and thematic markers” and to derive information on how
nomenclature, linguistic usage, and literary style have changed over
time. Authors Guild, Inc., 954 F.Supp.2d at 287. The district court gave as
an example “track[ing] the frequency of references to the United
States as a single entity (‘the United States is’) versus references to the
United States in the plural (‘the United States are’) and how that
usage has changed over time.” Id.6
The Google Books search function also allows the user a limited
viewing of text. In addition to telling the number of times the word or
term selected by the searcher appears in the book, the search function
will display a maximum of three “snippets” containing it. A snippet is
a horizontal segment comprising ordinarily an eighth of a page. Each
page of a conventionally formatted book in the Google Books database
is divided into eight non-overlapping horizontal segments, each such
horizontal segment being a snippet. (Thus, for such a book with 24

COPYRIGHT : A Contemporary Approach

75

lines to a page, each snippet is comprised of three lines of text.) Each
search for a particular word or term within a book will reveal the same
three snippets, regardless of the number of computers from which the
search is launched. Only the first usage of the term on a given page is
displayed. Thus, if the top snippet of a page contains two (or more)
words for which the user searches, and Google’s program is fixed to
reveal that particular snippet in response to a search for either term,
the second search will duplicate the snippet already revealed by the
first search, rather than moving to reveal a different snippet containing
the word because the first snippet was already revealed. Google’s
program does not allow a searcher to increase the number of snippets
revealed by repeated entry of the same search term or by entering
searches from different computers. A searcher can view more than
three snippets of a book by entering additional searches for different
terms. However, Google makes permanently unavailable for snippet
view one snippet on each page and one complete page out of every
ten—a process Google calls “blacklisting.”
Google also disables snippet view entirely for types of books for which
a single snippet is likely to satisfy the searcher’s present need for the
book, such as dictionaries, cookbooks, and books of short poems.
Finally, since 2005, Google will exclude any book altogether from
snippet view at the request of the rights holder by the submission of
an online form.
****
DISCUSSION

I. The Law of Fair Use
****
Although well established in the common law development of
copyright, fair use was not recognized in the terms of our statute until
the adoption of § 107 in the Copyright Act of 1976. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et
seq.
****
Furthermore, notwithstanding fair use’s long common-law history,
not until the [Supreme Court’s ruling in Campbell v. Acuff–Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)] did courts undertake to explain the standards
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for finding fair use.
The Campbell Court undertook a comprehensive analysis of fair use’s
requirements, discussing every segment of § 107. Beginning with the
examples of purposes set forth in the statute’s preamble, the Court
made clear that they are “illustrative and not limitative” and “provide
only general guidance about the sorts of copying that courts and
Congress most commonly ha [ve] found to be fair uses.” 510 U.S. at
577–578, 114 S.Ct. 1164 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The statute “calls for case-by-case analysis” and “is not to be simplified
with bright-line rules.” Id. at 577, 114 S.Ct. 1164. Section 107’s four
factors are not to “be treated in isolation, one from another. All are to
be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes
of copyright.” Id. at 578, 114 S.Ct. 1164. Each factor thus stands as part
of a multifaceted assessment of the crucial question: how to define the
boundary limit of the original author’s exclusive rights in order to best
serve the overall objectives of the copyright law to expand public
learning while protecting the incentives of authors to create for the
public good.
At the same time, the Supreme Court has made clear that some of the
statute’s four listed factors are more significant than others. The Court
observed in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises that the
fourth factor, which assesses the harm the secondary use can cause to
the market for, or the value of, the copyright for the original, “is
undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.” 471 U.S.
539, 566, 105 S.Ct. 2218, 85 L.Ed.2d 588 (1985) (citing MELVILLE B.
NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A], at 13–76 (1984)).
This is consistent with the fact that the copyright is a commercial
right, intended to protect the ability of authors to profit from the
exclusive right to merchandise their own work.
In Campbell, the Court stressed also the importance of the first factor,
the “purpose and character of the secondary use.” 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
The more the appropriator is using the copied material for new,
transformative purposes, the more it serves copyright’s goal of
enriching public knowledge and the less likely it is that the
appropriation will serve as a substitute for the original or its plausible
derivatives, shrinking the protected market opportunities of the
copyrighted work. 510 U.S. at 591, 114 S.Ct. 1164 (noting that, when
the secondary use is transformative, “market substitution is at least
less certain, and market harm may not be so readily inferred.”).
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With this background, we proceed to discuss each of the statutory
factors, as illuminated by Campbell and subsequent case law, in relation
to the issues here in dispute.

II. The Search and Snippet View Functions
A. Factor One
(1) Transformative purpose. Campbell’s explanation of the first factor’s
inquiry into the “purpose and character” of the secondary use focuses
on whether the new work, “in Justice Story’s words . . . merely
‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation, . . . or instead adds
something new, with a further purpose . . . . [I]t asks, in other words,
whether and to what extent the new work is ‘transformative.’ ” 510
U.S. at 578–579, 114 S.Ct. 1164 (citations omitted). While recognizing
that a transformative use is “not absolutely necessary for a finding of
fair use,” the opinion further explains that the “goal of copyright, to
promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of
transformative works” and that “[s]uch works thus lie at the heart of
the fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the confines
of copyright.” Id. at 579, 114 S.Ct. 1164. In other words, transformative
uses tend to favor a fair use finding because a transformative use is one
that communicates something new and different from the original or
expands its utility, thus serving copyright’s overall objective of
contributing to public knowledge.
The word “transformative” cannot be taken too literally as a sufficient
key to understanding the elements of fair use. It is rather a suggestive
symbol for a complex thought, and does not mean that any and all
changes made to an author’s original text will necessarily support a
finding of fair use. The Supreme Court’s discussion in Campbell gave
important guidance on assessing when a transformative use tends to
support a conclusion of fair use. The defendant in that case defended
on the ground that its work was a parody of the original and that
parody is a time-honored category of fair use. Explaining why parody
makes a stronger, or in any event more obvious, claim of fair use than
satire, the Court stated,
[T]he heart of any parodist’s claim to quote from existing
material . . . is the use of . . . a prior author’s composition to . .
. comment[ ] on that author’s works . . . . If, on the contrary, the
commentary has no critical bearing on the substance or style
of the original composition, which the alleged infringer
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merely uses to get attention or to avoid the drudgery in
working up something fresh, the claim to fairness in
borrowing from another’s work diminishes accordingly (if it
does not vanish) . . . . * * * *
Id. at 580–81, 114 S.Ct. 1164 (emphasis added). In other words, the
would-be fair user of another’s work must have justification for the
taking. . . . This part of the Supreme Court’s discussion is significant in
assessing Google’s claim of fair use because, as discussed extensively
below, Google’s claim of transformative purpose for copying from the
works of others is to provide otherwise unavailable information about
the originals.
A further complication that can result from oversimplified reliance on
whether the copying involves transformation is that the word
“transform” also plays a role in defining “derivative works,” over which
the original rights holder retains exclusive control. Section 106 of the
Act specifies the “exclusive right[ ]” of the copyright owner “(2) to
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.” See 17
U.S.C. § 106. The statute defines derivative works largely by example,
rather than explanation. The examples include “translation, musical
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version,
sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement, condensation,” to
which list the statute adds “any other form in which a work may be . . .
transformed.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added). . . . The statutory
definition suggests that derivative works generally involve
transformations in the nature of changes of form. 17 U.S.C. § 101. By
contrast, copying from an original for the purpose of criticism or
commentary on the original or provision of information about it, tends
most clearly to satisfy Campbell’s notion of the “transformative”
purpose involved in the analysis of Factor One.
With these considerations in mind, we first consider whether
Google’s search and snippet views functions satisfy the first fair use
factor with respect to Plaintiffs’ rights in their books. (The question
whether these functions might infringe upon Plaintiffs’ derivative
rights is discussed in the next Part.)
(2) Search Function. We have no difficulty concluding that Google’s
making of a digital copy of Plaintiffs’ books for the purpose of enabling
a search for identification of books containing a term of interest to the
searcher involves a highly transformative purpose, in the sense
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intended by Campbell. In [Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 95
(2d Cir.2014)], [a]uthors brought claims of copyright infringement
against HathiTrust, an entity formed by libraries participating in the
Google Library Project to pool the digital copies of their books created
for them by Google. . . . Among the challenged uses was HathiTrust’s
offer to its patrons of “full-text searches,” which, very much like the
search offered by Google Books to Internet users, permitted patrons of
the libraries to locate in which of the digitized books specific words or
phrases appeared. 755 F.3d at 98.
****
Notwithstanding that the libraries had downloaded and stored
complete digital copies of entire books, we noted that such copying
was essential to permit searchers to identify and locate the books in
which words or phrases of interest to them appeared. Id. at 97. We
concluded “that the creation of a full-text searchable database is a
quintessentially transformative use ... [as] the result of a word search
is different in purpose, character, expression, meaning, and message
from the page (and the book) from which it is drawn.” Id. We cited
A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 639–40 (4th
Cir.2009), Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th
Cir.2007), and Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir.2003)
as examples of cases in which courts had similarly found the creation
of complete digital copies of copyrighted works to be transformative
fair uses when the copies “served a different function from the
original.” HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 97.
As with HathiTrust (and iParadigms), the purpose of Google’s copying of
the original copyrighted books is to make available significant
information about those books, permitting a searcher to identify those
that contain a word or term of interest, as well as those that do not
include reference to it. In addition, through the ngrams tool, Google
allows readers to learn the frequency of usage of selected words in the
aggregate corpus of published books in different historical periods.
We have no doubt that the purpose of this copying is the sort of
transformative purpose described in Campbell as strongly favoring
satisfaction of the first factor.
We recognize that our case differs from HathiTrust in two potentially
significant respects. First, HathiTrust did not “display to the user any
text from the underlying copyrighted work,” 755 F.3d at 91, whereas
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Google Books provides the searcher with snippets containing the
word that is the subject of the search. Second, HathiTrust was a
nonprofit educational entity, while Google is a profit-motivated
commercial corporation. We discuss those differences below.
(3) Snippet View. Plaintiffs correctly point out that this case is
significantly different from HathiTrust in that the Google Books search
function allows searchers to read snippets from the book searched,
whereas HathiTrust did not allow searchers to view any part of the
book. Snippet view adds important value to the basic transformative
search function, which tells only whether and how often the searched
term appears in the book. Merely knowing that a term of interest
appears in a book does not necessarily tell the searcher whether she
needs to obtain the book, because it does not reveal whether the term
is discussed in a manner or context falling within the scope of the
searcher’s interest. For example, a searcher seeking books that explore
Einstein’s theories, who finds that a particular book includes 39
usages of “Einstein,” will nonetheless conclude she can skip that book
if the snippets reveal that the book speaks of “Einstein” because that is
the name of the author’s cat. In contrast, the snippet will tell the
searcher that this is a book she needs to obtain if the snippet shows
that the author is engaging with Einstein’s theories.
Google’s division of the page into tiny snippets is designed to show
the searcher just enough context surrounding the searched term to
help her evaluate whether the book falls within the scope of her
interest (without revealing so much as to threaten the author’s
copyright interests). Snippet view thus adds importantly to the highly
transformative purpose of identifying books of interest to the searcher.
With respect to the first factor test, it favors a finding of fair use
(unless the value of its transformative purpose is overcome by its
providing text in a manner that offers a competing substitute for
Plaintiffs’ books, which we discuss under factors three and four
below).
(4) Google’s Commercial Motivation. Plaintiffs also contend that Google’s
commercial motivation weighs in their favor under the first factor.
Google’s commercial motivation distinguishes this case from
HathiTrust, as the defendant in that case was a non-profit entity
founded by, and acting as the representative of, libraries. Although
Google has no revenues flowing directly from its operation of the
Google Books functions, Plaintiffs stress that Google is profit-
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motivated and seeks to use its dominance of book search to fortify its
overall dominance of the Internet search market, and that thereby
Google indirectly reaps profits from the Google Books functions.
For these arguments Plaintiffs rely primarily on two sources. First is
Congress’s specification in spelling out the first fair use factor in the
text of § 107 that consideration of the “purpose and character of the
[secondary] use” should “include[e] whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.” Second is
the Supreme Court’s assertion in dictum in Sony Corporation of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc, that “every commercial use of copyrighted
material is presumptively . . . unfair.” 464 U.S. 417, 451, 104 S.Ct. 774,
78 L.Ed.2d 574 (1984). If that were the extent of precedential authority
on the relevance of commercial motivation, Plaintiffs’ arguments
would muster impressive support. However, while the commercial
motivation of the secondary use can undoubtedly weigh against a
finding of fair use in some circumstances, the Supreme Court, our
court, and others have eventually recognized that the Sony dictum was
enormously overstated.
The Sixth Circuit took the Sony dictum at its word in Acuff–Rose Music,
Inc. v. Campbell, concluding that, because the defendant rap music
group’s spoof of the plaintiff’s ballad was done for profit, it could not
be fair use. 972 F.2d 1429, 1436–1437 (6th Cir.1992). The Supreme
Court reversed on this very point, observing that “Congress could not
have intended” such a broad presumption against commercial fair
uses, as “nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the preamble
paragraph of § 107 . . . are generally conducted for profit in this
country.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584, 114 S.Ct. 1164 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
****
While we recognize that in some circumstances, a commercial
motivation on the part of the secondary user will weigh against her,
especially, as the Supreme Court suggested, when a persuasive
transformative purpose is lacking, Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579, 114 S.Ct.
1164, we see no reason in this case why Google’s overall profit
motivation should prevail as a reason for denying fair use over its
highly convincing transformative purpose, together with the absence
of significant substitutive competition, as reasons for granting fair use.
Many of the most universally accepted forms of fair use, such as news
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reporting and commentary, quotation in historical or analytic books,
reviews of books, and performances, as well as parody, are all normally
done commercially for profit.

B. Factor Two

The second fair use factor directs consideration of the “nature of the
copyrighted work.” . . .
The second factor has rarely played a significant role in the
determination of a fair use dispute. See WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY
ON FAIR USE § 4.1 (2015). The Supreme Court in Harper & Row made
a passing observation in dictum that, “[t]he law generally recognizes a
greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or
fantasy.” 471 U.S. 539, 563, 105 S.Ct. 2218 (1985). Courts have
sometimes speculated that this might mean that a finding of fair use is
more favored when the copying is of factual works than when copying
is from works of fiction. However, while the copyright does not
protect facts or ideas set forth in a work, it does protect that author’s
manner of expressing those facts and ideas. At least unless a
persuasive fair use justification is involved, authors of factual works,
like authors of fiction, should be entitled to copyright protection of
their protected expression.
****
Nothing in this case influences us one way or the other with respect to
the second factor considered in isolation. To the extent that the
“nature” of the original copyrighted work necessarily combines with
the “purpose and character” of the secondary work to permit
assessment of whether the secondary work uses the original in a
“transformative” manner, as the term is used in Campbell, the second
factor favors fair use not because Plaintiffs’ works are factual, but
because the secondary use transformatively provides valuable
information about the original, rather than replicating protected
expression in a manner that provides a meaningful substitute for the
original.

C. Factor Three

The third statutory factor instructs us to consider “the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole.”
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****
(1) Search Function. . . . The Supreme Court said in Campbell that “the
extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose and character of
the use” and characterized the relevant questions as whether “the
amount and substantiality of the portion used ... are reasonable in
relation to the purpose of the copying,” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586–587,
114 S.Ct. 1164 . . . .
In HathiTrust, our court concluded in its discussion of the third factor
that “[b]ecause it was reasonably necessary for the [HathiTrust Digital
Library] to make use of the entirety of the works in order to enable the
full-text search function, we do not believe the copying was
excessive.” 755 F.3d at 98. As with HathiTrust, not only is the copying of
the totality of the original reasonably appropriate to Google’s
transformative purpose, it is literally necessary to achieve that
purpose. If Google copied less than the totality of the originals, its
search function could not advise searchers reliably whether their
searched term appears in a book (or how many times). . . .
(2) Snippet View. Google’s provision of snippet view makes our third
factor inquiry different from that inquiry in HathiTrust. What matters
in such cases is not so much “the amount and substantiality of the
portion used” in making a copy, but rather the amount and substantiality
of what is thereby made accessible to a public for which it may serve as a
competing substitute.
****
We . . . conclude that, at least as presently structured by Google, the
snippet view does not reveal matter that offers the marketplace a
significantly competing substitute for the copyrighted work.
Google has constructed the snippet feature in a manner that
substantially protects against its serving as an effectively competing
substitute for Plaintiffs’ books. In the Background section of this
opinion, we describe a variety of limitations Google imposes on the
snippet function. These include the small size of the snippets
(normally one eighth of a page), the blacklisting of one snippet per
page and of one page in every ten, the fact that no more than three
snippets are shown—and no more than one per page—for each term
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searched, and the fact that the same snippets are shown for a searched
term no matter how many times, or from how many different
computers, the term is searched. In addition, Google does not provide
snippet view for types of books, such as dictionaries and cookbooks,
for which viewing a small segment is likely to satisfy the searcher’s
need. The result of these restrictions is, so far as the record
demonstrates, that a searcher cannot succeed, even after long
extended effort to multiply what can be revealed, in revealing through
a snippet search what could usefully serve as a competing substitute
for the original.
****

D. Factor Four

The fourth fair use factor, “the effect of the [copying] use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,” focuses on
whether the copy brings to the marketplace a competing substitute
for the original, or its derivative, so as to deprive the rights holder of
significant revenues because of the likelihood that potential
purchasers may opt to acquire the copy in preference to the original.
Because copyright is a commercial doctrine whose objective is to
stimulate creativity among potential authors by enabling them to earn
money from their creations, the fourth factor is of great importance in
making a fair use assessment. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566, 105
S.Ct. 2218 (describing the fourth factor as “undoubtedly the single
most important element of fair use”).
Campbell stressed the close linkage between the first and fourth factors,
in that the more the copying is done to achieve a purpose that differs
from the purpose of the original, the less likely it is that the copy will
serve as a satisfactory substitute for the original. 510 U.S. at 591, 114
S.Ct. 1164. Consistent with that observation, the HathiTrust court
found that the fourth factor favored the defendant and supported a
finding of fair use because the ability to search the text of the book to
determine whether it includes selected words “does not serve as a
substitute for the books that are being searched.” 755 F.3d at 100.
However, Campbell‘s observation as to the likelihood of a secondary use
serving as an effective substitute goes only so far. Even if the purpose of
the copying is for a valuably transformative purpose, such copying
might nonetheless harm the value of the copyrighted original if done in
a manner that results in widespread revelation of sufficiently
significant portions of the original as to make available a significantly
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competing substitute. The question for us is whether snippet view,
notwithstanding its transformative purpose, does that. We conclude
that, at least as snippet view is presently constructed, it does not.
Especially in view of the fact that the normal purchase price of a book
is relatively low in relation to the cost of manpower needed to secure
an arbitrary assortment of randomly scattered snippets, we conclude
that the snippet function does not give searchers access to effectively
competing substitutes. Snippet view, at best and after a large
commitment of manpower, produces discontinuous, tiny fragments,
amounting in the aggregate to no more than 16% of a book. This does
not threaten the rights holders with any significant harm to the value
of their copyrights or diminish their harvest of copyright revenue.
We recognize that the snippet function can cause some loss of sales.
There are surely instances in which a searcher’s need for access to a
text will be satisfied by the snippet view, resulting in either the loss of
a sale to that searcher, or reduction of demand on libraries for that
title, which might have resulted in libraries purchasing additional
copies. But the possibility, or even the probability or certainty, of some
loss of sales does not suffice to make the copy an effectively competing
substitute that would tilt the weighty fourth factor in favor of the
rights holder in the original. There must be a meaningful or significant
effect “upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.” 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
Furthermore, the type of loss of sale envisioned above will generally
occur in relation to interests that are not protected by the copyright. A
snippet’s capacity to satisfy a searcher’s need for access to a
copyrighted book will at times be because the snippet conveys a
historical fact that the searcher needs to ascertain.
****
[An a]uthor[’s] copyright does not extend to the facts communicated
by his book. It protects only the author’s manner of expression.
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir.1980) (“A
grant of copyright in a published work secures for its author a limited
monopoly over the expression it contains.”) (emphasis added).
****
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Even if the snippet reveals some authorial expression, because of the
brevity of a single snippet and the cumbersome, disjointed, and
incomplete nature of the aggregation of snippets made available
through snippet view, we think it would be a rare case in which the
searcher’s interest in the protected aspect of the author’s work would be
satisfied by what is available from snippet view, and rarer still—
because of the cumbersome, disjointed, and incomplete nature of the
aggregation of snippets made available through snippet view—that
snippet view could provide a significant substitute for the purchase of
the author’s book.
Accordingly, considering the four fair use factors in light of the goals
of copyright, we conclude that Google’s making of a complete digital
copy of Plaintiffs’ works for the purpose of providing the public with
its search and snippet view functions (at least as snippet view is
presently designed) is a fair use and does not infringe Plaintiffs’
copyrights in their books.

III. Derivative Rights in Search and Snippet View

Plaintiffs next contend that, under Section 106(2), they have a
derivative right in the application of search and snippet view
functions to their works, and that Google has usurped their exclusive
market for such derivatives.
There is no merit to this argument. As explained above, Google does
not infringe Plaintiffs’ copyright in their works by making digital
copies of them, where the copies are used to enable the public to get
information about the works, such as whether, and how often they use
specified words or terms (together with peripheral snippets of text,
sufficient to show the context in which the word is used but too small
to provide a meaningful substitute for the work’s copyrighted
expression). The copyright resulting from the Plaintiffs’ authorship of
their works does not include an exclusive right to furnish the kind of
information about the works that Google’s programs provide to the
public. For substantially the same reasons, the copyright that protects
Plaintiffs’ works does not include an exclusive derivative right to
supply such information through query of a digitized copy.
The extension of copyright protection beyond the copying of the work
in its original form to cover also the copying of a derivative reflects a
clear and logical policy choice. An author’s right to control and profit
from the dissemination of her work ought not to be evaded by
conversion of the work into a different form. The author of a book

COPYRIGHT : A Contemporary Approach

87

written in English should be entitled to control also the dissemination
of the same book translated into other languages, or a conversion of
the book into a film. The copyright of a composer of a symphony or
song should cover also conversions of the piece into scores for
different instrumentation, as well as into recordings of performances.
This policy is reflected in the statutory definition, which explains the
scope of the “derivative” largely by examples—including “a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization,
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction,
abridgement, [or] condensation”—before adding, “or any other form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.
As noted above, this definition, while imprecise, strongly implies that
derivative works over which the author of the original enjoys exclusive
rights ordinarily are those that re-present the protected aspects of the
original work, i.e., its expressive content, converted into an altered
form, such as the conversion of a novel into a film, the translation of a
writing into a different language, the reproduction of a painting in the
form of a poster or post card, recreation of a cartoon character in the
form of a three-dimensional plush toy, adaptation of a musical
composition for different instruments, or other similar conversions. If
Plaintiffs’ claim were based on Google’s converting their books into a
digitized form and making that digitized version accessible to the
public, their claim would be strong. But as noted above, Google
safeguards from public view the digitized copies it makes and allows
access only to the extent of permitting the public to search for the very
limited information accessible through the search function and
snippet view. The program does not allow access in any substantial
way to a book’s expressive content. Nothing in the statutory
definition of a derivative work, or of the logic that underlies it,
suggests that the author of an original work enjoys an exclusive
derivative right to supply information about that work of the sort
communicated by Google’s search functions.
****
While the telephone ringtones at issue in [United States v. American
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), 599 F.Supp.2d 415
(S.D.N.Y.2009), which] Plaintiffs cite[,] are superficially comparable
to Google’s snippets in that both consist of brief segments of the
copyrighted work, in a more significant way they are fundamentally
different. While it is true that Google’s snippets display a fragment of
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expressive content, the fragments it displays result from the
appearance of the term selected by the searcher in an otherwise
arbitrarily selected snippet of text. Unlike the reading experience that
the Google Partners program or the Amazon Search Inside the Book
program provides, the snippet function does not provide searchers
with any meaningful experience of the expressive content of the book.
Its purpose is not to communicate copyrighted expression, but rather,
by revealing to the searcher a tiny segment surrounding the searched
term, to give some minimal contextual information to help the
searcher learn whether the book’s use of that term will be of interest
to her. The segments taken from copyrighted music as ringtones, in
contrast, are selected precisely because they play the most famous,
beloved passages of the particular piece—the expressive content that
members of the public want to hear when their phone rings. The value
of the ringtone to the purchaser is not that it provides information but
that it provides a mini-performance of the most appealing segment of
the author’s expressive content. There is no reason to think the courts
in the cited cases would have come to the same conclusion if the
service being provided by the secondary user had been simply to
identify to a subscriber in what key a selected composition was
written, the year it was written, or the name of the composer. These
cases, and the existence of unpaid licensing schemes for substantial
viewing of digitized works, do not support Plaintiffs’ derivative works
argument.
[The court considers the Plaintiffs’ contention that “Google’s storage
of its digitized copies of Plaintiffs’ books exposes them to the risk that
hackers might gain access and make the books widely available, thus
destroying the value of their copyrights,” and dismisses it on the basis
that “it is not supported by the evidence.” It also dismisses the
Plaintiffs’ contention “that Google’s distribution to a participating
library of a digital copy of Plaintiffs’ books is not a fair use,” because, it
finds, “[t]he libraries propose to use their digital copies to enable the
very kinds of searches that we here hold to be fair uses,” and “[t]he
contract between Google and each of the participating libraries
commits the library to use its digital copy only in a manner consistent
with the copyright law, and to take precautions to prevent
dissemination of their digital copies to the public at large.”]
Notes
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1. The Increasing Dominance of the Concept of “Transformative
Use,” and the Views of its Creator. After the Supreme Court’s
decision in Campbell, lower courts started placing increasing
weight in fair use analysis on whether a use was “transformative,”
and it is easy to see why. “Transformative” is a rather abstract
term with positive connotations – similar in that regard to
“innovative” – and thus might be used rather flexibly by courts to
sanction uses that they found salutary. Some courts also
interpreted the Campbell Court as suggesting that when a use is
transformative, the other fair use factors become less important,
which would make fair use analysis a lot easier: instead of
balancing four factors, a court could just ask one question: is a use
“transformative” or not? The increasing emphasis placed on
“transformative use” then resulted in suggestions that the concept
was overused and unhelpful. See, e.g., Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation
LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014) (questioning whether it is
helpful to ask if alterations to a photograph are “transformative”);
Thomas F. Cotter, Transformative Use and Cognizable Harm, 12
Vand. J. Ent. & Tech Law 701 (2010); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman,
The More Things Change the Less They Seem “Transformed”:
Some Reflections on Fair Use, 46 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 251
(1998).
Judge Leval, author of the Google Books opinion above, himself
coined the term “transformative use” in a 1990 law review article,
which then influenced the Supreme Court’s analysis in the
Campbell case. See Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev.
1105 (1990). Thus, Judge Leval’s opinion in Google Books could be
read in part as a defense of the “transformative use” concept,
coupled with an explanation of its proper scope and application in
light of its development in the twenty-one years between the
Campbell decision and the Google Books decision. Can you identify
where Judge Leval is expressing such views, and what his views
are?
2.

Transformative Use, “New Expression,” and the Derivative
Work Right. In Campbell, the Court suggested that whether the
defendant’s work was “transformative” was a matter of whether it
“adds something new, with a further purpose or different
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or
message.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. And of course the work at
issue involved in Campbell, Two Live Crew’s version of “Pretty
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Woman,” took some of the lyrics and music of Roy Orbison’s song,
but added new lyrics and music to it. Taking a preexisting work
and adding new expression to it could also count as the
preparation of a derivative work, an activity that the owner of
copyright in the preexisting work has the right to control under §
106(2) of the Copyright Act. When does combining elements of a
preexisting work with new expression – a type of “transformative
use” – count as fair use, and when does it count as the preparation
of a derivative work? What other fair use factors might come into
play? Does the Google Books opinion have anything to say about
this?
3. Transformative Use Without New Expression. The Google Books
case can be placed in a line of cases that have found transformative
use without the addition of any new expression. Previous cases
concerned visual search engines, see Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336
F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir.2003); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,
508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir.2007); and plagiarism-checking
software. see A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC., 562
F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009). In that last case, the defendant
iParadigms made electronic copies of academic papers written by
students without their consent, for the purpose of building a
database to provide a plagiarism-checking service. The service
compares newly-submitted papers to those previously entered into
the database, to check whether the former have copied from the
latter without proper attribution. The Fourth Circuit held that the
copying of the academic papers counted as fair use: “iParadigms’
use of plaintiffs’ works had an entirely different function and
purpose than the original works; the fact that there was no
substantive alteration to the works does not preclude the use from
being transformative in nature.” Id. at 639.
4. Fair Use Without Transformative Use. As the Google Books
opinion indicates, the Second Circuit held in Authors Guild, Inc. v.
HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir.2014), that copying books for the
purpose of providing full-text searching of them was a
transformative use. By contrast, the HathiTrust court held that
copying for the purpose of providing access to the print-disabled
was not a transformative use, because it just enabled a wider
audience to enjoy the books, and did not change the authors’
original purposes. However, the court noted that the House
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Committee Report on the 1976 Act stated that “’the making of a
single copy or phonorecord by an individual as a free service for a
blind persons [sic ] would properly be considered a fair use under
section 107’” id. at *12 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476, at 73
(1976)), and that the Supreme Court had mentioned this passage
with approval in Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 n. 40 (1984). Weighing all the factors, the
court held that access to the print-disabled counted as a fair use.
5. Fair Use as Complementary Use? In Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 292
F.3d 512, 517–518 (7th Cir.2002), Judge Richard Posner opined that
the fundamental distinction to be made in fair use analysis was
between
copying that is complementary to the copyrighted work (in
the sense that nails are complements of hammers)[, which]
is fair use, [and] copying that is a substitute for the
copyrighted work (in the sense that nails are substitutes
for pegs or screws), or for derivative works from the
copyrighted work, [which] is not fair use. If the price of
nails fell, the demand for hammers would rise but the
demand for pegs would fall. The hammer manufacturer
wants there to be an abundant supply of cheap nails, and
likewise publishers want their books reviewed and
wouldn't want reviews inhibited and degraded by a rule
requiring the reviewer to obtain a copyright license from
the publisher if he wanted to quote from the book.
Id. at 517. Judge Posner suggests that distinguishing between
“transformative” and “superseding” uses is just a confusing way of
distinguishing between “complementary” and “substitutional”
uses. Id. at 518.
In footnote 18 of his Google Books opinion, Judge Leval responded
to Judge Posner’s suggestion:
We do not find the term “complementary” particularly
helpful in explaining fair use. . . . When a novel is converted
into film, for example, the original novel and the film
ideally complement one another in that each contributes to
achieving results that neither can accomplish on its own.
The invention of the original author combines with the
cinematographic interpretive skills of the filmmaker to
produce something that neither could have produced
independently. Nonetheless, at least when the intention of
the film is to make a “motion picture version” of the novel . .
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. the film is generally understood to be a derivative work,
which under § 106, falls within the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner.
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d at 216 n. 18 (2015). Is Judge
Leval using the term “complementary” in the same way that Judge
Posner is? Is it possible that if a movie version of a novel were
available, sales of the novel might decrease, because some people
might choose to see the movie rather than read the book? If that
were the case, would we say that the movie was not
“complementary” to the book in Judge Posner’s sense of the term,
even though it was “complementary” in Judge Leval’s sense of the
term? Can Judge Posner’s concept of economic complementarity
explain all of fair use doctrine, or at best some of it?
6. “Appropriation Art” and Fair Use Without Commentary.
Appropriation art involves taking existing images and
“recontextualizing” them. By making slight changes in objects or
displaying them in a new context an artist can allow us to view
them in a new light. According to
See It
the Tate Gallery in London,
To read a short explanation of
appropriation art is “the more or
“appropriation” as an artistic
less direct taking over into a
technique on the web site of the
work of art a real object or even
Museum of Modern Art, you can
an existing work of art.” In Cariou
click here. You can see examples
v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir.
of Cariou's original photographs
2013), the plaintiff was a
and Prince's alterations by
photographer who published a
viewing the opinion on Westlaw
book of photographs he made
Next.
while living with Rastafarians in
Jamaica for several years. Some time later, an appropriation artist
named Richard Prince altered several dozen of the photographs
for use in a series of paintings and collages he called Canal Zone.
The Second Circuit found that Prince had sufficiently transformed
all but five of the images to qualify for the fair use defense (the
court remanded to the District Court for full consideration of the
five remaining images). Along the way to that conclusion it
rejected the District Court’s requirement that the new works must
“comment” on or critically refer back to the originals in order for
fair use to apply. As Judge Parker put it for the Second Circuit,
The law imposes no requirement that a work comment on
the original or its author in order to be considered
transformative, and a secondary work may constitute a fair
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use even if it serves some purpose other than those
(criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship,
and research) identified in the preamble to the statute. . . .
Prince's work could be transformative even without
commenting on Cariou's work or on culture, and even
without Prince's stated intention to do so. Rather than
confining our inquiry to Prince's explanations of his
artworks, we instead examine how the artworks may
“reasonably be perceived” in order to assess their
transformative nature.
Id. at 707. The Second Circuit held that Prince’s works did not
substantially interfere with the market for Cariou’s photographs
in part because they sold for so much more: While “[c]ertain of
[Prince’s] Canal Zone artworks have sold for two million or more
dollars,” Cariou earned “just over $8000 in royalties” for his book
of photographs. Thus, “Prince's audience is very different from
Cariou's, and there is no evidence that Prince's work ever
touched—much less usurped—either the primary or derivative
market for Cariou's work.” Id. at 709. Should it count as
“transformation” that Prince managed to make far more money
from Cariou’s photographs then Cariou ever did, by
incorporating those photographs without commenting on them?
7. When Fair Use Encounters Mass Digitization. The Google Books
opinion reaffirms that courts must perform fair use analysis on a
case-by-case basis, and yet in the context of mass digitization
projects, is that really possible? How does Judge Leval deal with
the fact that the second fair use factor, “the character of the
work,” would traditionally be weighed differently with respect
to the various different books that Google scanned, since some
of them were works of nonfiction, and others works of fiction?
8. Fair Use and the Development of Specific Exceptions to
Copyright. Will heavy reliance on fair use stifle further
development of more bright-line, administrable exceptions to
the exclusive rights of copyright? Consider, for example, § 121 of
the Copyright Act, which provides an exception for copies made
and distributed by authorized entities in specialized formats
exclusively for the use of blind or other persons with disabilities.
This section might have been suitable for an era in which the
leading technology for the print-disabled was braille. In the era
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of synthetic text-to-speech software, perhaps it should be
rewritten. If major efforts to provide access to the print-disabled
are deemed fair uses, however, there may be little motivation for
such a rewrite. Are there both advantages and disadvantages to
routing everything through fair use, and if so, how would you
articulate them?
9. Fair Use and First Sale: A Conundrum? How does § 107
interact with § 109 , the latter being the Copyright Act’s
statement of the first sale doctrine? Section 109 provides that
“the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made
under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is
entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or
phonorecord.” If the copies that Google and Hathitrust made
were “lawfully made,” because they were made in pursuance of
fair uses, can Google and Hathitrust now turn around and sell
them, without gaining the permission of the owner of copyright?
If not, how would you write the opinion that explained why
not?

p. 355 – Insert after Note 2
2A. Verbatim Copying for Purpose of Criticism. If context is
everything, does the fair use doctrine allow you to use a copyrighted
photograph to illustrate a news story or blog post that is critical of the
person depicted in the photograph? In Katz v. Google Inc., 802 F.3d 1178,
1180 (11th Cir. 2015), the Eleventh Circuit said yes. Raanam Katz is a
major real estate developer in South Florida and part owner of the
Miami Heat NBA team. He owns the copyright in a picture of himself,
which we have reproduced below, and which he feels is highly
unflattering.
The photo was originally taken by an Israeli
photojournalist when Katz was visiting that country, and was
published in an Israeli newspaper. Katz acquired the copyright from
the photographer. Irina Chevaldina was a former tenant in one of
Katz’s shopping centers, who the court described as “disgruntled.”
Over a 16-month period she published a total of 25 highly critical blog
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posts about Katz, illustrating each of them with the photograph in
question, which had found online via a Google search.
When Katz sued, Chevaldina raised the fair use defense. The district
court summary judgment in her favor and the Court of Appeals
affirmed. In discussing the first fair use factor the court said
“Chevaldina's use of the Photo was transformative because, in the
context of the blog post's surrounding commentary, she used Katz's
purportedly ‘ugly’ and ‘compromising’ appearance to ridicule and
satirize his character.” Regarding the fourth factor, the court observed
that “Chevaldina's use of the Photo would not materially impair Katz's
incentive to publish the work. Katz took the highly unusual step of
obtaining the copyright to the Photo and initiating this lawsuit
specifically to prevent its publication. Katz profoundly distastes [sic]
the Photo and seeks to extinguish, for all time, the dissemination of his
“embarrassing” countenance. Due to Katz's attempt to
utilize copyright as an instrument of censorship against unwanted
criticism, there is no potential market for his work.” Would it be
transformative to use a flattering picture to illustrate critical
commentary? Might that affect the market value of the flattering
picture? What about using a flattering picture to illustrate flattering
commentary?

The disputed photograph of Raanan Katz
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Chapter 6 Enforcement and Protection Strategies
A. Direct Infringement
Page 376 – insert after note 2:
3. Some Ninth Circuit Wavering on the Volitional Conduct
Requirement. Two District Court judges in the Ninth Circuit
announced that they will not impose a volitional conduct
requirement for direct infringement without clear instructions
from the Circuit Court. See Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. WTV
Systems, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (C.D. Cal. 2011), Arista Records LLC
v. Myxer Inc., f/k/a Visible Technologies, Inc., Case No. CV 08–3935–GAF
(JCx) (C.D. Cal. April 1, 2011). However, those instructions may
have arrived. In Fox Broadcasting Co. v. Dish Network, LLC, 2013 WL
3814917 (9th Cir.), the Ninth Circuit held that Dish Network could
not be held directly liable for recording broadcast television shows
because it was Dish subscribers, rather than Dish itself, that
decided to make the recordings. Citing Cartoon Network, the court
held that “operating a system used to make copies at the user's
command does not mean that the system operator, rather than the
user, caused copies to be made.” Id. at *4. Because “Dish's program
creates the copy only in response to the user's command . . . the
district court did not err in concluding that the user, not Dish,
makes the copy.” Id.

B. Secondary Liability: An Introduction
p. 384 - insert the following before “Copyright in the Real World:
A Trip to the Copy Shop”:
4. Authorization Liability Revisited. In Banco Popular de Puerto
Rico v. Asociación de Compositores y Editores de Musica
Latinoamericana (ACEMLA), 678 F.3d 102 (1st Cir. 2012), a
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company named Guillermo Venegas Lloveras, Inc. (“GLVI”) proved
that it owned copyright in a song called “Genesís,” which Banco
Popular de Puerto Rico (“BPPR”) had performed in a Christmas
concert in 1993. At the time of the concert, BPPR had no license to
perform the song. Later, ACEMLA, representing that it owned
copyright in “Genesís,” entered into a “retroactive licensing
agreement” with BPPR. The District Court held that ACEMLA’s
retroactive license of BPPR’s performance amounted to copyright
infringement, entitling GLVI to recover the license fees collected by
ACEMLA for the song. The First Circuit affirmed. It distinguished
its own decision in Venegas-Hernandez, mentioned in note 3 above, by
explaining that while in Venegas-Hernandez, there was no finding
that the songs at issue had actually been performed, in this case the
parties stipulated that “Genesís” had been performed, which
“support[ed] the District Court’s finding of liability for copyright
infringement.” Id. at 113.
Can that be right? Could ACEMLA have become a direct
infringer by purporting to authorize someone else’s performance
after it occurred? How about secondary liability – by purporting to
license after-the-fact, can ACEMLA be said to have induced or
materially contributed to the infringement, or to have had any
control over BPPR? Although both the District Court and the First
Circuit seem content with labelling ACEMLA an infringer, the
judgment might be better defended as an application of the
equitable remedy of restitution. See Restatements of the Law 3d,
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 47 (“If a third person makes a
payment to the defendant in respect of an asset belonging to the
claimant, the claimant is entitled to restitution from the defendant
as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.”). In that case,
however, would it matter whether infringement had taken place, or
only whether the defendant had received payments in exchange for
purportedly licensing a work in which copyright was owned by the
plaintiff? In other words, if BPPR actually had a license from
GLVI, and then performed the song under that license but paid the
royalties to ACEMLA instead of to GLVI, GLVI’S claim against
ACEMLA seems to be one for restitution.
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5. Vicarious Liability and Corporate Officers. In Universal Furniture
Int’l, Inc. v. Frankel, 538 Fed. Appx. 267 (4th Cir. 2013), the plaintiff,
Universal, had recovered an $11 million judgment against a
competitor called Collezione for using certain of its copyrighted
furniture designs.
Collezione, a closely held corporation,
subsequently filed for bankruptcy and was unable to satisfy that
judgment, so Universal brought a separate suit against Paul
Frankel, who was Vice President and Treasurer of Collezione.
Frankel had been actively involved “the ‘operations and financial
side of the business,’ including transactions with the Collezione
warehouse; ‘order fulfillment;’ ‘purchasing and flow of product;’
‘general operation of the sales [department];’ and ‘supervision of . . .
[the] distribution center.’ ” The Fourth Circuit affirmed a finding
that Frankel was vicariously liable for the acts of the corporation
using the traditional two-prong test of (1) right and ability to
supervise the direct infringer plus (2) a financial interest in the
infringement. It also held that he was collaterally estopped from
re-litigating the merits of the infringement claim.
The result is consistent with the weight of the case law. As
summarized by the Nimmer treatise: “an officer of an infringing
corporation will be personally liable if he either participates
personally (and other than merely in his corporate capacity) in the
manufacture and sale of an infringing article, or if he uses the
corporation as an instrument to carry out his willful and deliberate
infringements, or if he is the dominant influence in the corporation
and determines the policies that result in infringement, or if he
derives financial benefit from the infringing activities either as a
major shareholder or through other means, or on the basis of some
combination of the above criteria.” Melville B. Nimmer and David
Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright, § 12.04[A][1]. Can this result be
squared with the principle of limited liability which is one of the
primary reasons for organizing a business as a corporation? If
Collezione had failed to pay its rent or one of its suppliers would
Frankel be personally liable? If not, why is copyright infringement
different?

E. Shielding and Recruiting New Gatekeepers: the
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Treatment of Online Service Providers in Section 512
pp. 410-425 - replace the District Court opinion in Viacom
International Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. and the accompanying notes
with:

Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 2012
676 F.3d 19
***
JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge
This appeal requires us to clarify the contours of the “safe harbor”
provision of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) that
limits the liability of online service providers for copyright
infringement that occurs “by reason of the storage at the direction of a
user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or
operated by or for the service provider.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
The plaintiffs-appellants in these related actions—Viacom
International, Inc. (“Viacom”), The Football Association Premier
League Ltd. (“Premier League”), and various film studios, television
networks, music publishers, and sports leagues (jointly, the
“plaintiffs”)—appeal from an August 10, 2010 judgment of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Louis L.
Stanton, Judge), which granted summary judgment to defendantsappellees YouTube, Inc., YouTube, LLC, and Google Inc. (jointly,
“YouTube” or the “defendants”). The plaintiffs alleged direct and
secondary copyright infringement based on the public performance,
display, and reproduction of approximately 79,000 audiovisual “clips”
that appeared on the YouTube website between 2005 and 2008. They
demanded, inter alia, statutory damages pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)
or, in the alternative, actual damages from the alleged infringement, as
well as declaratory and injunctive relief.
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* * *
These related cases present a series of significant questions of
statutory construction. We conclude that the District Court correctly
held that the § 512(c) safe harbor requires knowledge or awareness of
specific infringing activity, but we vacate the order granting summary
judgment because a reasonable jury could find that YouTube had
actual knowledge or awareness of specific infringing activity on its
website. * * *
BACKGROUND
A. The DMCA Safe Harbors
“The DMCA was enacted in 1998 to implement the World
Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty,” Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 440 (2d Cir.2001), and to update
domestic copyright law for the digital age, see Ellison v. Robertson, 357
F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir.2004). Title II of the DMCA, separately titled
the “Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act”
(OCILLA), was designed to “clarif[y] the liability faced by service
providers who transmit potentially infringing material over their
networks.” S.Rep. No. 105–190 at 2 (1998). But “[r]ather than
embarking upon a wholesale clarification” of various copyright
doctrines, Congress elected “to leave current law in its evolving state
and, instead, to create a series of ‘safe harbors[ ]’ for certain common
activities of service providers.” Id. at 19. To that end, OCILLA
established a series of four “safe harbors” that allow qualifying service
providers to limit their liability for claims of copyright infringement
based on (a) “transitory digital network communications,” (b) “system
caching,” (c) “information residing on systems or networks at [the]
direction of users,” and (d) “information location tools.” 17 U.S.C. §
512(a)-(d).
To qualify for protection under any of the safe harbors, a party
must meet a set of threshold criteria. First, the party must in fact be a

101

COPYRIGHT : A Contemporary Approach

“service provider,” defined, in pertinent part, as “a provider of online
services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor.” 17
U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B). A party that qualifies as a service provider must
also satisfy certain “conditions of eligibility,” including the adoption
and reasonable implementation of a “repeat infringer” policy that
“provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of
subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or
network.” Id. § 512(i)(1)(A). In addition, a qualifying service provider
must accommodate “standard technical measures” that are “used by
copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted works.” Id. §
512(i)(1)(B), (i)(2).
Beyond the threshold criteria, a service provider must satisfy the
requirements of a particular safe harbor. In this case, the safe harbor at
issue is § 512(c), which covers infringement claims that arise “by
reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides
on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service
provider.” Id. § 512(c)(1). The § 512(c) safe harbor will apply only if the
service provider:
(A) (i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an
activity using the material on the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts
or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material;
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the
infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the
right and ability to control such activity; and
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in
paragraph (3), responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access
to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of
infringing activity.
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Id. § 512(c)(1)(A)-(C). Section 512(c) also sets forth a detailed
notification scheme that requires service providers to “designate[ ] an
agent to receive notifications of claimed infringement,” id. § 512(c)(2),
and specifies the components of a proper notification, commonly
known as a “takedown notice,” to that agent, see id. § 512(c)(3). Thus,
actual knowledge of infringing material, awareness of facts or
circumstances that make infringing activity apparent, or receipt of a
takedown notice will each trigger an obligation to expeditiously
remove the infringing material.
With the statutory context in mind, we now turn to the facts of
this case.
B. Factual Background
YouTube was founded in February 2005 by Chad Hurley
(“Hurley”), Steve Chen (“Chen”), and Jawed Karim (“Karim”), three
former employees of the internet company Paypal. When YouTube
announced the “official launch” of the website in December 2005, a
press release described YouTube as a “consumer media company” that
“allows people to watch, upload, and share personal video clips at
www.You Tube.com.” Under the slogan “Broadcast yourself,”
YouTube achieved rapid prominence and profitability, eclipsing
competitors such as Google Video and Yahoo Video by wide margins.
In November 2006, Google acquired YouTube in a stock-for-stock
transaction valued at $1.65 billion. By March 2010, at the time of
summary judgment briefing in this litigation, site traffic on YouTube
had soared to more than 1 billion daily video views, with more than 24
hours of new video uploaded to the site every minute.
The basic function of the YouTube website permits users to
“upload” and view video clips free of charge. Before uploading a video
to YouTube, a user must register and create an account with the
website. The registration process requires the user to accept
YouTube's Terms of Use agreement, which provides, inter alia, that the
user “will not submit material that is copyrighted ... unless [he is] the
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owner of such rights or ha[s] permission from their rightful owner to
post the material and to grant YouTube all of the license rights
granted herein.” When the registration process is complete, the user
can sign in to his account, select a video to upload from the user's
personal computer, mobile phone, or other device, and instruct the
YouTube system to upload the video by clicking on a virtual upload
“button.”
Uploading a video to the YouTube website triggers a series of
automated software functions. During the upload process, YouTube
makes one or more exact copies of the video in its original file format.
YouTube also makes one or more additional copies of the video in
“Flash” format, a process known as “transcoding.” The transcoding
process ensures that YouTube videos are available for viewing by most
users at their request. The YouTube system allows users to gain access
to video content by “streaming” the video to the user's computer in
response to a playback request. YouTube uses a computer algorithm to
identify clips that are “related” to a video the user watches and display
links to the “related” clips.
***
DISCUSSION
***
A. Actual and “Red Flag” Knowledge: § 512(c)(1)(A)
The first and most important question on appeal is whether the
DMCA safe harbor at issue requires “actual knowledge” or
“aware[ness]” of facts or circumstances indicating “specific and
identifiable infringements,” Viacom, 718 F.Supp.2d at 523. We consider
first the scope of the statutory provision and then its application to
the record in this case.
1. The Specificity Requirement
“As in all statutory construction cases, we begin with the language
of the statute,” Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450, 122 S.Ct.
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941, 151 L.Ed.2d 908 (2002). Under § 512(c)(1)(A), safe harbor
protection is available only if the service provider:
(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity
using the material on the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material....
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A). As previously noted, the District Court
held that the statutory phrases “actual knowledge that the material ...
is infringing” and “facts or circumstances from which infringing
activity is apparent” refer to “knowledge of specific and identifiable
infringements.” Viacom, 718 F.Supp.2d at 523. For the reasons that
follow, we substantially affirm that holding.
Although the parties marshal a battery of other arguments on
appeal, it is the text of the statute that compels our conclusion. In
particular, we are persuaded that the basic operation of § 512(c)
requires knowledge or awareness of specific infringing activity. Under
§ 512(c)(1)(A), knowledge or awareness alone does not disqualify the
service provider; rather, the provider that gains knowledge or
awareness of infringing activity retains safe-harbor protection if it
“acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material.” 17
U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii). Thus, the nature of the removal obligation
itself contemplates knowledge or awareness of specific infringing
material, because expeditious removal is possible only if the service
provider knows with particularity which items to remove. Indeed, to
require expeditious removal in the absence of specific knowledge or
awareness would be to mandate an amorphous obligation to “take
commercially reasonable steps” in response to a generalized awareness
of infringement. Viacom Br. 33. Such a view cannot be reconciled with
the language of the statute, which requires “expeditious[ ]” action to
remove or disable “the material ” at issue. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii)
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(emphasis added).
On appeal, the plaintiffs dispute this conclusion by drawing our
attention to § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii), the so-called “red flag” knowledge
provision. See id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) (limiting liability where, “in the
absence of such actual knowledge, [the service provider] is not aware
of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent”).
In their view, the use of the phrase “facts or circumstances”
demonstrates that Congress did not intend to limit the red flag
provision to a particular type of knowledge. The plaintiffs contend
that requiring awareness of specific infringements in order to establish
“aware[ness] of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity
is apparent,” 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii), renders the red flag provision
superfluous, because that provision would be satisfied only when the
“actual knowledge” provision is also satisfied. For that reason, the
plaintiffs urge the Court to hold that the red flag provision “requires
less specificity” than the actual knowledge provision. Pls.' Supp. Br. 1.
This argument misconstrues the relationship between “actual”
knowledge and “red flag” knowledge. It is true that “we are required to
‘disfavor interpretations of statutes that render language superfluous.’
” Conn. ex rel. Blumenthal v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 228 F.3d 82, 88 (2d
Cir.2000) (quoting Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253, 112
S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992)). But contrary to the plaintiffs'
assertions, construing § 512(c)(1)(A) to require actual knowledge or
awareness of specific instances of infringement does not render the red
flag provision superfluous. The phrase “actual knowledge,” which
appears in § 512(c)(1)(A)(i), is frequently used to denote subjective
belief. See, e.g., United States v. Quinones, 635 F.3d 590, 602 (2d Cir.2011)
(“[T]he belief held by the defendant need not be reasonable in order
for it to defeat ... actual knowledge.”). By contrast, courts often invoke
the language of “facts or circumstances,” which appears in §
512(c)(1)(A)(ii), in discussing an objective reasonableness standard.
See, e.g., Maxwell v. City of New York, 380 F.3d 106, 108 (2d Cir.2004)
(“Police officers' application of force is excessive ... if it is objectively
unreasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them,
without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” (internal
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quotation marks omitted)).
The difference between actual and red flag knowledge is thus not
between specific and generalized knowledge, but instead between a
subjective and an objective standard. In other words, the actual
knowledge provision turns on whether the provider actually or
“subjectively” knew of specific infringement, while the red flag
provision turns on whether the provider was subjectively aware of
facts that would have made the specific infringement “objectively”
obvious to a reasonable person. The red flag provision, because it
incorporates an objective standard, is not swallowed up by the actual
knowledge provision under our construction of the § 512(c) safe
harbor. Both provisions do independent work, and both apply only to
specific instances of infringement.
The limited body of case law interpreting the knowledge
provisions of the § 512(c) safe harbor comports with our view of the
specificity requirement. Most recently, a panel of the Ninth Circuit
addressed the scope of § 512(c) in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital
Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir.2011), a copyright infringement
case against Veoh Networks, a video-hosting service similar to
YouTube. As in this case, various music publishers brought suit
against the service provider, claiming direct and secondary copyright
infringement based on the presence of unauthorized content on the
website, and the website operator sought refuge in the § 512(c) safe
harbor. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
determination on summary judgment that the website operator was
entitled to safe harbor protection. With respect to the actual
knowledge provision, the panel declined to “adopt[ ] a broad
conception of the knowledge requirement,” id. at 1038, holding instead
that the safe harbor “[r]equir [es] specific knowledge of particular
infringing activity,” id. at 1037. The Court of Appeals “reach[ed] the
same conclusion” with respect to the red flag provision, noting that
“[w]e do not place the burden of determining whether [materials] are
actually illegal on a service provider.” Id. at 1038 (alterations in
original) (quoting Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1114 (9th
Cir.2007)).
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***
Based on the text of § 512(c)(1)(A), as well as the limited case law
on point, we affirm the District Court's holding that actual knowledge
or awareness of facts or circumstances that indicate specific and
identifiable instances of infringement will disqualify a service provider
from the safe harbor.
2. The Grant of Summary Judgment
The corollary question on appeal is whether, under the foregoing
construction of § 512(c)(1)(A), the District Court erred in granting
summary judgment to YouTube on the record presented. For the
reasons that follow, we hold that although the District Court correctly
interpreted § 512(c)(1)(A), summary judgment for the defendants was
premature.
i. Specific Knowledge or Awareness
The plaintiffs argue that, even under the District Court's
construction of the safe harbor, the record raises material issues of fact
regarding YouTube's actual knowledge or “red flag” awareness of
specific instances of infringement. To that end, the plaintiffs draw our
attention to various estimates regarding the percentage of infringing
content on the YouTube website. For example, Viacom cites evidence
that YouTube employees conducted website surveys and estimated
that 75–80% of all YouTube streams contained copyrighted material.
The class plaintiffs similarly claim that Credit Suisse, acting as
financial advisor to Google, estimated that more than 60% of
YouTube's content was “premium” copyrighted content—and that
only 10% of the premium content was authorized. These
approximations suggest that the defendants were conscious that
significant quantities of material on the YouTube website were
infringing. See Viacom Int'l, 718 F.Supp.2d at 518 (“[A] jury could find
that the defendants not only were generally aware of, but welcomed,
copyright-infringing material being placed on their website.”). But
such estimates are insufficient, standing alone, to create a triable issue
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of fact as to whether YouTube actually knew, or was aware of facts or
circumstances that would indicate, the existence of particular
instances of infringement.
Beyond the survey results, the plaintiffs rely upon internal
YouTube communications that do refer to particular clips or groups of
clips. The class plaintiffs argue that YouTube was aware of specific
infringing material because, inter alia, YouTube attempted to search for
specific Premier League videos on the site in order to gauge their
“value based on video usage.” In particular, the class plaintiffs cite a
February 7, 2007 e-mail from Patrick Walker, director of video
partnerships for Google and YouTube, requesting that his colleagues
calculate the number of daily searches for the terms “soccer,”
“football,” and “Premier League” in preparation for a bid on the global
rights to Premier League content. On another occasion, Walker
requested that any “clearly infringing, official broadcast footage” from
a list of top Premier League clubs—including Liverpool Football Club,
Chelsea Football Club, Manchester United Football Club, and Arsenal
Football Club—be taken down in advance of a meeting with the heads
of “several major sports teams and leagues.” YouTube ultimately
decided not to make a bid for the Premier League rights—but the
infringing content allegedly remained on the website.
The record in the Viacom action includes additional examples. For
instance, YouTube founder Jawed Karim prepared a report in March
2006 which stated that, “[a]s of today[,] episodes and clips of the
following well-known shows can still be found [on YouTube]: Family
Guy, South Park, MTV Cribs, Daily Show, Reno 911, [and] Dave
Chapelle [sic].” Karim further opined that, “although YouTube is not
legally required to monitor content ... and complies with DMCA
takedown requests, we would benefit from preemptively removing
content that is blatantly illegal and likely to attract criticism.” He also
noted that “a more thorough analysis” of the issue would be required.
At least some of the TV shows to which Karim referred are owned by
Viacom. A reasonable juror could conclude from the March 2006
report that Karim knew of the presence of Viacom-owned material on
YouTube, since he presumably located specific clips of the shows in
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question before he could announce that YouTube hosted the content
“[a]s of today.” A reasonable juror could also conclude that Karim
believed the clips he located to be infringing (since he refers to them as
“blatantly illegal”), and that YouTube did not remove the content from
the website until conducting “a more thorough analysis,” thus
exposing the company to liability in the interim.
Furthermore, in a July 4, 2005 e-mail exchange, YouTube founder
Chad Hurley sent an e-mail to his co-founders with the subject line
“budlight commercials,” and stated, “we need to reject these too.”
Steve Chen responded, “can we please leave these in a bit longer?
another week or two can't hurt.” Karim also replied, indicating that he
“added back in all 28 bud videos.” Similarly, in an August 9, 2005 email exchange, Hurley urged his colleagues “to start being diligent
about rejecting copyrighted / inappropriate content,” noting that
“there is a cnn clip of the shuttle clip on the site today, if the boys from
Turner would come to the site, they might be pissed?” Again, Chen
resisted:
but we should just keep that stuff on the site. i really don't see what
will happen. what? someone from cnn sees it? he happens to be
someone with power? he happens to want to take it down right
away. he gets in touch with cnn legal. 2 weeks later, we get a cease
& desist letter. we take the video down.
And again, Karim agreed, indicating that “the CNN space shuttle
clip, I like. we can remove it once we're bigger and better known, but
for now that clip is fine.”
Upon a review of the record, we are persuaded that the plaintiffs
may have raised a material issue of fact regarding YouTube's
knowledge or awareness of specific instances of infringement. The
foregoing Premier League e-mails request the identification and
removal of “clearly infringing, official broadcast footage.” The March
2006 report indicates Karim's awareness of specific clips that he
perceived to be “blatantly illegal.” Similarly, the Bud Light and space
shuttle e-mails refer to particular clips in the context of
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correspondence about whether to remove infringing material from the
website. On these facts, a reasonable juror could conclude that
YouTube had actual knowledge of specific infringing activity, or was
at least aware of facts or circumstances from which specific infringing
activity was apparent. See § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii). Accordingly, we hold
that summary judgment to YouTube on all clips-in-suit, especially in
the absence of any detailed examination of the extensive record on
summary judgment, was premature.
We hasten to note, however, that although the foregoing e-mails
were annexed as exhibits to the summary judgment papers, it is
unclear whether the clips referenced therein are among the current
clips-in-suit. By definition, only the current clips-in-suit are at issue in
this litigation. Accordingly, we vacate the order granting summary
judgment and instruct the District Court to determine on remand
whether any specific infringements of which YouTube had knowledge
or awareness correspond to the clips-in-suit in these actions.
ii. “Willful Blindness”
The plaintiffs further argue that the District Court erred in
granting summary judgment to the defendants despite evidence that
YouTube was “willfully blind” to specific infringing activity. On this
issue of first impression, we consider the application of the common
law willful blindness doctrine in the DMCA context.
The principle that willful blindness is tantamount to knowledge is
hardly novel.” Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 110 n. 16 (2d
Cir.2010) (collecting cases); see In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d
643, 650 (7th Cir.2003) (“Willful blindness is knowledge, in copyright
law ... as it is in the law generally.”). A person is “willfully blind” or
engages in “conscious avoidance” amounting to knowledge where the
person “ ‘was aware of a high probability of the fact in dispute and
consciously avoided confirming that fact.’ ” United States v. AinaMarshall, 336 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir.2003) (quoting United States v.
Rodriguez, 983 F.2d 455, 458 (2d Cir.1993)); cf. Global–Tech Appliances, Inc.
v. SEB S.A., ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2060, 2070–71, 179 L.Ed.2d 1167
(2011) (applying the willful blindness doctrine in a patent

111

COPYRIGHT : A Contemporary Approach

infringement case). Writing in the trademark infringement context,
we have held that “[a] service provider is not ... permitted willful
blindness. When it has reason to suspect that users of its service are
infringing a protected mark, it may not shield itself from learning of
the particular infringing transactions by looking the other way.”
Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 109.
The DMCA does not mention willful blindness. As a general
matter, we interpret a statute to abrogate a common law principle
only if the statute “speak[s] directly to the question addressed by the
common law.” Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 14 (2d Cir.2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The relevant question, therefore, is
whether the DMCA “speak[s] directly” to the principle of willful
blindness. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The DMCA
provision most relevant to the abrogation inquiry is § 512(m), which
provides that safe harbor protection shall not be conditioned on “a
service provider monitoring its service or affirmatively seeking facts
indicating infringing activity, except to the extent consistent with a
standard technical measure complying with the provisions of
subsection (i).” 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1). Section 512(m) is explicit:
DMCA safe harbor protection cannot be conditioned on affirmative
monitoring by a service provider. For that reason, § 512(m) is
incompatible with a broad common law duty to monitor or otherwise
seek out infringing activity based on general awareness that
infringement may be occurring. That fact does not, however, dispose
of the abrogation inquiry; as previously noted, willful blindness cannot
be defined as an affirmative duty to monitor. See Aina–Marshall, 336
F.3d at 170 (holding that a person is “willfully blind” where he “was
aware of a high probability of the fact in dispute and consciously
avoided confirming that fact”). Because the statute does not “speak[ ]
directly” to the willful blindness doctrine, § 512(m) limits—but does
not abrogate—the doctrine. Accordingly, we hold that the willful
blindness doctrine may be applied, in appropriate circumstances, to
demonstrate knowledge or awareness of specific instances of
infringement under the DMCA.
The District Court cited § 512(m) for the proposition that safe
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harbor protection does not require affirmative monitoring, Viacom, 718
F.Supp.2d at 524, but did not expressly address the principle of willful
blindness or its relationship to the DMCA safe harbors. As a result,
whether the defendants made a “deliberate effort to avoid guilty
knowledge,” In re Aimster, 334 F.3d at 650, remains a fact question for
the District Court to consider in the first instance on remand.
B. Control and Benefit: § 512(c)(1)(B)
Apart from the foregoing knowledge provisions, the § 512(c) safe
harbor provides that an eligible service provider must “not receive a
financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a
case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control
such activity.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B). The District Court addressed
this issue in a single paragraph, quoting from § 512(c)(1)(B), the socalled “control and benefit” provision, and concluding that “[t]he
‘right and ability to control’ the activity requires knowledge of it,
which must be item-specific.” Viacom, 718 F.Supp.2d at 527. For the
reasons that follow, we hold that the District Court erred by
importing a specific knowledge requirement into the control and
benefit provision, and we therefore remand for further fact-finding on
the issue of control.
1. “Right and Ability to Control” Infringing Activity
On appeal, the parties advocate two competing constructions of
the “right and ability to control” infringing activity. 17 U.S.C. §
512(c)(1)(B). Because each is fatally flawed, we reject both proposed
constructions in favor of a fact-based inquiry to be conducted in the
first instance by the District Court.
The first construction, pressed by the defendants, is the one
adopted by the District Court, which held that “the provider must
know of the particular case before he can control it.” Viacom, 718
F.Supp.2d at 527. The Ninth Circuit recently agreed, holding that
“until [the service provider] becomes aware of specific unauthorized
material, it cannot exercise its ‘power or authority’ over the specific
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infringing item. In practical terms, it does not have the kind of ability
to control infringing activity the statute contemplates.” UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022, 1041 (9th
Cir.2011). The trouble with this construction is that importing a
specific knowledge requirement into § 512(c)(1)(B) renders the
control provision duplicative of § 512(c)(1)(A). Any service provider
that has item-specific knowledge of infringing activity and thereby
obtains financial benefit would already be excluded from the safe
harbor under § 512(c)(1)(A) for having specific knowledge of
infringing material and failing to effect expeditious removal. No
additional service provider would be excluded by § 512(c)(1)(B) that
was not already excluded by § 512(c)(1)(A). Because statutory
interpretations that render language superfluous are disfavored, Conn.
ex rel. Blumenthal, 228 F.3d at 88, we reject the District Court's
interpretation of the control provision.
The second construction, urged by the plaintiffs, is that the control
provision codifies the common law doctrine of vicarious copyright
liability. The common law imposes liability for vicarious copyright
infringement “[w]hen the right and ability to supervise coalesce with
an obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of
copyrighted materials—even in the absence of actual knowledge that
the copyright mono [poly] is being impaired.” Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v.
H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir.1963); cf. Metro–Goldwyn–Mayer
Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 n. 9, 125 S.Ct. 2764, 162
L.Ed.2d 781 (2005). To support their codification argument, the
plaintiffs rely on a House Report relating to a preliminary version of
the DMCA: “The ‘right and ability to control’ language ... codifies the
second element of vicarious liability.... Subparagraph (B) is intended
to preserve existing case law that examines all relevant aspects of the
relationship between the primary and secondary infringer.” H.R.Rep.
No. 105–551(I), at 26 (1998). In response, YouTube notes that the
codification reference was omitted from the committee reports
describing the final legislation, and that Congress ultimately
abandoned any attempt to “embark[ ] upon a wholesale clarification”
of vicarious liability, electing instead “to create a series of ‘safe harbors'
for certain common activities of service providers.” S.Rep. No. 105–190,
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at 19.
Happily, the future of digital copyright law does not turn on the
confused legislative history of the control provision. The general rule
with respect to common law codification is that when “Congress uses
terms that have accumulated settled meaning under the common law,
a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress
means to incorporate the established meaning of those terms.” Neder v.
United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999)
(ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted). Under the common
law vicarious liability standard, “ ‘[t]he ability to block infringers'
access to a particular environment for any reason whatsoever is
evidence of the right and ability to supervise.’ ” Arista Records LLC v.
Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F.Supp.2d 124, 157 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (alteration in
original) (quoting A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023
(9th Cir.2001)). To adopt that principle in the DMCA context,
however, would render the statute internally inconsistent. Section
512(c) actually presumes that service providers have the ability to
“block ... access” to infringing material. Id. at 157; see Shelter Capital, 667
F.3d at 1042–43. Indeed, a service provider who has knowledge or
awareness of infringing material or who receives a takedown notice
from a copyright holder is required to “remove, or disable access to, the
material” in order to claim the benefit of the safe harbor. 17 U.S.C. §
512(c)(1)(A)(iii) & (C). But in taking such action, the service provider
would—in the plaintiffs' analysis—be admitting the “right and ability
to control” the infringing material. Thus, the prerequisite to safe
harbor protection under § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) & (C) would at the same
time be a disqualifier under § 512(c)(1)(B).
Moreover, if Congress had intended § 512(c)(1)(B) to be
coextensive with vicarious liability, “the statute could have
accomplished that result in a more direct manner.” Shelter Capital, 667
F.3d at 1045.
It is conceivable that Congress ... intended that [service providers]
which receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the
infringing activity would not, under any circumstances, be able to
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qualify for the subsection (c) safe harbor. But if that was indeed
their intention, it would have been far simpler and much more
straightforward to simply say as much.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ellison v. Robertson, 189
F.Supp.2d 1051, 1061 (C.D.Cal.2002), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on
different grounds, 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir.2004)).
In any event, the foregoing tension—elsewhere described as a
“predicament” and a “catch22” —is sufficient to establish that the
control provision “dictates” a departure from the common law
vicarious liability standard, Neder, 527 U.S. at 21, 119 S.Ct. 1827.
Accordingly, we conclude that the “right and ability to control”
infringing activity under § 512(c)(1)(B) “requires something more than
the ability to remove or block access to materials posted on a service
provider's website.” MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F.Supp.2d at 645, 2011 WL
5104616, at *14; accord Wolk v. Kodak Imaging Network, Inc., ––– F.Supp.2d
––––, ––––, 2012 WL 11270, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2012); UMG II, 665
F.Supp.2d at 1114–15; Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F.Supp.2d
1132, 1151 (N.D.Cal.2008); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F.Supp.2d
1090, 1110 (W.D.Wash.2004), overruled on other grounds by Cosmetic Ideas,
Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp., 606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir.2010). The remaining—
and more difficult—question is how to define the “something more”
that is required.
To date, only one court has found that a service provider had the
right and ability to control infringing activity under § 512(c)(1)(B). In
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F.Supp.2d 1146 (C.D.Cal.2002),
the court found control where the service provider instituted a
monitoring program by which user websites received “detailed
instructions regard[ing] issues of layout, appearance, and content.” Id.
at 1173. The service provider also forbade certain types of content and
refused access to users who failed to comply with its instructions. Id.
Similarly, inducement of copyright infringement under Metro–
Goldwyn–Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 125 S.Ct. 2764,
162 L.Ed.2d 781 (2005), which “premises liability on purposeful,
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culpable expression and conduct,” id. at 937, 125 S.Ct. 2764, might also
rise to the level of control under § 512(c)(1)(B). Both of these examples
involve a service provider exerting substantial influence on the
activities of users, without necessarily—or even frequently—acquiring
knowledge of specific infringing activity.
In light of our holding that § 512(c)(1)(B) does not include a
specific knowledge requirement, we think it prudent to remand to the
District Court to consider in the first instance whether the plaintiffs
have adduced sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to
conclude that YouTube had the right and ability to control the
infringing activity and received a financial benefit directly attributable
to that activity.
C. “By Reason of” Storage: § 512(c)(1)
The § 512(c) safe harbor is only available when the infringement
occurs “by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material
that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for
the service provider.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1). In this case, the District
Court held that YouTube's software functions fell within the safe
harbor for infringements that occur “by reason of” user storage. Viacom,
718 F.Supp.2d at 526 (noting that a contrary holding would “confine[ ]
the word ‘storage’ too narrowly to meet the statute's purpose”). For
the reasons that follow, we affirm that holding with respect to three of
the challenged software functions—the conversion (or “transcoding”)
of videos into a standard display format, the playback of videos on
“watch” pages, and the “related videos” function. We remand for
further fact-finding with respect to a fourth software function,
involving the third-party syndication of videos uploaded to YouTube.
As a preliminary matter, we note that “the structure and language
of OCILLA indicate that service providers seeking safe harbor under [§
] 512(c) are not limited to merely storing material.” Io Grp., 586
F.Supp.2d at 1147. The structure of the statute distinguishes between
so-called “conduit only” functions under § 512(a) and the functions
addressed by § 512(c) and the other subsections. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(n)
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(“Subsections (a), (b), (c), and (d) describe separate and distinct
functions for purposes of applying this section.”). Most notably,
OCILLA contains two definitions of “service provider.” 17 U.S.C. §
512(k)(1)(A)-(B). The narrower definition, which applies only to
service providers falling under § 512(a), is limited to entities that
“offer[ ] the transmission, routing or providing of connections for
digital online communications, between or among points specified by
a user, of material of the user's choosing, without modification to the
content of the material as sent or received.” Id. § 512(k)(1)(A) (emphasis
added). No such limitation appears in the broader definition, which
applies to service providers—including YouTube—falling under §
512(c). Under the broader definition, “the term ‘service provider’
means a provider of online services or network access, or the operator
of facilities therefor, and includes an entity described in subparagraph
(A).” Id. § 512(k)(1)(B). In the absence of a parallel limitation on the
ability of a service provider to modify user-submitted material, we
conclude that § 512(c) “is clearly meant to cover more than mere
electronic storage lockers.” UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 620
F.Supp.2d 1081, 1088 (C.D.Cal.2008) (“ UMG I ”).
The relevant case law makes clear that the § 512(c) safe harbor
extends to software functions performed “for the purpose of
facilitating access to user-stored material.” Id.; see Shelter Capital, 667
F.3d at 1031–35. Two of the software functions challenged here—
transcoding and playback—were expressly considered by our sister
Circuit in Shelter Capital, which held that liability arising from these
functions occurred “by reason of the storage at the direction of a user.”
17 U.S.C. § 512(c); see Shelter Capital, 667 F.3d at 1027–28, 1031; see also
UMG I, 620 F.Supp.2d at 1089–91; Io Group, 586 F.Supp.2d at 1146–48.
Transcoding involves “[m]aking copies of a video in a different
encoding scheme” in order to render the video “viewable over the
Internet to most users.” Supp. Joint App'x I:236. The playback process
involves “deliver[ing] copies of YouTube videos to a user's browser
cache” in response to a user request. Id. at 239. The District Court
correctly found that to exclude these automated functions from the
safe harbor would eviscerate the protection afforded to service
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providers by § 512(c). Viacom, 718 F.Supp.2d at 526–27.
A similar analysis applies to the “related videos” function, by
which a YouTube computer algorithm identifies and displays
“thumbnails” of clips that are “related” to the video selected by the
user. The plaintiffs claim that this practice constitutes content
promotion, not “access” to stored content, and therefore falls beyond
the scope of the safe harbor. Citing similar language in the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§
1961–68, and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12 et seq., the plaintiffs argue
that the statutory phrase “by reason of” requires a finding of proximate
causation between the act of storage and the infringing activity. See,
e.g., Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267–68, 112 S.Ct. 1311,
117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992) (holding that the “by reason of” language in the
RICO statute requires proximate causation). But even if the plaintiffs
are correct that § 512(c) incorporates a principle of proximate
causation—a question we need not resolve here—the indexing and
display of related videos retain a sufficient causal link to the prior
storage of those videos. The record makes clear that the related videos
algorithm “is fully automated and operates solely in response to user
input without the active involvement of YouTube employees.” Supp.
Joint App'x I:237. Furthermore, the related videos function serves to
help YouTube users locate and gain access to material stored at the
direction of other users. Because the algorithm “is closely related to,
and follows from, the storage itself,” and is “narrowly directed toward
providing access to material stored at the direction of users,” UMG I,
620 F.Supp.2d at 1092, we conclude that the related videos function is
also protected by the § 512(c) safe harbor.
The final software function at issue here—third-party
syndication—is the closest case. In or around March 2007, YouTube
transcoded a select number of videos into a format compatible with
mobile devices and “syndicated” or licensed the videos to Verizon
Wireless and other companies. The plaintiffs argue—with some
force—that business transactions do not occur at the “direction of a
user” within the meaning of § 512(c)(1) when they involve the manual
selection of copyrighted material for licensing to a third party. The
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parties do not dispute, however, that none of the clips-in-suit were
among the approximately 2,000 videos provided to Verizon Wireless.
In order to avoid rendering an advisory opinion on the outer
boundaries of the storage provision, we remand for fact-finding on the
question of whether any of the clips-in-suit were in fact syndicated to
any other third party.
***
CONCLUSION
To summarize, we hold that:
(1) The District Court correctly held that 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)
requires knowledge or awareness of facts or circumstances that
indicate specific and identifiable instances of infringement;
(2) However, the June 23, 2010 order granting summary judgment to
YouTube is VACATED because a reasonable jury could conclude that
YouTube had knowledge or awareness under § 512(c)(1)(A) at least
with respect to a handful of specific clips; the cause is REMANDED
for the District Court to determine whether YouTube had knowledge
or awareness of any specific instances of infringement corresponding
to the clips-in-suit;
(3) The willful blindness doctrine may be applied, in appropriate
circumstances, to demonstrate knowledge or awareness of specific
instances of infringement under § 512(c)(1)(A); the cause is
REMANDED for the District Court to consider the application of the
willful blindness doctrine in the first instance;
(4) The District Court erred by requiring “item-specific” knowledge of
infringement in its interpretation of the “right and ability to control”
infringing activity under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B), and the judgment is
REVERSED insofar as it rests on that erroneous construction of the
statute; the cause is REMANDED for further fact-finding by the
District Court on the issues of control and financial benefit;
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(5) The District Court correctly held that three of the challenged
YouTube software functions—replication, playback, and the related
videos feature—occur “by reason of the storage at the direction of a
user” within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1), and the judgment is
AFFIRMED insofar as it so held; the cause is REMANDED for
further fact-finding regarding a fourth software function, involving the
syndication of YouTube videos to third parties.
***
Notes
1. Which Service Providers Does § 512 Affect? Congress added
section 512 to the Copyright Act in 1998 as part of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act. Section 512 creates “safe harbors” from
copyright infringement liability for those who provide four
different types of digital network services, provided they meet the
requirements established in that section. Here are descriptions of
the four types of services, each prefaced with a convenient, if
oversimplifying, one-word nickname:


“Transmitting”
—
Transitory
Digital
Network
Communications (§ 512(a)). Transmission of data by an ISP
acting as a mere data conduit, typically by telecommunications
companies or by firms that merely forwards email or other
digital messages or files along their way.



“Caching” — System Caching (§ 512(b)). Automated copying
and storage of data to ensure that access to that data is not
impeded by transmission bottlenecks. Thus, for example, a
web page originally hosted on a server in New York but
frequently requested by computer users in California might be
copied and stored, or “cached,” in California to avoid the
necessity of transmission across the US every time the page is
requested.



“Hosting” — Information Residing on Systems or Networks at
Direction of Users (§ 512(c)). This category prototypically is
directed towards companies that provide web hosting
services, storing content comprising websites that are
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maintained by independent sponsors of those websites. Note,
however, that it is broad enough to include operators of
websites such as YouTube, MySpace, and Facebook, which do
not simply store data and respond to requests for that stored
data, but provide a very detailed, structured context for the
content that is uploaded by users.


“Linking” — Information Location Tools (§ 512(d)). These are
typically services such as search engines run by Google,
Yahoo!, and Microsoft (Bing), but the broad definition seems
to include any web page linking to another web page that has
infringing material.

While these categories include many of the tools that assist digital
distribution of copyrighted material (whether infringing or not),
they certainly do not include all of them. Can you make a list of
other types of assistance that digital distributors would find
necessary or useful? Where do hardware manufacturers and
software creators fit in this scheme? Is it reasonable to view Sony v.
Universal City Studios as creating a fifth safe harbor, standing
alongside the four in § 512, applicable to them?
2. Section 512 as Recruiting New Gatekeepers. Section 512
promises immunity from infringement liability for those who meet
its requirements, and thus can be seen as shielding online service
providers, thereby enabling a whole industry to develop without
fear of potentially crushing liability. Yet it does also impose
requirements on those service providers, and to the extent that
those requirements include measures that combat copyright
infringement, the section can also be seen as recruiting the
assistance of the service providers in enforcing copyright. There
are two important requirements that apply to all four of the safe
harbors, namely:


Termination of Repeat Infringers. Under § 512(i)(1)(A), service
providers must implement and notify users of a policy of
terminating services to those who repeatedly use the services
to infringe.

Fall 2016 Supplement



122

Accommodation of Standard Technical Measures, Under §
512(i)(1)(B), service providers have to ensure that their services
allow copyright holders to use technical protection measures
such as encryption and watermarking to aid in hindering and
detecting copyright infringement.

3. How to Violate the Requirement to Terminate Repeat
Infringers.
In BMG Rights Management (US) LLC v. Cox
Communications, Inc., 2015 WL 7756130 (E.D. Va.), the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that Cox
Communications was not entitled to a § 512 safe-harbor defense
because it had not reasonably implemented a policy of terminating
service to repeat infringers. Cox’s policy for dealing with repeat
infringers was weak in a remarkable number of ways. Cox only
considered terminating a subscriber if it had received 14 takedown
notices concerning that subscriber within a six-month period. Id.
at *2-*3. Cox would only count the first notice concerning a
subscriber received on any particular day; it would not count any
other notice concerning that subscriber received on the same day.
Id. at *2. As a general matter, Cox would accept no more than 200
takedown notices per day from a copyright holder, regardless of
how much infringing material it might have been hosting. Id. Even
those features, however, were not what convinced the court that
Cox had not reasonably implemented a repeat-infringer
termination policy. It turns out that before 2012, in the relatively
few cases in which a subscriber received fourteen notices in six
months, Cox did not actually terminate services to the subscriber.
Rather, it nominally terminated services but reactivated accounts
upon request, as documented in emails reminding Cox employees
about how much revenue Cox would lose if the subscribers were
actually terminated. Id. at *14-*16. In 2012, Cox decided that if it
was going to terminate a subscriber, it would do so for at least six
months; but that caused it to virtually cease terminations,
dropping from 15.5 terminations per month during the period from
January 2010 through August 2012, to 0.8 terminations per month
during the period from September 2012 through November 2014.
Id. at *17. The Eastern District found that that conduct amounted
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to a refusal to implement a termination policy, and denied Cox
safe-harbor protection under § 512.
4. The Notice and Takedown Procedure for Hosting and Linking.
Other requirements apply more specifically to particular safe
harbor categories. The best-publicized of these are probably the
“notice and takedown” requirements, which apply to § 512(c)
“hosters” and in modified form to § 512(d) “linkers.” If you are
hosting material provided by a subscriber to your service,
§512(c)(2) requires you to have a registered agent who accepts
notices of claimed infringement. Upon receipt of a notice of
claimed infringement that meets the requirements of §512(c)(3)
(which enumerates six criteria including proper identification of
the allegedly infringed work and infringing material, and contact
information for the complainant) you must “respond expeditiously
to remove, or disable access to, the [allegedly infringing] material.”
17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (1)(C) – in other words, you have to “take down”
the material. You will not be liable for taking down material in
response to a proper notice, so long as you take reasonable steps to
notify the subscriber who posted the material that you took it
down. That subscriber can then submit a “counter notification”
under §512(g)(3), identifying itself and consenting to federal court
jurisdiction; if it does so, you must restore access to the material in
question, pending settlement or judicial resolution of the dispute.
17 U.S.C. §512(g)(2). This process is also applicable in the same
basic form to links to infringing material. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(3).
5. Sanctions for Inappropriate Take-Down Notices. Copyright
owners are likely to be better informed than many Internet users.
The former likely have the advice of counsel, may be “repeat
players” and may know the ins and out of the takedown
procedures, while the latter may be relatively ignorant. This might
permit the use of take-down notices to suppress legitimate uses of
copyrighted material as well as criticism or other forms of free
expression. This problem is principally addressed by the
interaction of § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) and § 512(f). The former requires a
takedown notification to include a “statement that the
complaining party has a good faith belief that the use of the
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material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the
copyright owner, its agent, or the law.” The latter provides that
“[a]ny person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this
section— (1) that material or activity is infringing, or (2) that
material or activity was removed or disabled by mistake or
misidentification, shall be liable for any damages, including costs
and attorneys’ fees, incurred by the alleged infringer.”
In Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 801
Go Online
F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2015), opinion amended
At issue in Lenz was a
and superseded on denial of rehearing, 815 F.3d
29-second home video
1145 (9th Cir. 2016), the Ninth Circuit that Stephanie Lenz
held that § 512 requires a copyright took of her 13-monthowner to consider whether the old son dancing to
potentially infringing material is making Prince’s recording of
“Let’s Go Crazy.” The
fair use of its copyrighted work before
video can be viewed on
issuing a takedown notice. It reasoned YouTube here.
that a copyright holder cannot make a
true declaration under § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) unless it has formed a
subjective good faith belief that the use of its work is not a fair use;
and the copyright holder cannot form a subjective good faith belief
unless it can demonstrate that it considered whether the use might
be a fair use. If the statement made under § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) is false,
the copyright holder may be liable for making a material
misrepresentation under § 512(f).
This creates a problem for copyright holders who use
automated systems to generate takedown notices. An automated
system that detects use of a sound recording or a video by
recognizing a portion of it does not consider whether that use
might qualify as a fair use. Does that mean that all potentially
infringing material needs to be reviewed by a human being before a
takedown notice is issued? In the original opinion issued in Lenz in
September 2015, the court noted “that the implementation of
computer algorithms appears to be a valid and good faith middle
ground for processing a plethora of content while still meeting the
DMCA’s requirements to somehow consider fair use. . . . For
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example, consideration of fair use may be sufficient if copyright
holders utilize computer programs that automatically identify for
takedown notifications content where: ‘(1) the video track
matches the video track of a copyrighted work submitted by a
content owner; (2) the audio track matches the audio track of that
same copyrighted work; and (3) nearly the entirety ... is comprised
of a single copyrighted work.’” Lenz, 801 F.3d at 1135 (citation
omitted). However, in its amended opinion issued in March 2016,
the court omits the language quoted above, and provides very little
detail about what kind of review is necessary to form the required
subjective good faith belief. Given the volume of unauthorized and
therefore potentially infringing material that is posted online every
day, what kind of human review is it realistic to require? How
carefully does a copyright holder need to consider the particular
use and the fair use factors before it can be said to have formed a
sufficient subjective good faith belief?
6. The Attractiveness of the Safe Harbors and the Relative
Roughness of the Seas Outside. A service provider’s failure to
qualify for a § 512 safe harbor does not mean that it is necessarily
subject to infringement liability; rather, the failure to qualify
means that it will be judged under the ordinary, general standards
for direct and indirect liability. Thus, the attractiveness and
importance of the safe harbors depends on the courts’ application
of those general standards. So, for example, as mentioned above,
the line of cases culminating in Cartoon Network that has
interpreted the Copyright Act to impose a “volitional act”
requirement for direct infringement liability makes the safe
harbors somewhat less important. See R. Anthony Reese, The
Relationship Between the ISP Safe Harbors and the Ordinary
Rules of Copyright Infringement Liability, 32 Colum. J. L. & Arts
427, 429-430 (2009).
7. Objective Knowledge of Infringement: Will Red Flags Ever
Wave? In Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, 2016 WL 3349368 (2d
Cir. June 16, 2016), the Second Circuit reiterated its holding in
Viacom v. YouTube that safe harbor protection will be lost under
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the “red flag” provision of 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) if an online
service provider is aware of facts and circumstances under which
it would be obvious to a reasonable person that a certain video was
infringing. Even if it can be proven that a defendant’s employee
viewed a user-generated video containing all or virtually all of a
recognizable, copyrighted song, there are still, according to the
Vimeo court, many reasons why the “red flag” standard might not
be met. One of the most widely applicable of those is lack of
knowledge of whether a use might be authorized: “Even an
employee who was a copyright expert cannot be expected to know
when use of a copyrighted song has been licensed.” Vimeo, 2016 WL
3349368, at *13. When would it be obvious to a reasonable person
that use of a work cannot have been authorized? Is the upload of
an entire feature film, perhaps even before commercial release, the
limiting case? Does that leave YouTube and other such services all
the room they need to attract viewers with shorter videos, so long
as they respond to takedown notices and don’t send internal emails that mention infringement?
8. The “Control and Benefit” Provision of §512(c)(1)(B): Is
Common-Law Vicarious Liability Inconsistent With Noticeand-Takedown? The Second Circuit sensibly overturns the
District Court’s holding that not only §512(c)(1)(A), but also
§512(c)(1)(B), contains a specific knowledge requirement. Yet it
then also holds that §512(c)(1)(B) does not embody the standards
of common-law vicarious liability, in spite of statutory language
that closely tracks judicial formulations of the elements of
vicarious liability. The court quotes the Arista Records case for the
proposition that under common-law standards, “ ‘[t]he ability to
block infringers' access to a particular environment for any reason
whatsoever is evidence of the right and ability to supervise.’ ” It
then decides that the provisions in §512(c) requiring takedown of
material upon notice of infringement assumes that kind of ability
to block infringers’ access. Congress, it argues, cannot have meant
to condition a safe harbor on an exercise of control which itself
places an online service provider in danger of losing the safe
harbor.
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Recall that vicarious liability developed from, and remains
related to, the respondeat superior liability of an employer for the
acts of an employee. In that light, might “right and ability to
control” be interpreted as a higher standard that would not be met
merely by being physically able to block access to content?
Although the notice-and-takedown provisions do seem to assume
the physical ability to take down content, they may not so much
assume the right to take down infringing content as create that
right. Presumably any contractual provision under which a web
host agreed with a user not to take down content for any reason,
infringement or otherwise, would as applied to infringing content
be considered void as inconsistent with federal law under §512.
Yet isn’t it possible that such a provision might well negate the
kind of pervasive “right and ability to control” that is associated
with employer-employee relationships? Indeed, a close reading of
the quote from Arista Records may lead to the conclusion that it is
insisting on such pervasiveness to satisfy the control prong of
common-law vicarious liability. The ability – legally and
physically – to block access “for any reason whatsoever” sounds
like pretty pervasive control, doesn’t it?
9. The Section 512 Safe Harbor and pre-1972 Sound Recordings.
As we mentioned in passing in Note 6 on page 409 of the main
volume, the Copyright Act does not currently protect sound
recordings fixed prior to February 15, 1972. Those works are
protected instead by state “common law” copyright, a situation
which will remain in effect until 2067. See 17 U.S.C. §301(c).
Assume that a website allows users to upload audio files and allows
other users to either download copies of those same files, or to
simply “stream” those files so that they can hear the recordings on
their own devices. If some of those recordings were fixed before
1972 and the copyright owner in those recordings brings an
infringement suit against the website, can the website rely on §
512(c) of the statute as a defense?
In June 2016, the Second Circuit answered that question in the
affirmative, holding that §512(c) did indeed apply to pre-1972
recordings that were not protected by federal copyright. See
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Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, 2016 WL 3349368 (2d Cir. June 16,
2016). In an opinion written by Judge Pierre Leval, the Second
Circuit panel concluded that §512(c)’s creation of a safe harbor
from “infringement of copyright” referred not only to federal
copyright, but to state common-law copyright. It rejected the
argument that §501(c) of the Copyright Act defined the term
“infringement of copyright” to refer only to conduct that violated
federal copyright law; that term, it decided, was not defined
anywhere in the Copyright Act. The court also rejected the
argument that §301(c) of the Copyright Act precludes interpreting
§512(c) to create a safe harbor for pre-1972 sound recordings. That
section provides that “[w]ith respect to sound recordings fixed
before February 15, 1972, any rights or remedies under the common
law or statutes of any State shall not be annulled or limited by this
title until” February 15, 2067.” 17 U.S.C. §301(c). The court
concluded that §512(c), which was enacted after §301(c), created an
exception to it. The court noted that its holding ran contrary to the
conclusion reached by the Copyright Office in a 2011 report, see U.S.
Copyright Office, Federal Copyright Protection for Pre-1972 Sound
Recordings, but it concluded that several steps in the reasoning in
that report were in error. The court therefore reversed the lower
court’s ruling in Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 972
F.Supp.2d 500, 536-37 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) that the §512(c) did not
apply to pre-1972 sound recordings, and implicitly overruled the
contrary decision of an intermediate appellate court of the State of
New York in UMG Recordings v. Escape Media Group, Inc., 107 A.D.3d 51,
964 N.Y.S.2d 106 (1st Dept. 2013).
10. The Treatment of Payment Processors. It is often convenient for
those who digitally distribute infringing copies of works to accept
payment for those infringing copies by credit or debit card,
submitted through an online payment processor. Payment
processing is not eligible for a § 512 safe harbor. See Perfect 10, Inc.
v. CCBill, LLC., 488 F.3d 1102, 1116-1117 (9th Cir. 2007); Perfect 10,
Inc. v. Visa Int’l Service Assoc., 494 F. 3d 788, 795 n.4 (9th Cir.
2007). Yet in the Visa International Service case, the Ninth Circuit
granted payment processors what could be seen as a super-safe
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harbor. It concluded that payment processing for infringing
distributors was not a “material contribution” to infringement that
could give rise to contributory liability, even if the payment
processor knew that the sale was of infringing material. The
majority reasoned that a payment processor neither enables
customers to locate infringing material, nor distributes it, its
services are not essential to the infringement, and infringers could
profit from their infringement in other ways. In dissent, Judge
Kozinski challenged this logic: “Defendants participate in every
credit card sale of pirated images; the images are delivered to the
buyer only after defendants approve the transaction and process
the payment. This is not just an economic incentive for
infringement; it’s an essential step in the infringement process.”
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Service Int’l Assoc., 494 F.3d at 811-812
(Kozinski, J., dissenting). Who has the better argument? For a
District Court opinion on contributory liability in trademark law
that draws more from the Perfect 10 dissent than the Perfect 10
majority, see Gucci America, Inc. v. Frontline Processions Corp.,
721 F.Supp.2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
11. Voluntary Cooperation between Copyright Owners and
Payment Processors. Although the Visa International Services case
summarized in the previous note gave “payment processors” like
Visa, MasterCard and American Express de facto immunity from
infringement liability, those companies have various practical and
public relations reasons to avoid being associated with parties
engaged in flagrant violations of intellectual property laws. In 2011
American Express, Discover, MasterCard, PayPal, and Visa
developed a voluntary program of “best practices” under which the
credit card companies agreed to terminate relationships with web
sites engaged in the sale of counterfeit or infringing goods. See
Statement of Cary H. Sherman, Chairman and CEO Recording
Industry Association of America before the House Judiciary
Committee’s Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and
the Internet, 2013 WL 5234398 (September 18, 2013). The program
has been put into effect by cooperation between the credit card
companies and a group called the International Anti-Counterfeiting
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Coalition, or IACC. Under the scheme copyright owners provide
evidence to the IACC that a site is engaged in impermissible or
illegitimate activities. If, after investigation, the claims are
confirmed, the credit card companies terminate their relationship
with that site. According to Mr. Sherman’s testimony, “as of
August 21, 2013, nearly 7,000
Go Online
websites had been referred via
IACC's portal for investigation, If you would like to learn more
®
resulting in termination of over about the ROGUEBLOCK you can
find additional information on
1,500 individual merchant IACC’s web site, by clicking here.
accounts.
Perhaps
more This program should not be
importantly, as IACC notes, the confused with the hooded
collaboration resulting from the sweatshirt, sold under the same
portal will likely result in name, and available here. You can
Visa’s statement of how it will
‘systematic
long
term handle complaints concerning
improvement in addressing the copyright infringement by clicking
trafficking of counterfeit goods here.
online’.” The parties have given
the program the name ROGUEBLOCK®, presumably playing off the
idea that the denial of payment processing services to infringers
will act as a roadblock to their activities.
12. Voluntary Cooperation between Copyright Owners and Online
Advertising Brokers. Another category of “gatekeepers” who can
potentially be enablers of copyright infringement in the on-line
environment are advertisers. A web site may host infringing
content and make it available to the public for free download,
attempting to profit from the arrangement through ad revenues. If
advertisers could be persuaded to refrain from doing business with
illicit sites, those sites might find that it was not worth their while
to continue in business. As with the payment processors discussed
in the previous note, the copyright community has entered into a
voluntary and cooperative arrangement with companies that
provide “ad network” services – effectively the brokers for the
placement of on-line advertising. These companies include such
household names as Google, Yahoo and Microsoft. As with the
payment processors, the content owners take the initiative by
informing the ad network that the advertising appears on a site
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that hosts infringing content. Upon receipt of a complaint, the ad
network then will investigate to determine if the site in question
sells counterfeit goods or engages in copyright infringement. The
full text of the Best Practices Guidelines for Ad Networks is
available here.
p. 428 – add the following paragraph to Note 11 “Six Strikes and
You’re Out”
The “six strikes” system, or
Go Online
Copyright Alert System as it is
If you are interested in reading
more formally known, is about two
the full study concerning the
years old as of this writing. Media effectiveness (or lack thereof)
reports on its effectiveness are of the French three-strike
mixed. According to one on-line warning system, you can find
source, as of February, 2014, the paper on the Social Science
Research Network, or SSRN,
Comcast had sent out about
by clicking here.
625,000 warnings pursuant to the
program, or about 1800 per day. See Report: Comcast Sends Out Around
1,800 Copyright Alert Notices Each Day on The Consumerist Blog.
Another source reports that the initiative is “seeing success,
according to the program’s director.” 'Six Strikes' Thwarting
Piracy, Leader Says, The Hill, February 25, 2014. On the other
hand, the website RT.com reported that “[t]here has . . . been no
indication that traffic to BitTorrent sites has subsided. In fact,
online traffic to The Pirate Bay, by far the most popular site used
by pirates hoping to share or download material illegally, has more
than doubled over two years,” and that “a research study
conducted by the University of Delaware in conjunction with
French academics found that such threats had no effect on online
theft. A paper published in January 2014 used data found in a
survey of 2,000 French internet users determined that a threestrikes law would not be enough to impede someone’s piracy
intentions.” One Year After High Profile Debut, Questions Remain
About Six-Strike Policy’s Effectiveness.
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Of course it is perhaps inevitable the ISPs that are involved
in the Copyright Alert System will seek to turn it into a profitmaking opportunity. Thus, according to the story on the
Consumerist blog cited in the previous paragraph, “Comcast is
reportedly working on a system that would identify suspected filesharers in real time and, when possible, give them the opportunity
to acquire the pirated content through legitimate means.” See also
Comcast Developing Anti-Piracy Alternative to ‘Six Strikes’ Variety,
August 5, 2013.

p. 449 – delete the material after the first paragraph in Unlocking
Your Mobile Phone and substitute the following:
Suppose that you have finished your initial contract period,
and would like to switch carriers but keep your current phone. To do
that, you would have to “unlock” your phone – that is, you would have
to circumvent the technical measures that prevent your phone from
being usable on another carrier’s network. If you did it, would that
circumvention violate § 1201(a)(1)? In 2006 and again in 2010 the
Librarian of Congress, acting upon recommendation of the Register of
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Copyrights, created a regulatory exception to § 1201(a)(1) allowing
circumvention of computer programs in the form of firmware that
enable “wireless telephone handsets to connect to a wireless telephone
communications network, when circumvention is accomplished for
the sole purpose of lawfully connecting to connect to a wireless
telecommunications network.” However in the 2012 triennial review
of the anti-circumvention regulations, that provision was deleted. (A
different provision, permitting “jailbreaking” – circumvention of
programs that prevent unauthorized apps from running on your cell
phone – was retained).
The Librarian relied on several arguments in reaching his
conclusion to revise the regulation. First, he noted that the law on
whether cell phone owners also own the copies of the computer
programs contained inside their phones -- which would give them
certain rights under § 117 of the statute -- was unclear. Second, he
noted that the sale of locked cell phone was an important part of a
business model in which wireless providers offer deeply discounted
phones with the expectation of recouping costs through phone service
subscription fees. Finally, he observed that a large number of
unlocked cell phones were not available to consumer. The full
explanation of his reasoning can be found in the Federal Register
notice of the new regulation, 77 Fed. Reg. 65260-01 (October 26, 2012).
Not surprisingly, the change led to something of an uproar
among consumers. An on-line petition requesting the White House to
back a change in the law gathered over 114,000 signatures, and in
March, 2013 the White House agreed, with those petitioners, saying
that in their view
consumers should be able to unlock their cell phones without
risking criminal or other penalties. In fact, we believe the same
principle should also apply to tablets, which are increasingly
similar to smart phones. And if you have paid for your mobile
device, and aren't bound by a service agreement or other
obligation, you should be able to use it on another network. Its
common sense, crucial for protecting consumer choice, and
important for ensuring we continue to have the vibrant,
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competitive wireless market that delivers innovative products
and solid service to meet consumers' needs.
You can read the full White House statement by clicking here.
Congress quickly climbed on the bandwagon and legislation was
introduced in both houses to permit the unlocking of cellphone. The
House acted first, passing its version of the bill, H.R. 1123, in February,
2014 by a vote of 295 to 114. That bill contained one controversial
provision, which provided, “Nothing in this subsection shall be
construed to permit the unlocking of wireless handsets or other
wireless devices, for the purpose of bulk resale, or to authorize the
Librarian of Congress to authorize circumvention for such purpose
under this Act, title 17, United States Code, or any other provision of
law.” This would have codified the sparse case law that had
interpreted the pre-2012 regulatory language to forbid bulk unlocking.
See TracFone Wireless Inc. v. GSM Group, Inc. 555 F.Supp.2d 1331 (S.D. Fla.
2008); TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Dixon, 475 F. Supp.2d 1236 (M.D. Fla.
2007).
A few months later, in July, the Senate adopted a virtually
identical bill, S.517, but without the language on bulk unlocking. On
July 25, 2014 the House approved the Senate version by a voice vote
and sent the bill to the President, who is virtually certain to sign it.
Thus, as you read these words, it is once again legal to unlock your
cellphone.
In the interim, the FCC persuaded several cell phone carriers
to enter into a voluntary agreement under which they will unlock
phones for you – either automatically or upon request from consumers
– but usually only after any service contract has expired. You can view
the specifics of the unlocking policy of ATT Wireless by clicking here,
and the specifics of Verizon’s policy by clicking here.

Chapter 7 The 1909 Act Framework and Its Partial Persistence: Of
Publication, Notice, Deposit and Registration
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p. 505 main volume – delete the district court opinion in Alaska
Stock v. Houghton Mifflin and substitute the following:

Alaska Stock, LLC v. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Pub . Co.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 2014
747 F.3d 673
KLEINFELD, Senior Circuit Judge:
We address whether copyright registration of a collective
work registered the component works within it.
Facts
. . . Alaska Stock, a stock photography agency, registered large
numbers of photographs at a time, listing
See It
only some of the authors and not listing
titles for each photograph. It licensed
To view one of the
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing
registrations at issue in
Company to use pictures it had registered,
the Alaska Stock case,
click here.
for fees based on the number of publications.
Houghton Mifflin and its printer, R.R.
Donnelley & Sons, greatly exceeded the number of publications
Houghton Mifflin had paid for, so Alaska Stock sued for injunctive
relief, actual and statutory damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs.
Alaska Stock owned the copyrights to all the photographs at
issue, pursuant to assignment by the individual photographers. It
registered the copyrights by registering CD catalogs and databases of
the stock photos, entitled “Alaska Stock CD catalog 4” and so forth,
which contained images of each of the photographs. For “name of
author” on its application, it listed only three of many, in the form “1)
Jeff Schultz 2) Chris Arend 3) Johnny Johnson & 103 others.”
This form of registration was prescribed by the Register of
Copyrights and was consistent with Copyright Office procedure for
thirty years. The district court nevertheless dismissed the claims on
the ground that the registrations [, a statutory precondition to filing
an infringement suit,] were defective, because Alaska Stock had not
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provided the names of each of the photographers and the titles of each
of the photographs in its registrations. * * *
We reverse.
* * *
Professional photographers make their living in various ways,
sometimes shooting pictures for weddings, sometimes for
advertisements, sometimes “stock.” In “stock photography,” the
photographer usually makes the images before he has a customer. He
then contracts with a stock agency for the agency to handle copyright
registration and licensing, often for a cash payment up front to the
stock agency and a percentage of whatever the stock agency collects.
Purchasers buy permission from the stock agency to use particular
pictures, usually for a limited number of copies, with the prices
varying from less than a dollar to perhaps a couple of hundred dollars.
The photographer’s income depends on getting noticed and on
volume, since the pictures are licensed so inexpensively. Stock
agencies relieve the photographers of some of the burden of managing
the commercial end of their business, so that they can focus more on
making images, and they relieve publishers of the burden of locating
photographers and purchasing rights to use the images they want.
A particularly important task the stock agencies may perform
is at issue here: registering copyrights, to deter pirating. That is what
Alaska Stock did for the many photographers whose images are
affected by this case. Alaska Stock registered thirteen automated
databases [37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(4) (2006) recodified at § 202.3(b)(5)]
and one “CD–ROM collection” of photographs. Alaska Stock’s
photographs are each independently copyrighted, so the databases
and CD–ROM at issue are each a “collective work” under the
Copyright Act. The several databases contained between 500 and
6,000 individual photographs each. Each database or CD–ROM
contained the work of between 32 and 106 photographers.
The copyright laws and procedures are complex, so photo
stock agencies worked out the registration procedure with the federal
agency in charge. Some stock agencies (such as the plaintiff in this
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case) are very small businesses reliant on a trade association to work
out the procedures they should follow. In 1995, a trade association of
stock agencies, Picture Agency Council of America, Inc., met with the
Register of Copyright (the head of the Copyright Office), her Chief
Examiner, and other Copyright Office staff, to work out how to
register large catalogs of images. The Register agreed that a stock
agency could register both a catalog of images and the individual
photographs in the catalog in one application if the photographers
temporarily transferred their copyrights to the stock agency for the
purposes of registration.
The trade association confirmed this with the Copyright
Office in writing, and advised its member stock agencies. Using
language suggested by the Copyright Office, Alaska Stock’s typical
pre–2001 agreement with a photographer includes this language: “I
grant Alaska Stock the right to register for copyright my photographs
which appear in this catalog in the name of Alaska Stock solely for the
purpose of catalog registration. Alaska Stock shall reassign such
copyright to me upon request.” The post–2001 language was
materially similar: “Photographer grants to Alaska Stock, solely for the
purpose of registration, the copyright....”
The Copyright Office provided a
letter to the trade association telling it
To view a letter from a
how stock photo catalogs ought to be
Copyright Office employee
registered. The letter says that listing only
approving the registration
three individual photographers by name,
procedure that Alaska
followed by the phrase “and x [number]
Stock used, click here.
others,” and naming the agency as owner
of the copyrights was “acceptable when the accompanying deposit
copies are catalogs consisting of photographs.” * * *
See It

Having the written blessing of the federal administrative
agency for its method, Alaska Stock filed its applications in accord
with what the Copyright Office had said was required. * * *. The
Copyright Office approved Alaska Stock’s applications and issued
certificates of registration to the company.
****
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Analysis
****
The issue in this case arises because the phrase in the statute
delegating authority to the Register to prescribe the forms used for
registration applications says that the application “shall include” “the
name . . . of the author or authors” and “the title of the work,” among
other things. [17 U.S.C. § 409.] The Register of Copyrights has
authority to permit “a single registration for a group of related works.”
[17 U.S.C. § 408(c)(1).] The issue is whether the Register could
prescribe a form and grant certificates extending registration to the
individual photographs at issue where the names of each of the
photographers were not provided, and titles for each of the
photographs were not provided, on the applications.
First, names. The statute requires that the application include
“the name and address of the copyright claimant,” “the name and
nationality or domicile of the author or authors,” and if the “claimant
is not the author, a brief statement of how the claimant obtained the
ownership of the copyright.” [17 U.S.C. § 409.] Alaska Stock gave its
name and address as the claimant and a statement of how it came to be
the owner.
The issue of names arises from the provision requiring “the
name and nationality or domicile of the author or authors.” Pursuant
to the Register of Copyright’s longstanding procedure, Alaska Stock’s
applications gave three names and said how many other authors there
were. The Register of Copyrights granted certificates based on these
applications. Addressing this practice, the Associate Register for
Registration and Recordation of the United States Copyright Office
filed a declaration stating that “[s]ince 1980, the Copyright Office has
permitted, as a matter of practice, copyright registrations of collective
works to cover underlying contributions where the rights in those
contributions belong to the claimant even though the individual
contributors are not named in the registration form.” She attached a
portion of the Copyright Office, Compendium II: Compendium of Copyright
Office Practices (1984), corroborating her declaration. The Compendium
says “the names of the individual authors of separate contributions
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being registered as part of the claim need not be given on the
application.”
Thus there is no question that Alaska Stock provided names as
required by the Register of Copyrights pursuant to a longstanding
administrative practice. And there is no question that Alaska Stock
did not provide names of the authors of each of the photographs
registered.
Second, titles. The statute requires a “title” for the “work,” but
only “an identification of any preexisting work or works that it is
based on or incorporates” for compilations or derivative works.
The application for copyright registration shall be made on a
form prescribed by the Register of Copyrights and shall
include . . .
...
(6) the title of the work, together with any previous or
alternative titles under which the work can be identified; . . .
...
(9) in the case of a compilation or derivative work, an
identification of any preexisting work or works that it is based
on or incorporates, and a brief, general statement of the
additional material covered by the copyright claim being
registered[.] [17 U.S.C. § 409(6), (9).]
Alaska Stock provided titles for each work it registered, such as
“Alaska Stock CD catalog 4,” and identified the contents with such
phrases as “CD catalog of stock photos.” The applications did not
provide titles for each photograph.
The district court concluded that the Copyright Office practice
could not be reconciled with the statute, as to both authors and titles,
so the registrations were inadequate. Houghton Mifflin argues that
the statute unambiguously requires the names of all the authors and
titles of all the constituent works. This tension between at least a
superficial reading of the statutory text and the long standing
administrative practice, remains a serious issue.
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For titles, the statutory text and administrative practice are
easily reconciled. The statute does not say that the registration
application must include a “title” for each constituent work, just an
“identification” of any “preexisting work or works”—Alaska Stock
identified the contents with such phrases as “CD catalog of stock
photos” and with CDs showing each image, even though it did not
give each image a title.
The requirement that the application must include the “title of
the work” refers to the collective work itself. The statute expressly
requires only “identification,” in the singular, not titles of preexisting
works incorporated, and a “brief, general statement of the additional
material being covered.” * * *. There is no inconsistency between the
statutory language and the Copyright Office procedure, allowing
identification of the “work” without requiring titles for each
constituent of the work.
The same analysis, that the “work” is what needs an author
designated, applies to the authors subsection, even though unlike the
“title” requirement it mentions “authors” in the plural:
The application for copyright registration shall be made on a
form prescribed by the Register of Copyrights and shall
include . . . (2) in the case of a work other than an anonymous
or pseudonymous work, the name and nationality or domicile
of the author or authors, and, if one or more of the authors is
dead, the dates of their deaths[.] [17 U.S.C. § 409(2).]
This subsection says that the name of the author or authors of
“the work” must be provided, the statute defines a “collective work” as
being a type of “work,” [17 U.S.C. § 101,] and here, the author of the
collective work was Alaska Stock. The references to nationality and
domicile have to do with the provisions for protection of works of
foreign origin in another section of the statute, [17 U.S.C. § 104,] which
are immaterial to this case. The “author or authors” that must be listed
in this context are the author or authors of the collective work itself,
and the applications in this case do name the author of “the work,”
Alaska Stock.
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****
* * * Houghton Mifflin points us to what it sees as the
“purpose” of registration: to create a public record of “what specific
works of intellectual property are registered.” It contends that
“[v]alidating registrations that intentionally lack the basic identifying
information that Section 409 requires would make that goal
unattainable.” This policy argument suggests that numerous images by
“Phillip Photographer” entitled “Mt. McKinley” would somehow
identify the images more specifically than the images themselves,
which were on the CDs.
The government makes a practical policy argument to the
contrary in its brief, that the expensive and error-prone tedium of the
Copyright Office typing all the names into its records may explain
why the Register of Copyrights was satisfied to have the names of only
three authors for so many years. The government suggests that the
elimination of this typing, because of electronic registrations, explains
why the Register now is experimenting with new provisions requiring
more information on material included within collective works.
****
The Fourth Circuit recently confronted the question we face in
this case and adopted the position advocated by Alaska Stock and the
government. Metropolitan Regional Information Systems, Inc. v. American
Home Realty Network, Inc., addressed whether a real estate listing service
had properly registered the individual photographs of properties
contained within their listings by registering their listings as a
database. [Metro. Reg’l Info. Sys., Inc. v. Am. Home Realty Network, Inc., 722
F.3d 591 (4th Cir.2013).] A competing real estate listing service used
these individual images without permission. The defendants in that
case made the same argument Houghton Mifflin makes here, namely,
that the “failure to identify names of creators and titles of individual
works as required by 17 U.S.C. § 409(2) and (6) limits the
registration[s] to the Database itself and therefore that the
registration[s] do[ ] not extend to the individual elements in the
Database.” [Id. at 597 (alteration marks original and internal quotation
marks omitted).] The Fourth Circuit rejected this argument, holding
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that “collective work registrations [are] sufficient to permit an
infringement action on behalf of component works, at least so long as
the registrant owns the rights to the component works as well.” [Id. at
598.] We agree.
****
We recognize that Houghton Mifflin’s position has prevailed
in one published and several unpublished district court decisions, but
we do not agree with them.
****
Chevron and its progeny generally articulate several reasons for
deferring to administrative interpretation, including gap filling
pursuant to implicit or explicit delegation to the agency, expertise of
the agency in addressing technical and complex matters, and
resolution of policy debates by “legislators and administrators” rather
than judges. [Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,
864, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).] While these
considerations counsel in favor of deference in this case, an even
stronger reason does as well
.
A longstanding administrative interpretation upon which
private actors have relied aids in construction of a statute precisely
because private parties have long relied upon it. * * * “In light of . . .
substantial reliance interests, the longstanding administrative
construction of [a] statute should ‘not be disturbed except for cogent
reasons.’ ” [Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 457–58, 98
S.Ct. 2441, 57 L.Ed.2d 337 (1978).]
We are not performing a mere verbal, abstract task when we
construe the Copyright Act. We are affecting the fortunes of people,
many of whose fortunes are small. The stock agencies through their
trade association worked out what they should do to register images
with the Register of Copyrights, the Copyright Office established a
clear procedure and the stock agencies followed it. The Copyright
Office has maintained its procedure for three decades, spanning
multiple administrations. The livelihoods of photographers and stock
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agencies have long been founded on their compliance with the
Register’s reasonable interpretation of the statute. Their reliance upon
a reasonable and longstanding administrative interpretation should be
honored. Denying the fruits of reliance by citizens on a longstanding
administrative practice reasonably construing a statute is unjust.

A Screen Shot of Alaska Stock’s Home Page

Notes
1. The Purposes of Registration: Providing Information About
Works Under Copyright — and in the Public Domain. Ever
since the very first Copyright Act in 1790, Congress has provided
for public registries of claims to copyright. Since 1870, the registry
has been centralized in the Library of Congress, and since 1897 in
the Copyright Office within the Library of Congress. What public
benefits do a registry and the process of registration provide? One
possible benefit is providing information about works under
copyright, to facilitate use of and commercial transactions in those
works. Take a look at the registration application form on pages
502–503, a form used for registration of nondramatic literary
works, from novels to computer programs. (Most applicants now
submit applications online, but it’s easier to present the paper
forms in this book.) What information would a properly completed
form provide about the work? Perhaps the most basic information
is the name and address of the party claiming to own copyright,
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which would help anyone who wanted to obtain permission to use
the work. (Recall that proper copyright notice includes the name of
the copyright owner, but no contact information.)
A completed form, however, provides much other useful
information. Note, for example, Item 6: the applicant states
whether or not the work in question is a derivative work or a
compilation, and if so, provides information about what is new
material in which copyright is claimed, and what is preexisting
material that may be in the public domain or owned by someone
else. That’s also important to know when considering whether you
need to license a work and from whom you need to license it. In
Alaska Stock, the plaintiff’s registrations were styled as registrations
of compilations. Given what you know about creativity in
compilations, what kind of creativity in selection and arrangement
do you suppose the plaintiff exhibited in putting together the CDROMs with hundreds of different photographs? How likely is it
that anyone would use most or all of those photographs in a way
that would preserve the plaintiff’s selection and arrangement?
Recall that the missing information in the registration forms at
issue in Alaska Stock was the names of the authors and titles of the
individual constituent works in the purported compilation – in
other words, of each individual photograph. The titles don’t need to
be fancy — they might just be numbers — but they are a means of
identifying the works and connecting them to authors. Why is the
name of the author important? In part, the answer to this question
depends on subjects that we haven’t yet studied in detail, but here
are two clues. First, the basic term of copyright is now the life of
the author plus 70 years, so we need to know who the author is (or
was) to know whether the work is still under copyright. Second, all
authors of works that are not works made for hire have
nonwaivable rights to terminate any transfer of copyright they have
made. For transfers made on or after January 1, 1978, authors and
certain successors can terminate any license or assignment between
35 and 40 years after they originally executed it.
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2. Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Requiring More
Information. In its regulations regarding registration of multiple
works on a single application, the Copyright Office seems to be
carefully weighing the costs and benefits in particular contexts of
requiring detailed information about each included work. For
example, groups of published photographs can be registered on a
single application only if they were all taken by a single
photographer, named on the application.
See 37 C.F.R.
202.3(b)(10)(ii). Unpublished collections of works can only be
registered on a single application if all of the works have at least
one author in common, also named on the application. See 37 C.F.R.
202.3(b)(4)(B)(4). Those provisions limit the amount of missing
author information. Published serials – newspapers and magazines
– can be registered in groups even though they are the product of
many authors, and the authors do not all need to be named on the
application. See 37 C.F.R. 202.3(b)(6). In that context, however,
one might expect that ordinarily, the authors of individual articles
are credited in the newspaper or magazine issues, so that the
copyright deposit copies of those issues – as well as the copies in
public circulation – preserve more detailed author information.
Most of the registrations at issue in Alaska Stock were based on
applications to register “automated databases.” That category of
group registration was originally created to address problems with
registering “dynamic databases” that were “constantly changing”
with “updates or other revisions” that might consist of “small
increments of information.” Registration of Claims to Copyright:
Registration and Deposit of Databases, 54 Fed. Reg 13177 (March
31, 1989). (Can you think of an example of a “dynamic database”?
Here’s hint. One such database has a name that rhymes with “Best
Slaw.”)
The automated database regulation allows claimants to
register three months of revisions to such a database in a single
application, without naming each author of each revision. See 37
C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(5)(F). Can you imagine the considerations that
went into defining the category of “automated databases” and
setting requirements for it? How well do the compilations of
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photographs registered by the Alaska Stock plaintiff seem to fit in
this category? What are the best arguments for and against
considering such compilations as “automated databases”?
3. Considering Improvements to the Registry’s Information
Function. Are there ways that the copyright registry could be
improved to better serve its information function? Consider these
points:


Identifying works. Many works, such as photographs and
sound recordings, may be published without titles or other
credits. If you encounter an unidentified work online and are
interested in licensing it, how do you find out who owns it?
The Copyright Office database is currently only searchable by
title, author, and so on. Private companies, however, have
constructed databases that allow searches with an image or a
sound recording itself as an input. Could such services connect
with the Copyright Office database, leading a searcher directly
to registration information?



Linking to Licensing Agent Databases. Many private
organizations that act as licensing agents — ASCAP, BMI,
SESAC, SoundExchange, the Copyright Clearance Center,
Harry Fox, the Motion Picture Licensing Center, and Movie
Licensing USA, to name a few — maintain their own registries
and databases, but they are not linked or keyed to the
Copyright Office database. Might building such links facilitate
communication for licensing transactions?



Making Registration Easier. To register a work, you now
need, at the very least, to go to the Copyright Office website,
enter in a bunch of information, upload a deposit copy of the
work, and pay $35. That’s enough of a barrier that a very large
percentage of published works (no one knows exactly what
the percentage is) are not registered. If it useful to collect and
make available registration information, why not make
registration easier? For example, why not work with software
companies to build a registration button into all major
authoring software — Microsoft Word for text, Adobe
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Photoshop for photos and graphics, Pro-Tools for sound
recordings, Sibelius for musical composition, and so on? Or
perhaps the Copyright Office should certify various trade and
other organizations to perform the registration function, just
as ICANN certifies a variety of domain name registrars, which
might result in more public awareness of registration and
lower prices. See Pamela Samuelson, et al., The Copyright
Principles Project: Directions for Reform 27-29 (2010),
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bclt_CPP.pdf.
Can you think of other ideas for improving the information flow about
works of authorship? There is room for plenty of innovation in this
area.
Insert after the end of note 2 on page 534:
3. Section 104A, the Berne Convention, and NAFTA and TRIPS.
Restoration of foreign copyrights is compelled by an interpretation of
§ 18(1) of the Berne Convention, which states that the Convention’s
provisions, including the ban on formalities as conditions of copyright,
apply “to all works which, at the moment of [the Convention’s]
coming into force, have not yet fallen into the public domain in the
country of origin through the expiry of the term of protection.” Yet
the United States did not enact § 104A when it joined the Berne
Convention; it waited until it joined NAFTA and TRIPS. Why do you
think that might be? Consider that while the Berne Convention has
no effective means of enforcement, TRIPS, which incorporated almost
all of the Berne Convention, does; the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
can authorize trade sanctions against a country found to be in
violation of a TRIPS provision.

Chapter 8: Initial Ownership of Copyright
p. 558 – add the following at the bottom of the page:

Greene v. Ablon
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, 2015
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2015 WL 4322887
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge.
* * *
II. The Copyright Dispute
A. Factual Background
In 1998, [Dr. Ross W.] Greene published The Explosive Child, a book
explaining the CPS [Collaborative Problem Solving] Approach [for
treating children with explosive behaviors] for lay audiences. The
book has been published in three subsequent editions and is
uncontestedly Greene’s solo work. Also in 1998, Greene met [Dr. J.
Stuart] Ablon, a trainee in the [Massachusetts General Hospital
(“MGH”)] psychology internship program. As one of Ablon’s
supervisors, Greene became his mentor. Under Greene’s mentorship,
Ablon became interested in the CPS Approach and began assisting in
its dissemination through workshops and speaking engagements.
In early 2002, Greene and Ablon wrote a prospectus for a new
book, ultimately called Treating Explosive Kids: The Collaborative Problem
Solving Approach (“Treating Explosive Kids”). The prospectus
acknowledged that the CPS Approach had first been articulated in
Greene’s prior work, The Explosive Child. In contrast to its predecessor,
Treating Explosive Kids was to be coauthored by Greene and Ablon and
written for an audience of mental health professionals. In April 2002,
they signed a publishing contract with Guilford Publications, Inc.
(“Guilford”), agreeing to complete the book by the end of 2002.
Both Greene and Ablon agree that, at the time they signed the
publishing contract, they intended that Ablon would make
substantive contributions to the book. They disagree, however, about
the quantity and quality of Ablon’s actual contributions. According to
Ablon, he “submitted most if not all of the treatment vignettes”—
dialogues that appear on 145 pages of the 226–page book. Ablon also
claims to have taken “the lead in writing Chapter 8, regarding
implementation of CPS in therapeutic and restrictive facilities, which
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wound up being 25 pages long,” to have written “significant parts of
other portions of the book[,] and [to have] reviewed and made
suggestions for many other sections.”
Greene tells a different story. According to Greene, “After
significant delay, Dr. Ablon, rather than delivering an acceptable
manuscript, delivered to me an ‘attempt’ at only one chapter.” Ablon’s
work was, in Greene’s view, “poorly written, lacked focus, and did not
accurately represent the [CPS Approach].” Greene claims that, after
consulting with the agent who had represented him and Ablon in their
dealings with Guilford, he discarded “most” of Ablon’s draft and wrote
what amounted to almost the entire book himself. However, as Greene
explains, “In an attempt to salvage for him some co-authorship role,
we decided that he (Dr. Ablon) would contribute as original material
some treatment vignettes describing some treatment interactions he
had encountered.” Greene calculates that Ablon’s contributions
survived on fewer than fifteen pages of the final published text. Both
authors acknowledge that Greene edited the drafts.
Guilford published Treating Explosive Kids in October 2005. The
book identifies Greene and Ablon as co-authors and as co-owners of
the copyright. Greene and Ablon divide royalties from the book
equally.
By 2007 or 2008, Greene and Ablon’s relationship had soured, and
efforts to improve their relationship through lawyers and a mediator
proved ineffective. Ablon became a full-time employee at MGH at the
end of 2008 and, soon after, was appointed Director of the Think:Kids
program. In that capacity, Ablon has created written expression,
including PowerPoint slides, that describe and promote the CPS
Approach and which form part of the basis for this action. MGH
terminated Greene’s employment on January 15, 2009.
* * *
C. Joint Work
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The district court held in its summary judgment ruling that
Treating Explosive Kids is a joint work. Under the Copyright Act, a joint
work is “a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention
that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent
parts of a unitary whole.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. “Inseparable” contributions
“have little or no independent meaning standing alone,” as might
frequently be the case with collaboration on a written text like a play
or a novel. Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 505 (2d Cir.1991).
“Interdependent” contributions, on the other hand, “have some
meaning standing alone but achieve their primary significance because
of their combined effect, as in the case of the words and music of a
song.” Id. For a work to be “joint,” the authors must have intended, “at
the time the writing is done,” that their contributions be merged into
“an integrated unit.” Id. (emphasis omitted) It is not necessary that
the authors’ contributions be quantitatively or qualitatively equal,
only that each author’s contribution be more than de minimis. 1
Melville Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 6.07[A][1]
(2014) (“Nimmer”).
Authors who create a joint work co-own the copyright in that
work. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a). Joint authors share “equal undivided
interests in the whole work—in other words, each joint author has the
right to use or to license the work as he or she wishes, subject only to
the obligation to account to the other joint author for any profits that
are made.” Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir.1998). Even if it is
clear that one co-author has contributed more to the work than
another co-author, they are nevertheless equal owners of the copyright
in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. 1 Nimmer § 6.08.
Greene argues that it is a genuine issue of material fact
whether he intended his contributions to merge with Ablon’s into a
unitary whole. He concedes that the book, as originally conceived,
would have been such an integrated work, but insists that his
intention changed after seeing Ablon’s early efforts. At that point,
Greene asserts, the initial project was aborted and reignited with
different intentions: Ablon’s contributions were to be limited to a
handful of stand-alone vignettes. As noted, Greene calculates that
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Ablon’s contributions ultimately comprised no more than fifteen pages
of the final 226–page published manuscript.
Even accepting that Ablon contributed a scant fifteen pages of
excisable vignettes, Greene’s argument fails because he confuses the
quality and quantity of Ablon’s contributions with the relationship
the authors intended those contributions would have to the rest of the
book. We agree with the district court that “there is no evidence that
either Greene or Ablon believed that Treating Explosive Kids was
anything other than a unitary book, and there is abundant evidence
that Ablon’s contributions to the book would be [i.e., proved to be
and, more importantly, were intended to be] interdependent with
Greene’s contributions.” Although Ablon’s vignettes and Greene’s
surrounding passages may “have some meaning standing alone,” the
structure of the book—vignettes nested in related text—demonstrates
that these contributions were undoubtedly intended to “achieve their
primary significance because of their combined effect.” Childress, 945
F.2d at 505. Furthermore, the prospectus, the publishing contract, the
copyright notice, and the book itself all describe Greene and Ablon,
without distinction, as co-authors of a single work. Based on these
facts, the only reasonable conclusion is that Ablon’s contributions
were always intended to be interdependent with Greene’s. Therefore,
the district court correctly determined at summary judgment that
Treating Explosive Kids is a joint work, meaning that Greene and Ablon
jointly own the copyright in that work.
D. Derivative Work
* * *
A derivative work is “a work based upon one or more
preexisting works.” 17 U.S.C. § 101. It “consists of a contribution of
original material to a pre-existing work so as to recast, transform or
adapt the pre-existing work.” Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found.,
Inc. v. Büchel, 593 F.3d 38, 64–65 (1st Cir.2010) (quoting 1 Nimmer §
3.03[A]). Importantly, “[t]he copyright in a . . . derivative work
extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work,
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as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work. .
..” 17 U.S.C. § 103(b). With respect to that preexisting work, “[a]ny
elements that the author of the derivative work borrowed from the
underlying work . . . remain protected by the copyrights in the
underlying work.” Gamma Audio & Video, Inc. v. Ean–Chea, 11 F.3d 1106,
1112 (1st Cir.1993).
Greene maintains that, when a derivative work is created
jointly, each co-author owns only the contributions he or she
personally penned. However, nothing about the limited scope of a
derivative work copyright upsets the ownership regime that normally
arises when more than one author contributes to a work. When the
authors of a derivative work are joint authors, they share equally in the
copyright to the derivative work, regardless of who penned the new
material. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a). Thus, Greene has no greater claim than
Ablon to any of the original expression in Treating Explosive Kids, and he
cannot claim copyright infringement on the basis of Ablon’s use of that
original expression in his PowerPoint slides.
We do have the fact here that an author of the joint work,
Treating Explosive Kids, is also the author of the relevant preexisting
work, The Explosive Child. However, that coincidence does not affect the
contours of the Treating Explosive Kids copyright, nor does it upset the
joint ownership arrangement described above. Treating Explosive Kids
may be both joint and derivative, with Greene alone owning the
copyright in the underlying work—The Explosive Child—and co-owning
the copyright in the derivative work with Ablon.1

1

Professor Nimmer provides another example of how a work may be both joint and
derivative. He posits a screenplay based on a novel. “[The] screenplay is a derivative
work of the novel on which it is based. Let us imagine that [two writers] work
together to translate the [novel] to the silver screen. Their resulting screenplay, as
between themselves, is a joint work. Nonetheless, vis-a-vis the novel, their
screenplay is a derivative work. One and the same production thus can occupy both
statuses.” 1 Nimmer § 6.05 (emphasis omitted). In that example, the screenplay
writers co-own the screenplay copyright, which does not include expression from
the preexisting novel.
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Hence, Greene might have a viable infringement claim against
Ablon if Ablon created a derivative of Treating Explosive Kids, such as the
slides, that used the non-original material in Treating Explosive Kids—
i.e., material derived from The Explosive Child and covered by Greene’s
copyright in that work. Consequently, Greene should have been
allowed to introduce into evidence slides with expression drawn
verbatim from Treating Explosive Kids. He could have used that
expression to argue to the jury both that Treating Explosive Kids is a
derivative work based on The Explosive Child and, relatedly, that Ablon
drew on expression from Treating Explosive Kids that the co-owned
Treating Explosive Kids copyright did not encompass. See, e.g ., Oddo v. Ries,
743 F.2d 630, 634 (9th Cir.1984) (holding that the co-owner of a
derivative work infringes on the other co-owner’s preexisting work
when he uses it without permission in a subsequent work,
notwithstanding that the preexisting work was used in the co-owned
derivative); see also Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., No. CV97–8414–ER (Mcx),
1998 WL 957053, at *3 (C.D.Cal. Jul. 29, 1998) (“[T]he owner of the
copyright in the original work may sue the author(s) of a jointderivative work who make further derivative works which employ preexisting material from the original work without the permission of the
owner of the original work.”). Instead, the court only allowed Greene
to introduce into evidence slides with expression that did not appear
verbatim in Treating Explosive Kids, on the theory that only those slides
would support an argument that Ablon had infringed Greene’s
copyright in The Explosive Child.
On the record before us, however, we are unable to assess
whether the district court’s erroneous conclusion harmed Greene in
any way. Greene failed to make an offer of proof of the alleged two
dozen additional expressions that he claims he would have sought to
introduce at trial if the court had allowed the jury to determine
whether Treating Explosive Kids is a derivative work. See Fed.R.Evid.
103(a)(2) (requiring an offer of proof); Faigin v. Kelly, 184 F.3d 67, 86
(1st Cir.1999) (“[I]t is a bedrock rule of trial practice that, to preserve
for appellate review a claim of error premised on the exclusion of
evidence, the aggrieved party must ensure that the record sufficiently
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reflects the content of the proposed evidence.” * * * Since Greene has
not developed a record to show that he has been harmed, we decline to
remand for further proceedings.
E. Accounting
Apart from the infringement claim based on Ablon’s unlawful
use of expression from The Explosive Child, Greene sought an accounting
from Ablon for Ablon’s use of their joint work, Treating Explosive Kids.
According to Greene, Ablon earned profits from activities that used
expression taken from Treating Explosive Kids and, since they co-owned
the copyright to that work, Ablon was obligated to share the profits
with Greene. The parties agreed that the accounting claim would be
submitted to the court instead of to the jury. After the infringement
trial, Greene moved for judgment on his accounting claim. The court
denied the motion because Greene had not presented any evidence
that Ablon had actually received any profits from his use of their joint
work. Hence, there was nothing for which to account.
A co-owner “must account to other co-owners for any profits
he earns from licensing or use of the copyright.” Oddo, 743 F.2d at 633.
The duty to account “comes from ‘equitable doctrines relating to
unjust enrichment and general principles of law governing the rights
of co-owners.’ ” * * *
As discussed in Section II(C), Treating Explosive Kids is a joint
work. Therefore, Greene and Ablon co-own the copyright to that
work. Greene argues that Ablon owes him an accounting for having
exploited Treating Explosive Kids in two contexts. First, as director of
MGH’s Think:Kids enterprise, Ablon allegedly used expression from
Treating Explosive Kids in MGH programs, advertising, and fundraising
efforts, as well as in the treatment of clients and in the training of
clinicians, yielding “large sums of revenue” for MGH in the form of
donations and fees. Second, Ablon allegedly earned revenue for
himself by using material from Treating Explosive Kids in talks he gave
outside of MGH.
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1. MGH Revenue
The district court rejected Greene’s first theory because, as a
matter of law, Ablon could not be called to account for MGH’s profits.
The court correctly held that “donations and fees to MGH are not
subject to an accounting as to Ablon’s profits.” As Greene concedes, an
accounting can only be sought from a co-owner, not the co-owner’s
licensee, see 1 Nimmer § 6.12[B], and MGH is not a co-owner of the
copyright in this case.
Still, Greene argues, even if Ablon did not himself earn revenue
from allowing MGH to use the copyright (impliedly licensing the
copyright to MGH), MGH’s financial gain shows that the copyright
had value, and Ablon must account to him for that value. In this
argument, Greene is pressing the depletion theory of copyright
accounting, which supposes that one co-owner’s use of the work
necessarily reduces the residual value available for other co-owners to
exploit. See 1 Nimmer § 6.12[A]. This lost value, the theory goes, is what
justifies the accounting. In effect, Greene argues that a party’s duty to
account for profits earned is really a duty to account for value lost.
We acknowledge the theoretical appeal of the notion that if
one owner permits free use of the copyright, that owner incurs a debt
to his co-owner because the use, paid-for or not, partially depletes the
value of the copyright. However, the duty to account is for profits, not
value. See Cambridge Literary Props., Ltd., 510 F.3d at 84 (discussing an
“accounting for profits by a co-owner of a copyright”); Goodman, 78
F.3d at 1012 (“It is widely recognized that ‘[a] co-owner of a copyright
must account to other co-owners for any profits he earns from the
licensing or use of the copyright ....‘ “ (quoting Oddo, 743 F.2d at 633));
Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1318 (2d Cir.1989) (“The only duty
joint owners have with respect to their joint work is to account for
profits from its use.”); see also Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music
Co., 221 F.2d 569, 571 (2d Cir.1955), modified, 223 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.1955)
(holding that the defendant was “entitled to an accounting ... of the
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proceeds received from the exploitation of the copyright” (emphasis
added)); Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F.Supp. 640, 646–47 (S
.D.N.Y.1970) (referring to a duty to account for “compensation”).
Indeed, Congress itself referred to “profits” as the subject of a coowner’s duty to account. See H.R.Rep. No. 94–1476, at 121 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5736 (describing co-owners of a
copyright “as tenants in common, with each co[-]owner having an
independent right to use or license the use of a work, subject to a duty
of accounting to the other co [-]owners for any profits”). Since Ablon
can be called to account only for profits earned, not value lost, the
district court correctly held that MGH’s alleged financial gain was
irrelevant to Ablon’s duty to account.
2. Ablon’s Revenue
In his motion for an accounting, Greene referred generally to
the “evidence at trial” to support his contention that Ablon “engaged
in speaking programs outside of MGH for which he was likely
compensated.” The district court rejected this argument, stating,
“Greene does not identify the evidence that would tie the Treating
Explosive Kids copyright to compensation that Ablon was ‘likely’ to
have received.” We agree that the record does not support this claim.
Even if Ablon were compensated for these speaking engagements,
Greene has not provided evidence that Ablon’s compensation would
have been tied to his use of expression from Treating Explosive Kids as
opposed to, for example, the underlying ideas. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery....”)
* * *
p. 570 main volume – add the following after Note 8 “Works Made
for Hire Under the 1909 Act”.
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9. Works Made for Hire and Superheroes. Once confined to the
pulpy pages of comic books and the sole province of middle-schoolaged boys, the comic-book superhero has now become an
extraordinarily lucrative piece of intellectual property. Superman,
Batman, Spiderman, Captain America and their many colleagues
now regularly appear in blockbuster movies, licensed products and
even the occasional disastrous Broadway play. The economic value
of these characters has caused their original creators – or more
often, the descendants of those creators – to attempt to recapture
the ownership of the relevant copyrights from the corporations that
currently hold them under provisions we consider in depth in
section B(2) of Chapter 10. They are not allowed to do so, however,
if the works in question constitute works made for hire. Marvel
Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119 (2nd Cir. 2013) is illustrative of
the kind of situations that have been litigated.
Jack Kirby, a legendary comic book artist, prepared a total of
262 works for Marvel Comics during the 5-year period from 1958 to
1963. The Second Circuit summarized the working relationship
between Kirby and Marvel as follows:
It is undisputed that Kirby was a freelancer, i.e., he was
not a formal employee of Marvel, and not paid a fixed wage
or salary. He did not receive benefits, and was not
reimbursed for expenses or overhead in creating his
drawings. He set his own hours and worked from his
home. Marvel, usually in the person of Stan Lee, was free to
reject Kirby's drawings or ask him to redraft them. When
Marvel accepted drawings, it would pay Kirby by check at
a per-page rate.
Despite the absence of a formal employment
agreement, however, the record suggests that Kirby and
Marvel were closely affiliated during the relevant time
period. . . . And Kirby seems to have done most of his work
with Marvel projects in mind. Although the Kirby children
assert that their father could and did produce and sell his
work to other publishers during those years, lists of
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Kirby's works cited by both parties establish that the vast
majority of his published work in that time frame was
published by Marvel . . . .
To determine whether the works at issue in this case were “for
hire” the Second Circuit applied what it called the “instance and
expense test” under the 1909 statute. Under this approach, “an
independent contractor is an ‘employee’ and a hiring party an
‘employer’ for purposes of the [1909 Act] if the work is made at the
hiring party's ‘instance and expense.’” Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v.
Dumas, 53 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir.1995). The court went on to
explain that work was at the instance of the hiring party if that
party induced the creation of the work and had the power to direct
the manner in which it would be performed, in some cases even if
that power was not exercised (an approach explicitly repudiated
in CCNV for cases arising under the 1976 Act). Regarding the
“expense” component of the test, the court that the provision of
tools, resources or overhead were usually relevant factors in the
inquiry, as is payment of a flat sum for the work, rather than a
royalty arrangement.
Applying this test to the works at issue, the court found that
they were works made for hire. It noted that the relationship
between Kirby and Marvel was “close and continuous” and that
Marvel had published the “great majority” of Kirby’s work during
the relevant time period. As the court put it, “Kirby's works during
this period were hardly self-directed projects in which he hoped
Marvel, as one of several potential publishers, might have an
interest; rather, he created the relevant works pursuant to Marvel's
assignment or with Marvel specifically in mind.” It also stressed
that Kirby was paid a flat fee per page of work, and that although
Marvel could reject work, because the material built on preexisting characters and story lines, Kirby had a relatively certain
assurance of payment.
Does the approach of the Kirby court essentially mean that any
specially commissioned work will be treated as a work made for
hire under the 1909 Act? Be sure to pay attention to the very
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different approach used in this kind of situation under the current
statute when you get to Morris v. Atchity just a few pages further on
in the main volume.

Chapter 10: Copyright Duration and Related Limitations on
Transfer
p. 764: Add the following to the end of Note 2
A recent example is Baldwin v. EMI Feist Catalog, Inc., 805 F.3d 18, 27 (2d
Cir. 2015), involving that perennial December earworm Santa Claus is
Coming to Town. In 1951, the author of the song, J. Fred Coots, executed
a grant to EMI, a music publisher in 1951. In 1981, using the threat of a
future termination under section 304, Coots renegotiated the deal.
Some decades later, Coots’ heirs sought to terminate the 1981 grant.
EMI argued that the 1951 grant was still controlling and that it could
no longer be terminated under section 304, but the court found that
the 1981 agreement supplanted the earlier deal even though it did not
say so explicitly. The result was a win for the heirs who will recover
the rights to the song in 2016, exactly 35 years after the 1981 deal was
executed.
pp. 777-778: Replace note 1 with the following:
1. Same Sex Couples and Termination of Transfers. Many openly
gay persons have been highly successful in the arts. A very, very
small illustrative list would include playwrights Edward Albee and
Tennessee Williams, Broadway composers Stephen Sondheim and
Jerry Herman, singer-songwriters Melissa Etheridge and Elton
John, and authors Truman Capote and David Sedaris. Until
recently, the termination rights held by these artists might not have
inured to the benefit of their life-long companions because of the
lack of marriage rights for same sex couples. Unless you have been
unusually inattentive to current events, however, you are likely
aware that the Supreme Court held in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct.
2584 2015 WL 2473451 (2015) that marriage is a fundamental right
and that the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment forbid states from denying same-sex
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couples that right. Assume you were counseling a successful
author, composer, or sculptor who was in a committed relationship
(either with someone of the same or opposite sex), but who did not
wish to marry. What steps would you advise him or her to take to
insure that his or her partner would be the one holding the right to
terminate any assignments or licenses in the event that the creator
was not alive 35 years after the agreements were signed?

Chapter 11 The Reproduction, Distribution, and Adaptation
Rights, and the Visual Artists Rights Act
p. 785 – insert at the end of the list of statutory licenses for which
the Copyright Royalty Board sets rates:
The Constitution and the Appointment of Copyright Royalty
Judges. In July 2012, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that the statutory scheme under which
Copyright Royalty Judges (“CRJs”) are appointed violated the
Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See Intercollegiate
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Board, 2012 WL 2609324
(C.A.D.C.). To remedy the constitutional violation, the court voided
the statutory limitation on the power of the Librarian of Congress to
remove the CRJs, thus empowering the Librarian to remove the CRJs
at will, but preserved the remainder of the scheme.
p. 803 – insert after note 3:
3A. Subsequent Developments. In June, 2012, the Eighth Circuit
reinstated the original verdict of $220,000 against Ms. Thomas
(now Ms. Thomas-Rasset). It noted that “[t]he Supreme Court
never has held that the punitive damages guideposts are applicable
in the context of statutory damages.” Capitol Records, Inc. v. ThomasRasset, 692 F.3d 899, 907 (8th Cir. 2012). Unlike punitive damages,
which are unpredictable, the Court of Appeals noted that the
amount of potential statutory damages are “identified and
constrained” by the statute. Id. It thus held that the original jury
award of $9,250 per each of twenty-four works is not “so severe and
oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and
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obviously unreasonable.” Id. (quoting St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v.
Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 67 (1919)). In March 2013, the Supreme Court
denied Thomas-Rasset’s petition for certiorari, leaving her
obligated to pay the full $220,000 award. Thomas-Rasset v. Capitol
Records, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 1584 (2013). Even more recently, the First
Circuit reached the same result on the same reasoning, sustaining a
verdict of $675,000 for the downloading and distribution of 30
songs ($22,500 each). Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, 719
F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2013).
p. 813 – insert after note 5:
6.

Digital First Sale? A U.S. Assessment. In the “old world” of
physical distribution of copies and phonorecords, movies, music
and software typically came in packages that contained relatively
few works – a DVD might contain one or two movies, and CD
might contain ten or twelve songs. By contrast, in the “new world”
of electronic distribution, the physical copy of a song acquired by a
purchaser typically resides on a hard drive or flash memory that
likely contains thousands of other works – an eclectic jumble of
music, video, documents, application software, and an operating
system. The § 109 privilege to sell the hard drive without the
permission of the owner of copyright in all of those works is of
little practical use: how often will you want to sell all of those
works at once, and then find a buyer who wants just that
idiosyncratic collection of copies that you have acquired over a
number of years?
Several companies have tried to recreate markets for copies of
single works in the digital networked environment. One such
effort in that of U.S.-based ReDigi, Inc. to create a “virtual
marketplace” for used iTunes songs. Under ReDigi’s original
system, when an owner of a copy of a song purchased on iTunes or
from another ReDigi user sells it to another ReDigi user, the file is
transmitted to the purchaser’s computer, through the intermediate
step of a transfer to a ReDigi server, and the seller is directed by the
ReDigi software to delete the file from her own computer. ReDigi’s
policy is to suspend the accounts of sellers who refuse to delete the

Fall 2016 Supplement

162

sold files, but the ReDigi software can only detect song files on the
computer on which it is installed and any connected devices, not on
other devices onto which a song may have been copied.
Capitol Records sued ReDigi, and in Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi,
Inc., 2013 WL 1286134 (S.D.N.Y), Judge Richard J. Sullivan granted
Capitol’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of copyright
infringement. Judge Sullivan held, first, that a transfer of a file from
one computer to another involved the making of a reproduction
within the scope of a copyright owner’s § 106(1) reproduction right,
even if the file was then deleted from the source computer, and also
amounted to a distribution within the scope of the § 106(3)
distribution right. He then rejected ReDigi’s argument that the §
109 first sale doctrine should be construed to shield ReDigi’s
activities from liability. He noted that the § 109 privilege concerns
only the distribution right, and thus cannot affect ReDigi’s liability
for making reproductions; he also reasoned that § 109 is limited to
distributions that involve copies “lawfully made under this title,”
which the new copies on purchasers’ computers are not. Judge
Sullivan declined ReDigi’s invitation to adapt § 109 to the digital
world, concluding that that should be left to Congress. He refused
to rule on the copyright implications of “ReDigi 2.0,” a new version
launched well after Capitol filed its complaint, under which users
could direct new iTunes purchases to be downloaded directly onto
ReDigi servers, and stream those songs from those servers
whenever they wanted to listen to them. Under the 2.0 system, a
“sale” of a song would simply reallocate rights over the copy on
Redigi’s server, without changing its physical location. What is
your assessment of the chance that the Redigi 2.0 system will
survive an infringement challenge?
7. A Contrasting E.U. Approach. Meanwhile, in the European Union,
the Court of Justice of the European Union has taken a different
approach to issues of digital first sale on somewhat different facts.
In Usedsoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp., Case C 128/11 (C.J.E.U.
July 3, 2012), Oracle licensed database software on a per-machine
basis; Usedsoft acted as a broker, acquiring licenses from those who
no longer wanted them and selling them to others. The database
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software itself was downloaded from an Oracle server, and
unlocked using a license key. The court held that as long as the
license was perpetual, and had been given “in return for payment of
a fee intended to enable [Oracle] to obtain a remuneration
corresponding to the economic value of the copy of the work of
which [it] was a proprietor,” then Oracle’s copyright rights in that
license were exhausted, and the license could be sold by the first
user and by Usedsoft without Oracle’s authorization.
This decision treats the bundle of rights to use a copy as the copy
itself for purposes of applying the first sale doctrine, doesn’t it?
Does that subtle but powerful shift represent one way of preserving
secondary markets in a digital networked world? Note that
network connections could enable Oracle to control attempts to
use a single license on more than one computer: software could be
configured to report the entry of a license key to Oracle, and to run
only if another computer was not reporting the use of the same
license key to unlock the software. Is this the wave of the future?
Or will most software and entertainment move to a subscription
model in which no user owns perpetual rights? See Greg Sandoval,
Has Spotify killed the iTunes star? Download sales slow as
streaming picks up, The Verge, July 19, 2013; David Pogue, Software
as a Monthly Rental, The New York Times, July 3, 2013 (discussing
Adobe’s decision to offer Photoshop on a rental-only basis)
p. 819: Replace Note 3 with the following:
3. California’s Resale Royalty Act: Passed 1976, Declared
Unconstitutional 2015 and 2016 . . . Many countries provide some
types of authors, typically visual artists, with the right to receive a
part of the proceeds from any resale of their works, a right
traditionally referred to by its French name, the “droit de suite.”
The U.S. Copyright Act does not recognize such a right, but one
state, California, passed legislation in 1976 which does. Under the
California Resale Royalty Act (CRRA), an artist is entitled to 5
percent of the gross resale price of her “work of fine art” if that
resale price is more than $1000, and is also more than the price at
which the seller purchased the work. See Cal. Civ. Code § 986
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(2008). The CRRA requires that its 5% royalty be paid “if “the
seller resides in California or the sale takes place in California.” Cal.
Civ.Code § 986(a).
Two recent cases, however, have together held the entire
CRRA to be invalid. In the first case, the defendants, who were
sued for failure to pay the required royalty on the sale of several
works, challenged the constitutionality that part of the statute that
purported to cover sales made outside of California solely because
the seller was a California resident. That case was eventually
reviewed by the en banc Ninth Circuit; in Sam Francis Foundation v.
Christies, 784 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct.
795 (2016), it struck down the challenged portion of the statute,
finding it violative of the so-called dormant commerce clause,
which forbids state regulation of commerce that takes place
“wholly outside of the state’s borders.”
The Sam Francis Foundation court found that the
unconstitutional portion of the statute was severable from the
provision requiring a royalty when the sale takes place within
California. More recently, however, a federal District Court held
that the latter provision was preempted by the Copyright Act. In
Estate of Graham v. Sotheby’s, Inc., 2016 WL 1464229 (C.D. Cal., April
11, 2016), the court concluded that duty to pay royalties upon resale,
as required by the California law, conflicted with the federal first
sale doctrine, codified in § 109 of the Copyright Act. “By conferring
unwaivable royalty rights on artists, and obligating resellers to
identify and locate those artists, the CRRA restricts transactions
that § 109(a) intended to leave unrestricted. . . . The royalty
obligation . . . acts as a disincentive for art investors to resell their
art, thereby restricting the secondary markets for fine art in
California. That result both undercuts the purpose of the first sale
doctrine and inhibits the uniformity Congress sought to achieve by
enacting the Copyright Act.” Id. at *5.
Does the result in these cases persuade you that there should
be a federal law requiring resale royalty payments on the sale of
works of fine art? In December 2013, the Copyright Office released
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Resale Royalties: An Updated Analysis (updating its 1992 report
entitled Droit de Suite: The Artist’s Resale Royalty). The updated
report offers what might be characterized as a mild endorsement of
federal resale royalty legislation: “The Office finds no clear
impediment to implementation of a resale royalty right in the
United States and supports the right as one alternative to address
the disparity in treatment of artists under the copyright law . . .
[M]ore deliberation is necessary to determine if it is the best
option.” U.S. Copyright Office, Resale Royalties: An Updated
Analysis 2-3 (December 2013).
pp. 820-830 – replace the opinion in Quality King Distributors,
Inc. v. L’Anza Research International, Inc. and the notes thereafter
with the following:

Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Supreme Court of the United States, 2013
2013 WL 1104736
Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 106 of the Copyright Act grants “the owner of copyright
under this title” certain “exclusive rights,” including the right “to
distribute copies ... of the copyrighted
Go Online
work to the public by sale or other
You can listen to the oral
transfer of ownership.” 17 U.S.C. § argument in this case by
106(3). These rights are qualified, clicking here. The same page
however, by the application of various also has a link to a transcript
limitations set forth in the next several of the argument in pdf format.
If you would like to see a
sections of the Act, §§ 107 through 122.
picture of Supap Kirtsaeng,
Those sections . . . include . . . the the petitioner in this case,
doctrine at issue here, the “first sale” click here.
doctrine (§ 109).
Section 109(a) sets forth the “first sale” doctrine as follows:
“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3) [the section that
grants the owner exclusive distribution rights], the owner of a
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title . . . is
entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or
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otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.”
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, even though § 106(3) forbids distribution of a copy of, say,
the copyrighted novel Herzog without the copyright owner's
permission, § 109(a) adds that, once a copy of Herzog has been
lawfully sold (or its ownership otherwise lawfully transferred), the
buyer of that copy and subsequent owners are free to dispose of it as
they wish. In copyright jargon, the “first sale” has “exhausted” the
copyright owner's § 106(3) exclusive distribution right.
What, however, if the copy of Herzog was printed abroad and then
initially sold with the copyright owner's permission? Does the “first
sale” doctrine still apply? Is the buyer, like the buyer of a domestically
manufactured copy, free to bring the copy into the United States and
dispose of it as he or she wishes?
To put the matter technically, an “importation” provision, §
602(a)(1), says that
“[i]mportation into the United States, without the authority of the
owner of copyright under this title, of copies ... of a work that have
been acquired outside the United States is an infringement of the
exclusive right to distribute copies ... under section 106....” 17 U.S.C.
§ 602(a)(1) (2006 ed., Supp. V) (emphasis added).
Thus § 602(a)(1) makes clear that importing a copy without
permission violates the owner's exclusive distribution right. But in
doing so, § 602(a)(1) refers explicitly to the § 106(3) exclusive
distribution right. As we have just said, § 106 is by its terms “[s]ubject
to” the various doctrines and principles contained in §§ 107 through
122, including § 109(a)'s “first sale” limitation. Do those same
modifications apply—in particular, does the “first sale” modification
apply—when considering whether § 602(a)(1) prohibits importing a
copy?
In Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135,
145, 118 S.Ct. 1125, 140 L.Ed.2d 254 (1998), we held that § 602(a)(1)'s
reference to § 106(3)'s exclusive distribution right incorporates the
later subsections' limitations, including, in particular, the “first sale”
doctrine of § 109. Thus, it might seem that, § 602(a)(1)
notwithstanding, one who buys a copy abroad can freely import that
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copy into the United States and dispose of it, just as he could had he
bought the copy in the United States.
But Quality King considered an instance in which the copy,
though purchased abroad, was initially manufactured in the United
States (and then sent abroad and sold). This case is like Quality King
but for one important fact. The copies at issue here were
manufactured abroad. That fact is important because § 109(a) says
that the “first sale” doctrine applies to “a particular copy or
phonorecord lawfully made under this title.” And we must decide here
whether the five words, “lawfully made under this title,” make a
critical legal difference.
****
I
A
Respondent, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., publishes academic
textbooks. Wiley obtains from its authors various foreign and
domestic copyright assignments, licenses and permissions—to the
point that we can, for present purposes, refer to Wiley as the relevant
American copyright owner. Wiley often assigns to its wholly owned
foreign subsidiary, John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte Ltd., rights to
publish, print, and sell Wiley's English language textbooks abroad.
Each copy of a Wiley Asia foreign edition will likely contain language
making clear that the copy is to be sold only in a particular country or
geographical region outside the United States.
****
The upshot is that there are two essentially equivalent versions of
a Wiley textbook, each version manufactured and sold with Wiley's
permission: (1) an American version printed and sold in the United
States, and (2) a foreign version manufactured and sold abroad. And
Wiley makes certain that copies of the second version state that they
are not to be taken (without permission) into the United States.
Petitioner, Supap Kirtsaeng, a citizen of Thailand, moved to the
United States in 1997 to study mathematics at Cornell University. He
paid for his education with the help of a Thai Government scholarship
which required him to teach in Thailand for 10 years on his return.
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Kirtsaeng successfully completed his undergraduate courses at
Cornell, successfully completed a Ph.D. program in mathematics at the
University of Southern California, and then, as promised, returned to
Thailand to teach. While he was studying in the United States,
Kirtsaeng asked his friends and family in Thailand to buy copies of
foreign edition English-language textbooks at Thai book shops, where
they sold at low prices, and mail them to him in the United States.
Kirtsaeng would then sell them, reimburse his family and friends, and
keep the profit.
B
In 2008 Wiley brought this federal lawsuit against Kirtsaeng for
copyright infringement. [Both the District Court and a split panel of
the Second Circuit held that Kirtsaeng could not assert the “first sale”
defense because the copies that had been made abroad were not
“lawfully made under this title” within the meaning of § 109(a) of the
Copyright Act.]
II
We must decide whether the words “lawfully made under this
title” restrict the scope of § 109(a)'s “first sale” doctrine geographically.
****
In our view, § 109(a)'s language, its context, and the common-law
history of the “first sale” doctrine, taken together, favor a nongeographical interpretation. We also doubt that Congress would have
intended to create the practical copyright-related harms with which a
geographical interpretation would threaten ordinary scholarly,
artistic, commercial, and consumer activities. . . .
A
The language of § 109(a) read literally favors Kirtsaeng's
nongeographical interpretation, namely, that “lawfully made under
this title” means made “in accordance with” or “in compliance with”
the Copyright Act. The language of § 109(a) says nothing about
geography. The word “under” can mean “[i]n accordance with.” 18
Oxford English Dictionary 950 (2d ed.1989). See also Black's Law
Dictionary 1525 (6th ed. 1990) (“according to”). And a
nongeographical interpretation provides each word of the five-word
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phrase with a distinct purpose. The first two words of the phrase,
“lawfully made,” suggest an effort to distinguish those copies that
were made lawfully from those that were not, and the last three
words, “under this title,” set forth the standard of “lawful[ness].” Thus,
the nongeographical reading is simple, it promotes a traditional
copyright objective (combatting piracy), and it makes word-by-word
linguistic sense.
The geographical interpretation, however, bristles with linguistic
difficulties. It gives the word “lawfully” little, if any, linguistic work to
do. (How could a book be unlawfully “made under this title”?) It
imports geography into a statutory provision that says nothing
explicitly about it. And it is far more complex than may at first appear.
To read the clause geographically, Wiley, like the Second Circuit
and the Solicitor General, must first emphasize the word “under.”
Indeed, Wiley reads “under this title” to mean “in conformance with
the Copyright Act where the Copyright Act is applicable.” Wiley must
then take a second step, arguing that the Act “is applicable” only in the
United States. . . .
One difficulty is that neither “under” nor any other word in the
phrase means “where.” See, e.g., 18 Oxford English Dictionary, supra,
at 947–952 (definition of “under”). It might mean “subject to,” see
post, at ––––, but as this Court has repeatedly acknowledged, the
word evades a uniform, consistent meaning. See Kucana v. Holder, 558
U.S. 233, 245, 130 S.Ct. 827, 175 L.Ed.2d 694 (2010) (“ ‘under’ is
chameleon”); Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135, 112 S.Ct. 515, 116 L.Ed.2d
496 (1991) (“under” has “many dictionary definitions” and “must draw
its meaning from its context”).
A far more serious difficulty arises out of the uncertainty and
complexity surrounding the second step's effort to read the necessary
geographical limitation into the word “applicable” (or the equivalent).
Where, precisely, is the Copyright Act “applicable”? The Act does not
instantly protect an American copyright holder from unauthorized
piracy taking place abroad. But that fact does not mean the Act is
inapplicable to copies made abroad. As a matter of ordinary English,
one can say that a statute imposing, say, a tariff upon “any
rhododendron grown in Nepal” applies to all Nepalese

Fall 2016 Supplement

170

rhododendrons. And, similarly, one can say that the American
Copyright Act is applicable to all pirated copies, including those
printed overseas. Indeed, the Act itself makes clear that (in the
Solicitor General's language) foreign-printed pirated copies are
“subject to” the Act. § 602(a)(2) (2006 ed., Supp. V) (referring to
importation of copies “the making of which either constituted an
infringement of copyright, or which would have constituted an
infringement of copyright if this title had been applicable”); Brief for
United States 5. See also post, at –––– (suggesting that “made under”
may be read as “subject to”).
The appropriateness of this linguistic usage is underscored by the
fact that § 104 of the Act itself says that works “subject to protection
under this title” include unpublished works “without regard to the
nationality or domicile of the author,” and works “first published” in
any one of the nearly 180 nations that have signed a copyright treaty
with the United States. §§ 104(a), (b) (2006 ed.) (emphasis added); §
101 (2006 ed., Supp. V) (defining “treaty party”); U.S. Copyright
Office, Circular No. 38A, International Copyright Relations of the
United States (2010). Thus, ordinary English permits us to say that the
Act “applies” to an Irish manuscript lying in its author's Dublin desk
drawer as well as to an original recording of a ballet performance first
made in Japan and now on display in a Kyoto art gallery.
The Ninth Circuit's geographical interpretation produces still
greater linguistic difficulty. As we said, that Circuit interprets the
“first sale” doctrine to cover both (1) copies manufactured in the
United States and (2) copies manufactured abroad but first sold in the
United States with the American copyright owner's permission.
We can understand why the Ninth Circuit may have thought it
necessary to add the second part of its definition. As we shall later
describe, without some such qualification a copyright holder could
prevent a buyer from domestically reselling or even giving away copies
of a video game made in Japan, a film made in Germany, or a dress
(with a design copyright) made in China, even if the copyright holder
has granted permission for the foreign manufacture, importation, and
an initial domestic sale of the copy. A publisher such as Wiley would
be free to print its books abroad, allow their importation and sale
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within the United States, but prohibit students from later selling their
used texts at a campus bookstore. We see no way, however, to
reconcile this half-geographical/ half-nongeographical interpretation
with the language of the phrase, “lawfully made under this title.” As a
matter of English, it would seem that those five words either do cover
copies lawfully made abroad or they do not.
In sum, we believe that geographical interpretations create more
linguistic problems than they resolve. And considerations of simplicity
and coherence tip the purely linguistic balance in Kirtsaeng's,
nongeographical, favor.
B
Both historical and contemporary statutory context indicate that
Congress, when writing the present version of § 109(a), did not have
geography in mind. In respect to history, we compare § 109(a)'s
present language with the language of its immediate predecessor. That
predecessor said:
“[N]othing in this Act shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or
restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the
possession of which has been lawfully obtained.” Copyright Act of
1909, § 41, 35 Stat. 1084 (emphasis added).
[The Court argues that the change to the present version of § 109(a),
which conditions the first sale defense on ownership rather than
possession, was due to problems with bailees and lessees claiming that
defense, particularly lessees of film prints in the motion picture
industry.]
. . . [W]e normally presume that the words “lawfully made under
this title” carry the same meaning when they appear in different but
related sections. Department of Revenue of Ore. v. ACF Industries, Inc., 510
U.S. 332, 342, 114 S.Ct. 843, 127 L.Ed.2d 165 (1994). But doing so here
produces surprising consequences. Consider:
(1) Section 109(c) says that, despite the copyright owner's exclusive
right “to display” a copyrighted work (provided in § 106(5)), the
owner of a particular copy “lawfully made under this title” may
publicly display it without further authorization. To interpret these
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words geographically would mean that one who buys a copyrighted
work of art, a poster, or even a bumper sticker, in Canada, in Europe,
in Asia, could not display it in America without the copyright
owner's further authorization.
[The Court discusses two other examples in § 109(e), concerning
public performance or display of video arcade games, and § 110(1),
concerning public performances during face-to-face teaching
activities.]
(4) In its introductory sentence, § 106 provides the Act's basic
exclusive rights to an “owner of a copyright under this title.” The
last three words cannot support a geographic interpretation.
Wiley basically accepts the first three readings, but argues that
Congress intended the restrictive consequences. And it argues that
context simply requires that the words of the fourth example receive a
different interpretation. Leaving the fourth example to the side, we
shall explain in Part II–D, infra, why we find it unlikely that Congress
would have intended these, and other related consequences.
C
A relevant canon of statutory interpretation favors a
nongeographical reading. “[W]hen a statute covers an issue previously
governed by the common law,” we must presume that “Congress
intended to retain the substance of the common law.” Samantar v.
Yousuf, 560 U.S. ––––, ––––, n. 13, 130 S.Ct. 2278, 2289–2290, n. 13, 176
L.Ed.2d 1047 (2010). See also Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783,
72 S.Ct. 1011, 96 L.Ed. 1294 (1952) (“Statutes which invade the
common law ... are to be read with a presumption favoring the
retention of long-established and familiar principles, except when a
statutory purpose to the contrary is evident”).
The “first sale” doctrine is a common-law doctrine with an
impeccable historic pedigree. [The opinion notes that Lord Coke, the
preeminent 17th-Century English jurist, described and suppored the
first sale doctrine.]
. . . American law too has generally thought that competition,
including freedom to resell, can work to the advantage of the
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consumer. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
U.S. 877, 886, 127 S.Ct. 2705, 168 L.Ed.2d 623 (2007) (restraints with
“manifestly anticompetitive effects” are per se illegal; others are
subject to the rule of reason (internal quotation marks omitted)); 1 P.
Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 100, p. 4 (3d ed. 2006)
(“[T]he principal objective of antitrust policy is to maximize
consumer welfare by encouraging firms to behave competitively”).
The “first sale” doctrine also frees courts from the administrative
burden of trying to enforce restrictions upon difficult-to-trace, readily
movable goods. And it avoids the selective enforcement inherent in
any such effort. Thus, it is not surprising that for at least a century the
“first sale” doctrine has played an important role in American
copyright law.
The common-law doctrine makes no geographical distinctions; nor
can we find any in Bobbs–Merrill [v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908)] (where
this Court first applied the “first sale” doctrine) or in § 109(a)'s
predecessor provision, which Congress enacted a year later. Rather, as
the Solicitor General acknowledges, “a straightforward application of
Bobbs–Merrill ” would not preclude the “first sale” defense from
applying to authorized copies made overseas. Brief for United States
27. And we can find no language, context, purpose, or history that
would rebut a “straightforward application” of that doctrine here.
****
D
Associations of libraries, used-book dealers, technology
companies, consumer-goods retailers, and museums point to various
ways in which a geographical interpretation would fail to further
basic constitutional copyright objectives, in particular “promot[ing]
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
The American Library Association tells us that library collections
contain at least 200 million books published abroad (presumably,
many were first published in one of the nearly 180 copyright-treaty
nations and enjoy American copyright protection under 17 U.S.C. §
104); that many others were first published in the United States but
printed abroad because of lower costs; and that a geographical
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interpretation will likely require the libraries to obtain permission (or
at least create significant uncertainty) before circulating or otherwise
distributing these books.
How, the American Library Association asks, are the libraries to
obtain permission to distribute these millions of books? How can they
find, say, the copyright owner of a foreign book, perhaps written
decades ago? They may not know the copyright holder's present
address. And, even where addresses can be found, the costs of finding
them, contacting owners, and negotiating may be high indeed. Are the
libraries to stop circulating or distributing or displaying the millions
of books in their collections that were printed abroad?
[The Court notes that used-book dealers expressed similar
concerns about resales of books first purchased abroad.]
Technology companies tell us that “automobiles, microwaves,
calculators, mobile phones, tablets, and personal computers” contain
copyrightable software programs or packaging. Many of these items
are made abroad with the American copyright holder's permission and
then sold and imported (with that permission) to the United States. A
geographical interpretation would prevent the resale of, say, a car,
without the permission of the holder of each copyright on each piece
of copyrighted automobile software. Yet there is no reason to believe
that foreign auto manufacturers regularly obtain this kind of
permission from their software component suppliers, and Wiley did
not indicate to the contrary when asked. Without that permission a
foreign car owner could not sell his or her used car.
Retailers tell us that over $2.3 trillion worth of foreign goods were
imported in 2011. American retailers buy many of these goods after a
first sale abroad. And, many of these items bear, carry, or contain
copyrighted “packaging, logos, labels, and product inserts and
instructions for [the use of] everyday packaged goods from floor
cleaners and health and beauty products to breakfast cereals.” The
retailers add that American sales of more traditional copyrighted
works, “such as books, recorded music, motion pictures, and
magazines” likely amount to over $220 billion. A geographical
interpretation would subject many, if not all, of them to the disruptive
impact of the threat of infringement suits.
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Art museum directors ask us to consider their efforts to display
foreign-produced works by, say, Cy Twombly, Rene Magritte, Henri
Matisse, Pablo Picasso, and others. A geographical interpretation, they
say, would require the museums to obtain permission from the
copyright owners before they could display the work—even if the
copyright owner has already sold or donated the work to a foreign
museum. What are the museums to do, they ask, if the artist retained
the copyright, if the artist cannot be found, or if a group of heirs is
arguing about who owns which copyright?
These examples, and others previously mentioned, help explain
why Lord Coke considered the “first sale” doctrine necessary to
protect “Trade and Traffi[c], and bargaining and contracting,” and
they help explain why American copyright law has long applied that
doctrine.
****
[T]he fact that harm [from a geographical interpretation] has
proved limited so far may simply reflect the reluctance of copyright
holders so far to assert geographically based resale rights. They may
decide differently if the law is clarified in their favor. Regardless, a
copyright law that can work in practice only if unenforced is not a
sound copyright law. It is a law that would create uncertainty, would
bring about selective enforcement, and, if widely unenforced, would
breed disrespect for copyright law itself.
Thus, we believe that the practical problems that petitioner and
his amici have described are too serious, too extensive, and too likely
to come about for us to dismiss them as insignificant—particularly in
light of the ever-growing importance of foreign trade to America. See
The World Bank, Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) (imports
in 2011 18% of U.S. gross domestic product compared to 11% in 1980),
online at http:// data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.IMP.GNFS.ZS? (as
visited Mar. 15, 2013, and available in Clerk of Court's case file). The
upshot is that copyright-related consequences along with language,
context, and interpretive canons argue strongly against a geographical
interpretation of § 109(a).
III
. . . Wiley and the dissent claim that a nongeographical
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interpretation will make it difficult, perhaps impossible, for publishers
(and other copyright holders) to divide foreign and domestic markets.
We concede that is so. A publisher may find it more difficult to charge
different prices for the same book in different geographic markets. But
we do not see how these facts help Wiley, for we can find no basic
principle of copyright law that suggests that publishers are especially
entitled to such rights.
* * * [T]he Constitution's language nowhere suggests that its
limited exclusive right should include a right to divide markets or a
concomitant right to charge different purchasers different prices for
the same book, say to increase or to maximize gain. Neither, to our
knowledge, did any Founder make any such suggestion. We have
found no precedent suggesting a legal preference for interpretations of
copyright statutes that would provide for market divisions.
To the contrary, Congress enacted a copyright law that (through
the “first sale” doctrine) limits copyright holders' ability to divide
domestic markets. And that limitation is consistent with antitrust
laws that ordinarily forbid market divisions. Cf. Palmer v. BRG of Ga.,
Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49–50, 111 S.Ct. 401, 112 L.Ed.2d 349 (1990) (per
curiam) (“[A]greements between competitors to allocate territories to
minimize competition are illegal”). Whether copyright owners should,
or should not, have more than ordinary commercial power to divide
international markets is a matter for Congress to decide. We do no
more here than try to determine what decision Congress has taken.
****
IV
For these reasons we conclude that the considerations supporting
Kirtsaeng's nongeographical interpretation of the words “lawfully
made under this title” are the more persuasive. The judgment of the
Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Justice KAGAN, with whom Justice ALITO joins, concurring.
I concur fully in the Court's opinion. Neither the text nor the
history of 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) supports removing first-sale protection
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from every copy of a protected work manufactured abroad. I
recognize, however, that the combination of today's decision and
Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 118
S.Ct. 1125, 140 L.Ed.2d 254 (1998), constricts the scope of § 602(a)(1)'s
ban on unauthorized importation. I write to suggest that any
problems associated with that limitation come not from our reading of
§ 109(a) here, but from Quality King 's holding that § 109(a) limits §
602(a)(1).
****
Here, after all, we merely construe § 109(a); Quality King is the
decision holding that § 109(a) limits § 602(a)(1). Had we come out the
opposite way in that case, § 602(a)(1) would allow a copyright owner
to restrict the importation of copies irrespective of the first-sale
doctrine. That result would enable the copyright owner to divide
international markets in the way John Wiley claims Congress
intended when enacting § 602(a)(1). But it would do so without
imposing downstream liability on those who purchase and resell in
the United States copies that happen to have been manufactured
abroad. In other words, that outcome would target unauthorized
importers alone, and not the “libraries, used-book dealers, technology
companies, consumer-goods retailers, and museums” with whom the
Court today is rightly concerned. Assuming Congress adopted §
602(a)(1) to permit market segmentation, I suspect that is how
Congress thought the provision would work—not by removing firstsale protection from every copy manufactured abroad (as John Wiley
urges us to do here), but by enabling the copyright holder to control
imports even when the first-sale doctrine applies (as Quality King
now prevents).2
2

Indeed, allowing the copyright owner to restrict imports irrespective of the firstsale doctrine—i.e., reversing Quality King—would yield a far more sensible scheme
of market segmentation than would adopting John Wiley's argument here. That is
because only the former approach turns on the intended market for copies; the latter
rests instead on their place of manufacture. To see the difference, imagine that John
Wiley prints all its textbooks in New York, but wants to distribute certain versions
only in Thailand. Without Quality King, John Wiley could do so—i.e., produce
books in New York, ship them to Thailand, and prevent anyone from importing
them back into the United States. But with Quality King, that course is not open to
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At bottom, John Wiley (together with the dissent) asks us to
misconstrue § 109(a) in order to restore § 602(a)(1) to its purportedly
rightful function of enabling copyright holders to segment
international markets. I think John Wiley may have a point about
what § 602(a)(1) was designed to do; that gives me pause about
Quality King 's holding that the first-sale doctrine limits the
importation ban's scope. But the Court today correctly declines the
invitation to save § 602(a)(1) from Quality King by destroying the
first-sale protection that § 109(a) gives to every owner of a copy
manufactured abroad. That would swap one (possible) mistake for a
much worse one, and make our reading of the statute only less
reflective of Congressional intent. If Congress thinks copyright
owners need greater power to restrict importation and thus divide
markets, a ready solution is at hand—not the one John Wiley offers in
this case, but the one the Court rejected in Quality King.
Justice GINSBURG, with whom Justice KENNEDY joins, and with
whom Justice SCALIA joins except as to Parts III and V–B–1,
dissenting.
. . . Instead of adhering to the Legislature's design, the Court today
adopts an interpretation of the Copyright Act at odds with Congress'
aim to protect copyright owners against the unauthorized importation
of low-priced, foreign-made copies of their copyrighted works. The
Court's bold departure from Congress' design is all the more stunning,
for it places the United States at the vanguard of the movement for
“international exhaustion” of copyrights—a movement the United
States has steadfastly resisted on the world stage.
To justify a holding that shrinks to insignificance copyright
protection against the unauthorized importation of foreign-made
John Wiley even under its reading of § 109(a): To prevent someone like Kirtsaeng
from re-importing the books—and so to segment the Thai market—John Wiley
would have to move its printing facilities abroad. I can see no reason why Congress
would have conditioned a copyright owner's power to divide markets on
outsourcing its manufacturing to a foreign country.

179

COPYRIGHT : A Contemporary Approach

copies, the Court identifies several “practical problems.” Ante, at ––––.
The Court's parade of horribles, however, is largely imaginary.
Congress' objective in enacting 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)'s importation
prohibition can be honored without generating the absurd
consequences hypothesized in the Court's opinion. I dissent from the
Court's embrace of “international exhaustion,” and would affirm the
sound judgment of the Court of Appeals.
I
Because economic conditions and demand for particular goods
vary across the globe, copyright owners have a financial incentive to
charge different prices for copies of their works in different geographic
regions. Their ability to engage in such price discrimination, however,
is undermined if arbitrageurs are permitted to import copies from lowprice regions and sell them in high-price regions. The question in this
case is whether the unauthorized importation of foreign-made copies
constitutes copyright infringement under U.S. law.
****
II
The text of the Copyright Act demonstrates that Congress
intended to provide copyright owners with a potent remedy against
the importation of foreign-made copies of their copyrighted works. As
the Court recognizes, this case turns on the meaning of the phrase
“lawfully made under this title” in § 109(a). In my view, that phrase is
most sensibly read as referring to instances in which a copy's creation
is governed by, and conducted in compliance with, Title 17 of the
U.S.Code. This reading is consistent with the Court's interpretation of
similar language in other statutes. * * *
Section 109(a), properly read, affords Kirtsaeng no defense against
Wiley's claim of copyright infringement. The Copyright Act, it has
been observed time and again, does not apply extraterritorially. See
United Dictionary Co. v. G. & C. Merriam Co., 208 U.S. 260, 264, 28 S.Ct.
290, 52 L.Ed. 478 (1908) (copyright statute requiring that U.S.
copyright notices be placed in all copies of a work did not apply to
copies published abroad because U.S. copyright laws have no “force”
beyond the United States' borders) . . . . The printing of Wiley's
foreign-manufactured textbooks therefore was not governed by Title
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17. The textbooks thus were not “lawfully made under [Title 17],” the
crucial precondition for application of § 109(a). And if § 109(a) does
not apply, there is no dispute that Kirtsaeng's conduct constituted
copyright infringement under § 602(a)(1).
The Court's point of departure is similar to mine. According to the
Court, the phrase “ ‘lawfully made under this title’ means made ‘in
accordance with’ or ‘in compliance with’ the Copyright Act.” Ante, at
––––. But the Court overlooks that, according to the very dictionaries
it cites, the word “under” commonly signals a relationship of
subjection, where one thing is governed or regulated by another. . . .
Only by disregarding this established meaning of “under” can the
Court arrive at the conclusion that Wiley's foreign-manufactured
textbooks were “lawfully made under” U.S. copyright law, even
though that law did not govern their creation. It is anomalous,
however, to speak of particular conduct as “lawful” under an
inapplicable law. For example, one might say that driving on the right
side of the road in England is “lawful” under U.S. law, but that would
be so only because U.S. law has nothing to say about the subject. The
governing law is English law, and English law demands that driving be
done on the left side of the road.4
The logical implication of the Court's definition of the word
“under” is that any copy manufactured abroad—even a piratical one
made without the copyright owner's authorization and in violation of
the law of the country where it was created—would fall within the
scope of § 109(a). Any such copy would have been made “in
accordance with” or “in compliance with” the U.S. Copyright Act, in
4

The Court asserts that my position gives the word “lawfully” in § 109(a) “little, if
any, linguistic work to do.” Ante, at ––––. That is not so. My reading gives meaning
to each word in the phrase “lawfully made under this title.” The word “made”
signifies that the conduct at issue is the creation or manufacture of a copy. See
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1356 (1961) (defining “made” as
“artificially produced by a manufacturing process”). The word “lawfully” indicates
that for § 109(a) to apply, the copy's creation must have complied with some body of
law. Finally, the prepositional phrase “under this title” clarifies what that body of
law is—namely, the copyright prescriptions contained in Title 17 of the U.S.Code.
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the sense that manufacturing the copy did not violate the Act (because
the Act does not apply extraterritorially).
The Court rightly refuses to accept such an absurd conclusion.
Instead, it interprets § 109(a) as applying only to copies whose making
actually complied with Title 17, or would have complied with Title 17
had Title 17 been applicable (i.e., had the copies been made in the
United States). See ante, at –––– (“§ 109(a)'s ‘first sale’ doctrine would
apply to copyrighted works as long as their manufacture met the
requirements of American copyright law.”). Congress, however, used
express language when it called for such a counterfactual inquiry in 17
U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(2) and (b). See § 602(a)(2) (“Importation into the
United States or exportation from the United States, without the
authority of the owner of copyright under this title, of copies or
phonorecords, the making of which either constituted an infringement
of copyright, or which would have constituted an infringement of
copyright if this title had been applicable, is an infringement of the
exclusive right to distribute copies or phonorecords under section
106.” (emphasis added)); § 602(b) (“In a case where the making of the
copies or phonorecords would have constituted an infringement of
copyright if this title had been applicable, their importation is
prohibited.” (emphasis added)). Had Congress intended courts to
engage in a similarly hypothetical inquiry under § 109(a), Congress
would presumably have included similar language in that section. . . .
Not only does the Court adopt an unnatural construction of the §
109(a) phrase “lawfully made under this title.” Concomitantly, the
Court reduces § 602(a)(1) to insignificance. As the Court appears to
acknowledge, the only independent effect § 602(a)(1) has under
today's decision is to prohibit unauthorized importations carried out
by persons who merely have possession of, but do not own, the
imported copies. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (§ 109(a) applies to any “owner
of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title”
(emphasis added)) If this is enough to avoid rendering § 602(a)(1)
entirely “superfluous,” it hardly suffices to give the owner's
importation right the scope Congress intended it to have. Congress
used broad language in § 602(a)(1); it did so to achieve a broad
objective. Had Congress intended simply to provide a copyright
remedy against larcenous lessees, licensees, consignees, and bailees of
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films and other copyright-protected goods, it would have used
language tailored to that narrow purpose.
The Court's decision also overwhelms 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(3)'s
exceptions to § 602(a)(1)'s importation prohibition. Those exceptions
permit the importation of copies without the copyright owner's
authorization for certain governmental, personal, scholarly,
educational, and religious purposes. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(3). Copies
imported under these exceptions “will often be lawfully made gray
market goods purchased through normal market channels abroad.” 2
[P. Goldstein, Copyright] § 7.6.1.2(a), at 7:141 [(3rd ed. 2012)]. But if, as
the Court holds, such copies can in any event be imported by virtue of
§ 109(a), § 602(a)(3)'s work has already been done. For example, had
Congress conceived of § 109(a)'s sweep as the Court does, what
earthly reason would there be to provide, as Congress did in §
602(a)(3)(C), that a library may import “no more than five copies” of a
non-audiovisual work for its “lending or archival purposes”?
The far more plausible reading of §§ 109(a) and 602(a), then, is that
Congress intended § 109(a) to apply to copies made in the United
States, not to copies manufactured and sold abroad. That reading of
the first sale and importation provisions leaves § 602(a)(3)'s
exceptions with real, meaningful work to do. In the range of
circumstances covered by the exceptions, § 602(a)(3) frees individuals
and entities who purchase foreign-made copies abroad from the
requirement they would otherwise face under § 602(a)(1) of obtaining
the copyright owner's permission to import the copies into the United
States.10
****
IV
Unlike the Court's holding, my position is consistent with the
10

The Court asserts that its reading of § 109(a) is bolstered by § 104, which extends
the copyright “protection[s]” of Title 17 to a wide variety of foreign works. See ante,
at –––– – ––––. The “protection under this title” afforded by § 104, however, is
merely protection against infringing conduct within the United States, the only
place where Title 17 applies. See 4 W. Patry, Copyright § 13:44.10, pp. 13–128 to 13–
129 (2012) (hereinafter Patry). Thus, my reading of the phrase “under this title” in §
109(a) is consistent with Congress' use of that phrase in § 104.
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stance the United States has taken in international-trade negotiations.
This case bears on the highly contentious trade issue of interterritorial
exhaustion. The issue arises because intellectual property law is
territorial in nature, see supra, at ––––, which means that creators of
intellectual property “may hold a set of parallel” intellectual property
rights under the laws of different nations. There is no international
consensus on whether the sale in one country of a good incorporating
protected intellectual property exhausts the intellectual property
owner's right to control the distribution of that good elsewhere.
Indeed, the members of the World Trade Organization, “agreeing to
disagree,” provided in Article 6 of the Agreement on Trade–Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 1197, 1200, that “nothing in this Agreement shall be used to
address the issue of ... exhaustion.”
In the absence of agreement at the international level, each country
has been left to choose for itself the exhaustion framework it will
follow. One option is a national-exhaustion regime, under which a
copyright owner's right to control distribution of a particular copy is
exhausted only within the country in which the copy is sold. Another
option is a rule of international exhaustion, under which the
authorized distribution of a particular copy anywhere in the world
exhausts the copyright owner's distribution right everywhere with
respect to that copy. The European Union has adopted the
intermediate approach of regional exhaustion, under which the sale of
a copy anywhere within the European Economic Area exhausts the
copyright owner's distribution right throughout that region. Section
602(a)(1), in my view, ties the United States to a national-exhaustion
framework. The Court's decision, in contrast, places the United States
solidly in the international-exhaustion camp.
Strong arguments have been made both in favor of, and in
opposition to, international exhaustion. International exhaustion
subjects copyright-protected goods to competition from lower priced
imports and, to that extent, benefits consumers. Correspondingly,
copyright owners profit from a national-exhaustion regime, which
also enlarges the monetary incentive to create new copyrightable
works.
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Weighing the competing policy concerns, our Government
reached the conclusion that widespread adoption of the internationalexhaustion framework would be inconsistent with the long-term
economic interests of the United States. See Brief for United States as
Amicus Curiae in Quality King, O.T.1997, No. 96–1470, pp. 22–26
(hereinafter Quality King Brief). Accordingly, the United States has
steadfastly “taken the position in international trade negotiations that
domestic copyright owners should ... have the right to prevent the
unauthorized importation of copies of their work sold abroad.” Id., at
22. The United States has “advanced this position in multilateral trade
negotiations,” including the negotiations on the TRIPS Agreement. Id.,
at 24. . . .
Even if the text and history of the Copyright Act were ambiguous
on the answer to the question this case presents—which they are not,
see Parts II–III, supra—I would resist a holding out of accord with the
firm position the United States has taken on exhaustion in
international negotiations. . . . While the Government has urged our
trading partners to refrain from adopting international-exhaustion
regimes that could benefit consumers within their borders but would
impact adversely on intellectual-property producers in the United
States, the Court embraces an international-exhaustion rule that
could benefit U.S. consumers but would likely disadvantage foreign
holders of U.S. copyrights. This dissonance scarcely enhances the
United States' “role as a trusted partner in multilateral endeavors.”
Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 539, 115
S.Ct. 2322, 132 L.Ed.2d 462 (1995).
V
I turn now to the Court's justifications for a decision difficult to
reconcile with the Copyright Act's text and history.
A
The Court asserts that its holding “is consistent with antitrust
laws that ordinarily forbid market divisions.” Section 602(a)(1),
however, read as I do and as the Government does, simply facilitates
copyright owners' efforts to impose “vertical restraints” on
distributors of copies of their works. * * * We have held that vertical
restraints are not per se illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
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§ 1, because such “restraints can have procompetitive effects.” 551 U.S.,
at 881–882, 127 S.Ct. 2705.17
B
The Court sees many “horribles” following from a holding that the
§ 109(a) phrase “lawfully made under this title” does not encompass
foreign-made copies. If § 109(a) excluded foreign-made copies, the
Court fears, then copyright owners could exercise perpetual control
over the downstream distribution or public display of such copies. A
ruling in Wiley's favor, the Court asserts, would shutter libraries, put
used-book dealers out of business, cripple art museums, and prevent
the resale of a wide range of consumer goods, from cars to calculators.
Copyright law and precedent, however, erect barriers to the
anticipated horribles.
1
Recognizing that foreign-made copies fall outside the ambit of §
109(a) would not mean they are forever free of the first sale doctrine.
As earlier observed, the Court stated that doctrine initially in its 1908
Bobbs–Merrill decision. At that time, no statutory provision expressly
codified the first sale doctrine. Instead, copyright law merely provided
that copyright owners had “the sole liberty of printing, reprinting,
publishing, completing, copying, executing, finishing, and vending”
their works. Copyright Act of 1891, § 1, 26 Stat. 1107.
In Bobbs–Merrill, the Court addressed the scope of the statutory
17

Despite the Court's suggestion to the contrary, this case in no way implicates the
per se antitrust prohibition against horizontal “ ‘[a]greements between competitors
to allocate territories to minimize competition.’ ” Ante, at –––– (quoting Palmer v.
BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49, 111 S.Ct. 401, 112 L.Ed.2d 349 (1990) (per curiam )).
Wiley is not requesting authority to enter into collusive agreements with other
textbook publishers that would, for example, make Wiley the exclusive supplier of
textbooks on particular subjects within particular geographic regions. Instead,
Wiley asserts no more than the prerogative to impose vertical restraints on the
distribution of its own textbooks. See Hovenkamp, Post–Sale Restraints and
Competitive Harm: The First Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66 N.Y.U. Ann. Survey
Am. L. 487, 488 (2011) ( “vertical restraints” include “limits [on] the way a seller's
own product can be distributed”).
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right to “ven[d].” In granting that right, the Court held, Congress did
not intend to permit copyright owners “to fasten ... a restriction upon
the subsequent alienation of the subject-matter of copyright after the
owner had parted with the title to one who had acquired full
dominion over it and had given a satisfactory price for it.” 210 U.S., at
349–350, 28 S.Ct. 722. “[O]ne who has sold a copyrighted article ...
without restriction,” the Court explained, “has parted with all right to
control the sale of it.” Id., at 350, 28 S.Ct. 722. Thus, “[t]he purchaser
of a book, once sold by authority of the owner of the copyright, may
sell it again, although he could not publish a new edition of it.” Ibid.
Under the logic of Bobbs–Merrill, the sale of a foreign-manufactured
copy in the United States carried out with the copyright owner's
authorization would exhaust the copyright owner's right to “vend”
that copy. The copy could thenceforth be resold, lent out, or otherwise
redistributed without further authorization from the copyright owner.
Although § 106(3) uses the word “distribute” rather than “vend,” there
is no reason to think Congress intended the word “distribute” to bear
a meaning different from the construction the Court gave to the word
“vend” in Bobbs–Merrill. See ibid. (emphasizing that the question
before the Court was “purely [one] of statutory construction”). Thus,
in accord with Bobbs–Merrill, the first authorized distribution of a
foreign-made copy in the United States exhausts the copyright
owner's distribution right under § 106(3). After such an authorized
distribution, a library may lend, or a used-book dealer may resell, the
foreign-made copy without seeking the copyright owner's permission.
****
This line of reasoning, it must be acknowledged, significantly
curtails the independent effect of § 109(a). If, as I maintain, the term
“distribute” in § 106(3) incorporates the first sale doctrine by virtue of
Bobbs–Merrill, then § 109(a)'s codification of that doctrine adds little to
the regulatory regime. Section 109(a), however, does serve as a
statutory bulwark against courts deviating from Bobbs–Merrill in a
way that increases copyright owners' control over downstream
distribution, and legislative history indicates that is precisely the role
Congress intended § 109(a) to play. Congress first codified the first
sale doctrine in § 41 of the Copyright Act of 1909, 35 Stat. 1084. It did
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so, the House Committee Report on the 1909 Act explains, “in order to
make ... clear that [Congress had] no intention [of] enlarg[ing] in any
way the construction to be given to the word ‘vend.’ ” H.R.Rep. No.
2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 19 (1909). According to the Committee
Report, § 41 was “not intended to change [existing law] in any way.”
Ibid. The position I have stated and explained accords with this
expression of congressional intent. In enacting § 41 and its successors,
I would hold, Congress did not “change ... existing law,” ibid., by
stripping the word “vend” (and thus its substitute “distribute”) of the
limiting construction imposed in Bobbs–Merrill.
****
2
Other statutory prescriptions provide further protection against
the absurd consequences imagined by the Court. For example, §
602(a)(3)(C) permits “an organization operated for scholarly,
educational, or religious purposes” to import, without the copyright
owner's authorization, up to five foreign-made copies of a nonaudiovisual work—notably, a book—for “library lending or archival
purposes.”
The Court also notes that amici representing art museums fear
that a ruling in Wiley's favor would prevent museums from displaying
works of art created abroad. Ante, at –––– (citing Brief for Association
of Art Museum Directors et al.). These amici observe that a museum's
right to display works of art often depends on 17 U.S.C. § 109(c). See
Brief for Association of Art Museum Directors et al. 11–13. That
provision addresses exhaustion of a copyright owner's exclusive right
under § 106(5) to publicly display the owner's work. Because § 109(c),
like § 109(a), applies only to copies “lawfully made under this title,”
amici contend that a ruling in Wiley's favor would prevent museums
from invoking § 109(c) with respect to foreign-made works of art. Id.,
at 11–13.
Limiting § 109(c) to U.S.-made works, however, does not bar art
museums from lawfully displaying works made in other countries.
Museums can, of course, seek the copyright owner's permission to
display a work. Furthermore, the sale of a work of art to a U.S.
museum may carry with it an implied license to publicly display the
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work. See 2 Patry § 5:131, at 5–280 (“[C]ourts have noted the potential
availability of an implied nonexclusive licens[e] when the
circumstances ... demonstrate that the parties intended that the work
would be used for a specific purpose.”). Displaying a work of art as
part of a museum exhibition might also qualify as a “fair use” under 17
U.S.C. § 107. Cf. Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Ltd. Partnership, 619 F.3d 301,
313–316 (C.A.4 2010) (display of copyrighted logo in museum-like
exhibition constituted “fair use”).
The Court worries about the resale of foreign-made consumer
goods “contain [ing] copyrightable software programs or packaging.”
Ante, at ––––. . . . Although this question strays far from the one
presented in this case and briefed by the parties, principles of fair use
and implied license (to the extent that express licenses do not exist)
would likely permit [such goods as cars] to be resold without the
copyright owners' authorization.
Most telling in this regard, no court, it appears, has been called
upon to answer any of the Court's “horribles” in an actual case. Three
decades have passed since a federal court first published an opinion
reading § 109(a) as applicable exclusively to copies made in the United
States. See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Scorpio Music Distributors,
Inc., 569 F.Supp. 47, 49 (E.D.Pa.1983), summarily aff'd, 738 F.2d 424
(C.A.3 1984) (table). Yet Kirtsaeng and his supporting amici cite not a
single case in which the owner of a consumer good authorized for sale
in the United States has been sued for copyright infringement after
reselling the item or giving it away as a gift or to charity. The absence
of such lawsuits is unsurprising. Routinely suing one's customers is
hardly a best business practice. Manufacturers, moreover, may be
hesitant to do business with software programmers taken to suing
consumers. Manufacturers may also insist that software programmers
agree to contract terms barring such lawsuits.
The Court provides a different explanation for the absence of the
untoward consequences predicted in its opinion—namely, that lower
court decisions regarding the scope of § 109(a)'s first sale prescription
have not been uniform. Uncertainty generated by these conflicting
decisions, the Court notes, may have deterred some copyright owners
from pressing infringement claims. But if, as the Court suggests, there
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are a multitude of copyright owners champing at the bit to bring
lawsuits against libraries, art museums, and consumers in an effort to
exercise perpetual control over the downstream distribution and
public display of foreign-made copies, might one not expect that at
least a handful of such lawsuits would have been filed over the past 30
years? The absence of such suits indicates that the “practical
problems” hypothesized by the Court are greatly exaggerated.27
VI
To recapitulate, the objective of statutory interpretation is “to give
effect to the intent of Congress.” American Trucking Assns., 310 U.S., at
542, 60 S.Ct. 1059. Here, two congressional aims are evident. First, in
enacting § 602(a)(1), Congress intended to grant copyright owners
permission to segment international markets by barring the
importation of foreign-made copies into the United States. Second, as
codification of the first sale doctrine underscores, Congress did not
want the exclusive distribution right conferred in § 106(3) to be
boundless. Instead of harmonizing these objectives, the Court
subordinates the first entirely to the second. . . .
Rather than adopting the very international-exhaustion rule the
United States has consistently resisted in international-trade
negotiations, I would adhere to the national-exhaustion framework
set by the Copyright Act's text and history. Under that regime,
codified in § 602(a)(1), Kirtsaeng's unauthorized importation of the
27

It should not be overlooked that the ability to prevent importation of foreign-made
copies encourages copyright owners such as Wiley to offer copies of their works at
reduced prices to consumers in less developed countries who might otherwise be
unable to afford them. The Court's holding, however, prevents copyright owners
from barring the importation of such low-priced copies into the United States,
where they will compete with the higher priced editions copyright owners make
available for sale in this country. To protect their profit margins in the U.S. market,
copyright owners may raise prices in less developed countries or may withdraw from
such markets altogether. . . . Such an outcome would disserve consumers—and
especially students—in developing nations and would hardly advance the “American
foreign policy goals” of supporting education and economic development in such
countries.
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foreign-made textbooks involved in this case infringed Wiley's
copyrights. I would therefore affirm the Second Circuit's judgment.
Notes
1. Statutory Interpretation Tangles. The positions of the majority
and the dissent both seem strained, don’t they? The majority can
only reach its conclusion by reading the importation provisions of
§ 602(a) to apply only to those importers who happen not to own
the copies they are importing, a reading that hardly makes sense of
the specific exceptions in that section, like the exception allowing
certain organizations to import up to five foreign-made copies of a
non-audiovisual work for “library lending or archival purposes.”
Meanwhile, the dissent has to argue that the common-law first
sale doctrine continues to exist alongside the statutory first-sale
doctrine in § 109, rendering the latter largely superfluous. One
might think that the least tangled reading is that advanced by
Justice Kagan in her concurrence, under which § 109 would be read
to establish international exhaustion, but § 602(a) would be read
to create separate liability for the act of unauthorized importation.
The Quality King Court, however, rejected that reading in part
because it feared another tangle: if § 602(a) was not subject to the
limitations in §§ 107 to 122, then § 602(a) would be violated even
by importing very brief quotations from copyrighted works, since
the § 107 fair use doctrine, which normally would shield such uses
from liability, would not apply to acts of importation under §
602(a). See Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523
U.S. 135, 150-51 (1998) (“Under L'anza's interpretation of the Act,
it presumably would be unlawful for a distributor to import copies
of a British newspaper that contained a book review quoting
excerpts from an American novel protected by a United States
copyright.”) Is there any way out of that tangle, or do these
juxtaposed sections inevitably require serious judicial patching?
2. Copyright Minimalism and Maximalism. In Chapter One, see
supra p. 12, we introduced a school of thought sometimes called
“copyright minimalism,” which takes the position that due to the
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drawbacks of granting exclusive rights, we should only grant
authors just enough rights to induce creation of their works and
no more. Its opposite, “copyright maximalism,” is less sceptical of
exclusive rights, and emphasizes their benefits as long as
transaction costs are kept low. Can you find “minimalist” and
“maximalist” tendencies come to the surface in positions expressed
or attributed to Congress in the majority and dissenting opinions?
3. Copyright and Price Discrimination Across National Markets.
There may be many reasons why a copyright owner would like to
keep copies intended for one market from reaching another
market, but perhaps most frequently the reason is price
discrimination: the copyright owner believes that the profitmaximizing price in one country is higher than that in another
country, and does not want its price in the higher-price country
undercut by imports from the lower-price country. Writing for
the Court, Justice Breyer states: “We can find no basic principle of
copyright law that suggests that publishers are especially entitled
to [charge different prices for the same work in different
markets].” However, that hardly ends debate over whether price
discrimination in relation to copyrighted works is a good thing or
a bad thing.
How would you evaluate the following two arguments? (1) Price
discrimination is bad because it reduces consumer surplus: it
forces each consumer to pay closer to the maximum he would pay
for a copyrighted work, and thus gives more of the benefits from
the sale of the work to the producer. (2) Price discrimination is
good because it reduces the deadweight loss caused by having to
set a single price. If a copyright owner has to set a single price for
copies of a work, it will probably be set high enough that many
people who would have paid more than the marginal cost of
making another copy of the work will not pay the price that the
copyright owner has set. The resultant loss in access to the work
can be avoided through effective price discrimination. How much
does your evaluation of these arguments depend upon whether the
difference in prices that consumers are willing to pay results from
their relative wealth or poverty, or rather from their differing
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desires even with equal wealth? Why do you think that the price
John Wiley & Sons charges for textbooks in Thailand is often less
than a quarter of the price it charges in the United States? For
discussion of such issues, see Christine Ongchin, Note, Price
Discrimination in the Textbook Market: An Analysis of the Post-Quality King
Proposals to Prevent and Disincentivize Reimportation and Arbitrage, 15
Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 223 (2007); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.,
Copyright’s Price Discrimination Panacea, 21 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 387
(2008); Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23
Cardozo L. Rev. 55 (2001).
4. Versioning as a Response to International Exhaustion in
Copyright. In response to an international exhaustion rule,
copyright owners may take measures to partially preserve their
ability to price discriminate between national markets. One
strategy is “versioning”— publishing different versions of works in
different national markets, which may be of different quality or be
incompatible in various ways. The District Court opinion in
Kirtsaeng reveals that John Wiley & Sons was already using this
strategy: “U.S. editions, authorized for sale in the U .S., are ‘of the
highest quality . . . generally printed with strong, hard-cover
bindings with glossy protective coatings,’ and are often
supplemented with CD-ROMs, access to educational websites,
and study guides. The foreign editions . . . ‘materially differ from
the United States editions . . . [with] thinner paper and different
bindings . . . fewer internal ink colors, if any, lower quality
photographs and graphics, . . . and often lack academic
supplements . . . .’” John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 2009 WL
3364037, *1 (S.D.N.Y). One could also imagine deliberate changes
introduced to render the versions less compatible, such as different
pagination or rephrased chapter headings. Under current U.S.
trademark law, a U.S. trademark owner can bar importation of a
foreign version of an item bearing its mark that is materially
different from the U.S. version.
See, e.g., Original Appalachian
Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Electronics, Inc., 816 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987); Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 877
F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Martin's Herend Imports, Inc. v. Diamond &
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Gem Trading USA Co., 112 F.3d 1296 (5th Cir. 1997). Suppose that
copyright owners are able to maintain price discrimination across
national markets in the face of an international exhaustion rule by
engaging in versioning, and in some cases using trademark law to
prevent importation. Would that change your assessment of the
desirability of such a rule?
5. Technical Measures as Another Response. Copyright owners
may also resort to technical measures to control distribution of
copyrighted works between different geographical regions. For
example, the DVD Copy Control
Association administers a regional
See It
playback control system, under
To see a map indicating
which many DVDs are encoded with which areas of the world fall
regional codes that allow them to be into each geographic region
played only on DVD players that for DVDs, click here. (Note
have the same regional code. For that China is a region unto
example, DVDs encoded as Region 3 itself; why do you suppose
that is?). For the
are intended for use in Southeast comparable map for Blu-Ray
Asia; they will not play on DVD discs, click here.
players encoded as Region 1, which
covers the United States and Canada. The DVD Copy Control
Association divides the world into six regions. The Blu-Ray Disc
Association has also developed a regional coding standard for BluRay discs, but that standard divides the world up into only three
regions. A number of video game formats also have regional coding
systems. Although these coding systems are not enforced through
the § 106 distribution right, they are technical protection measures
protected under § 1201 of the Copyright Act, which means that
hacking past them to play a DVD or game on an unauthorized
player is illegal.
If Internet distribution is involved, geolocation technologies can
also help copyright owners impose geographic limitations.
Databases are available that can estimate the location of an
Internet user from the Internet Protocol address or WiFi hotspot
she is using, and the user can be granted or denied access on the
basis of that estimated location.
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6. Divergent Exhaustion Regimes and Competitive Positions. As
Justice Ginsburg notes in her dissent, the European Union has
adopted a regional exhaustion scheme with respect to copyright
(and patent and trademark as well). Suppose that a UK publisher
that makes the bulk of its sales in the UK, and a U.S. publisher
that makes the bulk of its sales in the U.S., both decide that they
would like to enter the market for science textbooks in India.
Which one of them is going to have a more difficult time lowering
their prices in India without undercutting its domestic market?

D. Music and the First Three Exclusive Rights
2. Section 114(b) and Sampling
p. 843 – substitute for the fourth sentence in the second
paragraph:
The Harry Fox Agency, which was long a subsidiary of the National
Music Publishers Association, was acquired in September of 2015 by
SESAC, a relatively small performing rights organization. We will
discuss the role of performing rights organizations in greater detail in
Chapter 12, Part D. We note in passing at this point, however, that
this acquisition will enable SESAC to offer a bundle of rights covering
both reproductions and performances, which are often simultaneously
implicated by the business models of various digital services.
pp. 857-867 – replace the opinion in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v.
Dimension Films and the notes following that opinion with the
following:

VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
2016 WL 3090780
GRABER, Circuit Judge:
. . . In the early 1980s, [Shep] Pettibone recorded the song Ooh I Love It
(Love Break), which we refer to as Love Break. In 1990, Madonna [Louise
Ciccone] and Pettibone recorded the song Vogue, which would become
a mega-hit dance song after its release on Madonna’s albums. Plaintiff

195

COPYRIGHT : A Contemporary Approach

[VMG Salsoul, Inc.] alleges that, when recording Vogue, Pettibone
“sampled” certain sounds from the recording of Love Break and added
those sounds to Vogue. “Sampling” in this context means the actual
physical copying of sounds from an existing recording for use in a new
recording, even if accomplished with slight modifications such as
changes to pitch or tempo. See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192
(9th Cir. 2004) (discussing the term “sampling”).
Plaintiff asserts that it holds copyrights to the composition and to the
sound recording of Love Break. Plaintiff
Go Online
argues that, because Vogue contains
To hear “Ooh I Love It (Love
sampled material from Love Break,
Break” as it appears on
Defendants
have
violated
both
YouTube (100,000+ views),
copyrights. Although Plaintiff originally
click here. To hear, “Vogue”
as it appears on YouTube (51
asserted improper sampling of strings,
million+ views), click here.
vocals, congas, “vibraslap,” and horns
from Love Break as well as another song,
Plaintiff now asserts a sole theory of infringement: When creating two
commercial versions of Vogue, Pettibone sampled a “horn hit”1 from
Love Break, violating Plaintiff’s copyrights to both the composition and
the sound recording of Love Break.
[Ed. Note: our edited version of this opinion contains only the
opinion’s discussion of infringement of the sound recording.]
A. Application of the De Minimis Exception
A “use is de minimis only if the average audience would not recognize
the appropriation.” Newton, 388 F.3d at 1193; see id. at 1196 (affirming the
grant of summary judgment because “an average audience would not
discern Newton’s hand as a composer ... from Beastie Boys’ use of the
sample”); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986) (“As a
rule, a taking is considered de minimis only if it is so meager and
fragmentary that the average audience would not recognize the
appropriation.”); see also Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 692 (2d Cir. 1926)
(“[C]opying which is infringement must be something which ordinary
observations would cause to be recognized as having been taken from
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the work of another.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Accordingly, we must determine whether a reasonable juror could
conclude that the average audience would recognize the
appropriation.
****
When considering a claimed infringement of a copyrighted sound
recording, what matters is how the musicians played the notes, that is,
how their rendition distinguishes the recording from a generic
rendition of the same composition. See Newton, 388 F.3d at 1193
(describing the protected elements of a copyrighted sound recording
as “the elements unique to [the musician’s] performance”). Viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, by accepting its
experts’ reports, Pettibone sampled one single horn hit, which
occurred at 3:35 in Love Break. Pettibone then used that sampled single
horn hit to create the double horn hit used in Vogue.
The horn hit itself was not copied precisely. According to Plaintiff’s
expert, the chord “was modified by transposing it upward, cleaning up
the attack slightly in order to make it punchier [by truncating the
horn hit] and overlaying it with other sounds and effects. One such
effect mimicked the reverse cymbal crash.... The reverb/delay ‘tail’ ...
was prolonged and heightened.” Moreover, as with the composition,
the horn hits are not isolated sounds. Many other instruments are
playing at the same time in both Love Break and Vogue.
In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,
Pettibone copied one quarter-note of a four-note chord, lasting 0.23
seconds; he isolated the horns by filtering out the other instruments
playing at the same time; he transposed it to a different key; he
truncated it; and he added effects and other sounds to the chord itself.8
For the double horn hit, he used the same process, except that he
duplicated the single horn hit and shortened one of the duplicates to
create the eighth-note chord from the quarter-note chord. Finally, he
overlaid the resulting horn hits with sounds from many other
instruments to create the song Vogue.
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After listening to the audio recordings submitted by the parties, we
conclude that a reasonable juror could not conclude that an average
audience would recognize the appropriation of the horn hit. That
common-sense conclusion is borne out by dry analysis. The horn hit is
very short—less than a second. The horn hit occurs only a few times in
Vogue. Without careful attention, the horn hits are easy to miss.
Moreover, the horn hits in Vogue do not sound identical to the horn
hits from Love Break. As noted above, assuming that the sampling
occurred, Pettibone truncated the horn hit, transposed it to a different
key, and added other sounds and effects to the horn hit itself. The horn
hit then was added to Vogue along with many other instrument tracks.
Even if one grants the dubious proposition that a listener recognized
some similarities between the horn hits in the two songs, it is hard to
imagine that he or she would conclude that sampling had occurred.
****
B. The De Minimis Exception and Sound Recordings
Plaintiff argues, in the alternative, that even if the copying here is
trivial, that fact is irrelevant because the de minimis exception does
not apply to infringements of copyrighted sound recordings. Plaintiff
urges us to follow the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v.
Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005), which adopted a brightline rule: For copyrighted sound recordings, any unauthorized
copying—no matter how trivial—constitutes infringement.
The rule that infringement occurs only when a substantial portion is
copied is firmly established in the law. The leading copyright treatise
traces the rule to the mid-1800s. 4 Melville B. Nimmer & David
Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 13.03[A][2][a], at 13-56 to 13-57, 13-57
n.102 (2013) (citing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.Cas. 342, No. 4901 (C.C. Mass.
1841)); id. § 13.03[E] [2], at 13-100 & n.208 (citing Daly v. Palmer, 6
F.Cas. 1132, No. 3,552 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868)) . . . . The reason for the rule
is that the “plaintiff’s legally protected interest [is] the potential
financial return from his compositions which derive from the lay
public’s approbation of his efforts.” Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1165 (quoting
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Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946)). If the public does
not recognize the appropriation, then the copier has not benefitted
from the original artist’s expressive content. Accordingly, there is no
infringement.
Other than Bridgeport and the district courts following that decision,
we are aware of no case that has held that the de minimis doctrine
does not apply in a copyright infringement case. Instead, courts
consistently have applied the rule in all cases alleging copyright
infringement. Indeed, we stated in dictum in Newton that the rule
“applies throughout the law of copyright, including cases of music
sampling.”9 388 F.3d at 1195 (emphasis added).
Plaintiff nevertheless argues that Congress intended to create a special
rule for copyrighted sound recordings, eliminating the de minimis
exception.
****
. . . Plaintiff’s statutory argument hinges on the third sentence of 17
U.S.C. § 114(b), which states:10
The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound
recording under clauses (1) and (2) of section 106 do not
extend to the making or duplication of another sound
recording that consists entirely of an independent fixation of
other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate
those in the copyrighted sound recording.
Like all the other sentences in § 114(b), the third sentence imposes an
express limitation on the rights of a copyright holder: “The exclusive
rights of the owner of a copyright in a sound recording ... do not extend
to the making or duplication of another sound recording [with certain
qualities].” Id. (emphasis added); see id. (first sentence: “exclusive rights
... do not extend” to certain circumstances; second sentence: “exclusive
rights ... do not extend” to certain circumstances; fourth sentence:
“exclusive rights ... do not apply” in certain circumstances). We
ordinarily would hesitate to read an implicit expansion of rights into

199

COPYRIGHT : A Contemporary Approach

Congress’ statement of an express limitation on rights. Given the
considerable background of consistent application of the de minimis
exception across centuries of jurisprudence, we are particularly
hesitant to read the statutory text as an unstated, implicit elimination
of that steadfast rule.
A straightforward reading of the third sentence in § 114(b) reveals
Congress’ intended limitation on the rights of a sound recording
copyright holder: A new recording that mimics the copyrighted
recording is not an infringement, even if the mimicking is very well
done, so long as there was no actual copying. That is, if a band played
and recorded its own version of Love Break in a way that sounded very
similar to the copyrighted recording of Love Break, then there would be
no infringement so long as there was no actual copying of the recorded
Love Break. But the quoted passage does not speak to the question that
we face: whether Congress intended to eliminate the longstanding de
minimis exception for sound recordings in all circumstances even
where, as here, the new sound recording as a whole sounds nothing
like the original.
Even if there were some ambiguity as to congressional intent with
respect to § 114(b), the legislative history clearly confirms our analysis
on each of the above points. . . .
With respect to § 114(b) specifically, a House Report stated:
Subsection (b) of section 114 makes clear that statutory
protection for sound recordings extends only to the particular
sounds of which the recording consists, and would not prevent
a separate recording of another performance in which those
sounds are imitated. Thus, infringement takes place whenever
all or any substantial portion of the actual sounds that go to make
up a copyrighted sound recording are reproduced in
phonorecords by repressing, transcribing, recapturing off the
air, or any other method, or by reproducing them in the
soundtrack or audio portion of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work. Mere imitation of a recorded performance
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would not constitute a copyright infringement even where one
performer deliberately sets out to simulate another’s
performance as exactly as possible.
Id. at 106, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5721 (emphasis added). That
passage strongly supports the natural reading of § 114(b), discussed
above. Congress intended to make clear that imitation of a recorded
performance cannot be infringement so long as no actual copying is
done. There is no indication that Congress intended, through § 114(b),
to expand the rights of a copyright holder to a sound recording.
Perhaps more importantly, the quoted passage articulates the
principle that “infringement takes place whenever all or any substantial
portion of the actual sounds ... are reproduced.” Id. (emphasis added).
That is, when enacting this specific statutory provision, Congress
clearly understood that the de minimis exception applies to
copyrighted sound recordings, just as it applies to all other
copyrighted works. In sum, the statutory text, confirmed by the
legislative history, reveals that Congress intended to maintain the de
minimis exception for copyrighted sound recordings.
In coming to a different conclusion, the Sixth Circuit reasoned as
follows:
[T]he rights of sound recording copyright holders under clauses (1)
and (2) of section 106 “do not extend to the making or duplication of
another sound recording that consists entirely of an independent
fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or
simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording.” 17 U.S.C. §
114(b) (emphasis added). The significance of this provision is
amplified by the fact that the Copyright Act of 1976 added the word
“entirely” to this language. Compare Sound Recording Act of 1971,
Pub. L. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (Oct. 15, 1971) (adding subsection (f) to
former 17 U.S.C. § 1) (“does not extend to the making or duplication
of another sound recording that is an independent fixation of other
sounds”). In other words, a sound recording owner has the exclusive
right to “sample” his own recording.
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Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 800–01.
We reject that interpretation of § 114(b). Bridgeport ignored the
statutory structure and § 114(b)’s express limitation on the rights of a
copyright holder. Bridgeport also declined to consider legislative history
on the ground that “digital sampling wasn’t being done in 1971.” 410
F.3d at 805. But the state of technology is irrelevant to interpreting
Congress’ intent as to statutory structure. Moreover, as Nimmer
points out, Bridgeport’s reasoning fails on its own terms because
contemporary technology plainly allowed the copying of small
portions of a protected sound recording. Nimmer § 13.03[A][2][b], at
13-62 n.114.16.
****
The Sixth Circuit also looked beyond the statutory text, to the nature
of a sound recording, and reasoned:
[E]ven when a small part of a sound recording is sampled, the
part taken is something of value. No further proof of that is
necessary than the fact that the producer of the record or the
artist on the record intentionally sampled because it would (1)
save costs, or (2) add something to the new recording, or (3)
both. For the sound recording copyright holder, it is not the
“song” but the sounds that are fixed in the medium of his
choice. When those sounds are sampled they are taken directly
from that fixed medium. It is a physical taking rather than an
intellectual one.
Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801–02 (footnote omitted).
We disagree for three reasons. First, the possibility of a “physical
taking” exists with respect to other kinds of artistic works as well,
such as photographs, as to which the usual de minimis rule applies.
See, e.g., Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 216 (2d Cir. 1998)
(affirming summary judgment to the defendant because the
defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s photographs in a movie was de
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minimis). A computer program can, for instance, “sample” a piece of
one photograph and insert it into another photograph or work of art.
We are aware of no copyright case carving out an exception to the de
minimis requirement in that context, and we can think of no
principled reason to differentiate one kind of “physical taking” from
another. Second, even accepting the premise that sound recordings
differ qualitatively from other copyrighted works and therefore could
warrant a different infringement rule, that theoretical difference does
not mean that Congress actually adopted a different rule. Third, the
distinction between a “physical taking” and an “intellectual one,”
premised in part on “sav[ing] costs” by not having to hire musicians,
does not advance the Sixth Circuit’s view. The Supreme Court has
held unequivocally that the Copyright Act protects only the
expressive aspects of a copyrighted work, and not the “fruit of the
[author’s] labor.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349,
111 S.Ct. 1282, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991). . . .
Finally, Plaintiff advances several reasons why Bridgeport’s rule is
superior as a matter of policy. For example, the Sixth Circuit opined that
its bright-line rule was easy to enforce; that “the market will control
the license price and keep it within bounds”; and that “sampling is
never accidental” and is therefore easy to avoid. Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at
801. Those arguments are for a legislature, not a court. They speak to
what Congress could decide; they do not inform what Congress actually
decided.
We hold that the “de minimis” exception applies to actions alleging
infringement of a copyright to sound recordings.
****
SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
The plaintiff is the owner of a copyright in a fixed sound recording.
This is a valuable property right, the stock-in-trade of artists who
make their living recording music and selling records. The plaintiff
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alleges that the defendants, without a license or any sort of
permission, physically copied a small part of the plaintiff’s sound
recording—which, to repeat, is property belonging to the plaintiff—
and, having appropriated it, inserted into their own recording. If the
plaintiff’s allegations are to be believed, the defendants deemed this
maneuver preferable to paying for a license to use the material, or to
hiring their own musicians to record it. In any other context, this
would be called theft. It is no defense to theft that the thief made off
with only a “de minimis” part of the victim’s property.
The majority chooses to follow the views of a popular treatise instead
of an on-point decision of the Sixth Circuit, a decision that has
governed the music industry in Nashville—“Music City”1—and
elsewhere for over a decade without causing either the sky to fall in, or
Congress to step in. And just exactly what is the Sixth Circuit’s
radical holding in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films that the
majority finds so distasteful? It’s this: if you want to use an identical
copy of a portion of a copyrighted fixed sound recording—we’re not
talking about “substantially similar” tunes or rhythms, but an actual
identical copy of a sound that has already been recorded in a fixed
medium—get a license. You can’t just take it. 410 F.3d 792, 800–01
(6th Cir. 2005).
As the majority acknowledges, after Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189
(9th Cir. 2003), it is an “open question” in the Ninth Circuit whether a
de minimis defense applies to fixed sound recordings as it does to less
tangible works. The Bridgeport court explained why it should not.
First, by statute, sound recording copyright holders have an exclusive
right to sample their own recordings. It’s an exclusive right; the statute
does not give that right to others. 410 F.3d at 800–01. Under 17 U.S.C.
§§ 106 and 114, the holder of a copyright in a sound recording (but not
others) has the exclusive right to reproduce the work in copies or
records “that directly or indirectly recapture the actual sounds fixed in
the recording,” as well as the exclusive right to prepare derivative
works “in which the actual sounds fixed in the sound recording are
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rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in sequence or quality.” 17
U.S.C. §§ 106(1) and (2); 114(b). Congress clearly qualified these
exclusive rights, writing that “another sound recording that consists
entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even though such
sounds imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording”
are not within the scope of the copyright holder’s exclusive rights. 17
U.S.C. § 114(b). In other words, the world at large is free to imitate or
simulate the creative work fixed in the recording (like a tribute band,
for example) so long as an actual copy of the sound recording itself is
not made. 410 F.3d at 800.
The majority rejects this straightforward reading, explaining by way
of a rhetorical exercise that Bridgeport’s reading of § 114(b) is a logical
fallacy, expanding the rights of copyright holders beyond that allowed
under the judicial de minimis rule. As I see it, it is the majority that
tortures the natural reading of these provisions. Bear in mind that §
114(b) simply explains the scope of exclusive rights already granted to
copyright holders under § 106. These two provisions must be read
together, as the Sixth Circuit did. 410 F.3d at 799–801. When read
together, their message is clear: copyright holders have exclusive
rights to their recordings, but cannot be heard to complain (i.e., there
can be no infringement of those exclusive rights) where a new
recording consists entirely of independently created sounds, such as
might be found in a very good imitation. By the same token, if a new
recording includes something other than independently created
sounds, such as a blatant copy, the copyright holder whose work was
sampled has a legitimate gripe. That right was not invented by the
Sixth Circuit: it already exists in the statutes. And these statutes say
nothing about the de minimis exception.
The second reason the Sixth Circuit gave for not adopting the de
minimis rule is that sound recordings are different than their
compositional counterparts: when a defendant copies a recording, he
or she takes not the song but the sounds as they are fixed in the
medium of the copyright holders’ choice. Id. at 801–02. In other words,
the very nature of digital sampling makes a de minimis analysis
inapplicable, since sampling or pirating necessarily involves copying a
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fixed performance. See id. at 801 n.13. The defendants wanted horns to
punctuate their song, so they took the plaintiff’s copyrighted
recording of horns. The horn hit is brief, but clearly perceptible and
does its job. This is unlike indiscernible photographs used, not for
their content (which cannot be made out), but to dress a movie set. See
Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 1998).
This is a physical taking, not an intellectual one. Id. at 802. Sampling is
never accidental. Id. at 801. As the Sixth Circuit observed, it is not like
the case of a composer who has a melody in his head, perhaps not even
realizing that the reason he hears this melody is that it is the work of
another that he has heard before. Id. When you sample a sound
recording you know you are taking another’s work product. Id.
Accordingly, the pertinent inquiry in a sampling case is not whether a
defendant sampled a little or a lot, but whether a defendant sampled at
all. Id. at 798 n.6, 801–02 and n.13.
Again, the majority disagrees, rejecting Bridgeport’s characterization of
a sample as a “physical taking” on the basis that copyright protection
extends only to expressive aspects of a work, not the fruit of the
author’s labor. According to the majority, copyright protection doesn’t
extend to the sweat of an author’s brow. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349, 111 S.Ct. 1282, 113 L.Ed.2d 358 (1991)
(discussing originality as applied to factual compilations, such as
telephone directories). But that’s irrelevant here, since there is no
question that the underlying sound recording can be copyrighted, and
it is the taking of that protectable work that is at issue.
I find Bridgeport’s arguments well-reasoned and persuasive. Equally
compelling is, I think, Congress’s silence in the wake of Bridgeport,
especially in light of the fact that the Sixth Circuit explicitly invited
Congress to clarify or change the law if Bridgeport’s bright-line rule was
not what Congress intended. 410 F.3d at 805. While it’s true that
congressional inaction in the face of judicial interpretation is not
ironclad evidence of Congressional approval, see Alexander v. Sandoval,
532 U.S. 275, 292, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001), it’s not
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chopped liver either. In this case Bridgeport has not been hiding out in
the woods, waiting to be found: it has been governing the music
industry in Nashville and elsewhere for eleven years. The majority now
proposes to introduce a different rule for this circuit, creating a circuit
split, and providing a lower level of protection for copyright holders in
a different area of the country. See Seven Arts Filmed Entertainment Ltd. v.
Content Media Corp. PLC, 733 F.3d 1251, 1256 (9th Cir. 2013). This
inconsistent approach is plainly in contravention of Congressional
intent that copyright laws be predictable and uniform, yet the
majority defends its rogue path on the ground that Congress must
have intended something other than what the Sixth Circuit has
concluded, even though we’ve heard not a peep from Congress, or for
that matter the Supreme Court, in the eleven years since Bridgeport has
been on the books.
In short, the majority’s fuzzy approach would require a factual and
largely visceral inquiry into whether each and every instance of
sampling was “substantial,” whereas Bridgeport provides in the case of a
fixed sound recording a bright-line rule, and I quote: “Get a license or
do not sample.” 410 F.3d at 801. True, Get a license or do not sample doesn’t
carry the same divine force as Thou Shalt Not Steal, but it’s the same
basic idea. I would hold that the de minimis exception does not apply
to the sampling, copying, stealing, pirating, misappropriation—call it
what you will—of copyrighted fixed sound recordings. Once the
sound is fixed, it is tangible property belonging to the copyright
holder, and no one else has the right to take even a little of it without
permission. I therefore respectfully dissent.
Notes
1. Should Congress Step In? The majority in VMG dismisses the
policy arguments that had been advanced in the Sixth Circuit’s
earlier Bridgeport decision by saying that they are for Congress, not
the Courts.
Judge Silverman, dissenting, argues that
Congressional silence since Bridgeport suggests Congressional
approval of the result in that case, but of course, Congressional
silence is notoriously difficult to interpret. Now that we have a
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Circuit split, the issue may be destined for the Supreme Court. Is
this a good case for a Congressional fix, or is this something better
left for judicial determination?
2. Firm Rule or Flexible Standard. Perhaps the single most common
recurring issue in law is whether a given principle should be cast
as a bright-line test or subject to case-by-case determination. The
former provides certainty, but can result in unjust results in
specific instances. The later allow justice to be done, but at the
price of significant unpredictability. As Judge Silverman notes, the
rule adopted by the VMG majority now leaves those who wish to
sample (in the Ninth Circuit) in the position of having to guess
how much is “de minimis” and how much might cross the line. No
guessing is necessary in the Sixth Circuit under the Bridgeport “get
a license or do not sample” rule. On the other hand, the brightline test of Bridgeport might inhibit creativity on the part of artists
who want to use fleetingly brief samples from multiple recordings
but who cannot feasible license all of those samples, and it might
condemn as infringers those who many would consider to be free
of wrongdoing. Is there any rational way to choose between these
two approaches?
3. Assuming Away the Real Issue? The dissent by Judge Silverman
is rather tart. He sees unlicensed sampling as theft because, in his
view, there is a property interest in the original sound recording,
and stealing even a little is still stealing. (One is put in mind of Les
Miserables and the conviction of Jean Valjean for stealing a loaf of
bread.) The real question would seem to be, however, about how
the property interest should be defined. If the “property” in
question is defined as the right not to have other take substantially
similar chunks of your intellectual property, then the taking of de
minimis portions does not violate that property interest. This is
not a strange idea. If I own land subject to an easement, then my
property interest is subject to the easement. One could think of de
minimis use of copyrighted works as a public easement on the
property, in the interest of, dare we say it, promoting the progress
of science. Moreover, the “property interest” in copyright is
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strictly a matter of statutory definition. If there were no copyright
statute, Pettibone could have taken as much of Love Break as he
wanted without running any legal risks. If Congress steps in to
create a limited property right that only protects against “more than
de minimis” takings, is it really fair to call the de minimis taking
“theft?”

E. Protecting Integrity and Attribution: “Moral Rights” and
the Visual Artists Rights Act
p. 881 – Insert After Note 1
1A. VARA and “Applied Art.” One of the other categories of
material excluded from the definition of “works of visual art,” and
hence excluded from VARA coverage, are works of “applied art.” In
Cheffins v. Stewart, 2016 WL 3190914 (9th Cir. 2016) two artists – Simon
Cheffins and Gregory Jones -- took an old school bus and covered it
with a wooden structure to create a work resembling a Spanish
Galleon. They called this piece La Contessa and it was initially
displayed at the countercultural festival known as Burning Man each
year from 2002 through 2005. During the festival those in attendance
could take rides on the La Contessa and it was used for other public
gatherings including, in at least one instance, a wedding. After 2005
Cheffins stored the La Contessa on land in the possession of a friend
named Grant. When Grant vacated the property, the land came into
the possession of Michael Stewart, the eventual defendant in the case.
Stewart didn’t much care for La Contessa, so he burned it, with the
ultimate goal of selling the underlying bus as scrap metal. Cheffins
and Jones sued for violation of their VARA rights. On appeal, the
focus was on the threshold question of whether La Contessa qualified as
a work of visual art or whether it was, instead, a work of “applied art.”
The court endorsed a Second Circuit definition of applied art as “twoand three-dimensional ornamentation or decoration that is affixed to
otherwise utilitarian objects.” Carter v. Helmsley–Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77,
84-85 (2d Cir. 1995). Effectively, the court’s view was that if the
object had any utilitarian function, it would fall into the category of
applied art. That made the case easy for the court, which noted
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The La Contessa began as a simple school bus—an object which
unquestionably served the utilitarian function of
transportation. To transform the bus into the La Contessa,
Cheffins and Jones adorned it with the visual trappings of a
16th-century Spanish galleon. While the La Contessa's elaborate
decorative elements may have had many artistic qualities,
the La Contessa retained a largely practical function even after it
had been completed. At Burning Man, the La Contessa was used
for transportation, providing rides to festival-goers, hosting
musical performances and weddings, and serving as a stage for
poetry and acrobatics shows.
Do you think La Contessa was copyrightable as a sculptural work?
Even if were utilitarian (as the world’s most preposterous bus),
copyright would be available if there were “conceptually separable”
aesthetic elements. Do you think there were? If there were, should
that also be the dividing line between works of applied art and VARAprotectable works of visual art?

The La Contessa in the Nevada Desert
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p. 891 – add the following before Note 2 “Does VARA Protect
Artists or Copies of Works of Art?
1A. VARA and Graffiti. Much urban graffiti is – at least to the
untutored eyes of your authors – nothing more than spray-painted
scribbles. However there is a genre of graffiti – sometimes now
called exterior aerosol art – which has higher aspirations and
clearly displays significant artistic merit. Jonathan Cohen is a
graffiti artist (working under the name Meres One), who also
“curated” a large collection of exterior aerosol art on a warehouse
building in the Long Island City neighborhood of New York. The
owners of the building – which became known as 5Pointz –
allowed the artists to use it, but they subsequently decided they
wanted to demolish it, to construct, among other things a high rise
luxury condominium building. Cohen and others brought suit
under VARA to prevent the destruction of their work. Among
other things, they argued that the various works involved were of
“recognized stature,” because the site was mentioned in 150 tour
guides of the New York City, listed as a “must-see” attraction by
Time Out New York magazine, and was the destination for numerous
school tours which sold out months in advance.
Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction, but in Cohen v. G & M
Realty L.P., 2013 WL 6172732 (S.D.N.Y.) the court denied their
request. On the merits, the court felt that issue of “recognized
stature” was close. Defendant’s expert insisted that a work could
not meet the statutory requirement unless it was mentioned in the
scholarly literature or at least had achieved widespread notoriety
on-line. Plaintiff’s expert, focused instead on the popularity of the
works as a tourist attraction and their intrinsic artistic quality.
The decisive factor, however, was that in the court’s view, the
plaintiffs could not demonstrate irreparable harm – a requirement
for preliminary injunctive relief. The court reasoned that if
plaintiffs prevailed after a full trial on the merits, they would be
entitled to recover potentially substantial monetary damages,
which would be an adequate remedy under the circumstances. The
court was also swayed by the transient nature of the works – the
artists knew that the building was eventually slated for demolition
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and some of the works in question were even created after the City
Planning Commission approved the owner’s demolition proposal.
The court announced its ruling on November 12, 2013. One
week later, on November 19, 2013, the exterior of the building was
painted white, obliterating all of the graffiti. The court published
its opinion on the preliminary injunction the following day.

5Pointz, Before and After
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Jonathan Cohen’s Drunken Bulbs, formerly on
the wall at 5Pointz. A work of “recognized
stature”?
Chapter 12 Public Performance and Display Rights
A. When is A Performance or Display “Public”?
p. 904 – insert after note 5:
5A. Yet another variation. In Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. WTV
Systems, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (C.D. Cal. 2011), some overly
clever entrepreneurs purchased hundreds of DVD players, inserted
DVDs of popular movies into them, placed them in a data center in
Santa Clara, California, and marketed a DVD “rental” service under
the brand name Zediva. For $1.99, customers could “rent” a DVD
for 14 days and have its contents streamed to them over the
Internet. In fact, however, even during that 14-day rental period, a
customer did not have exclusive rights to any particular DVD copy;
whenever a customer asked to play the contents of the DVD, the
automated system would direct his request to an available machine
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loaded with the DVD in question; if none were available, the system
would notify him when one became available. The court granted
the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that the
defendants were publicly performing the movies on the DVDs. It
distinguished Cablevision on the ground that “unlike Cablevision,
Defendants' customers do not produce their own unique copy of
Plaintiffs' Copyrighted Works.” More broadly, the court declined
to adopt the “volitional conduct” requirement for direct
infringement imposed by the Second Circuit in Cablevision “without
clear instruction from the Ninth Circuit.” Note that this case was
decided before the Dish Network case discussed on Page 8 of this
Supplement. Does the logic of Dish Network suggest that WTV
Systems was wrongly decided?
p. 905 – insert the following after note 7:
Copyright in the Real World:
Do cable and satellite TV companies have to pay copyright owners
when they carry broadcast TV channels?
When a cable TV company like Cablevision retransmits a
channel like Cartoon Network, it pays Cartoon Network a negotiated
licensing fee for the copyrighted content that Cartoon Network
provides. Cartoon Network is a cable- and satellite-only channel – it
does not broadcast its content over-the-air – and it would only
provide its “feed” to Cablevision and other cable companies if they
paid licensing fees.
As you likely know, however, cable and satellite companies
also carry over-the-air broadcast channels. For example, for its
subscribers in the Washington, DC area, Comcast carries local
Washington broadcast channels like WUSA (affiliated with the CBS
network), WJLA (affiliated with ABC), and WETA (affiliated with
PBS). Suppose that WJLA were to broadcast the movie musical
“Hairspray” -- as it has in fact done. WJLA is clearly publicly
performing the movie, and so it (or ABC) has to obtain a license from
New Line Cinema, the owner of copyright in the movie. It is also
publicly performing the songs that are featured in the movie, like
“Good Morning Baltimore” and “Run and Tell That,” and so it has to
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get a license from Winding Brook Way Music and Walli Woo
Entertainment, the music publishers that own copyright in those
compositions, or from their licensing agent ASCAP.
Now suppose that Comcast picks up the WJLA broadcast
signal with an antenna, and then carries that signal over its cables to
its subscribers. Is it also publicly performing the movie and the songs,
or is it just passing along WJLA’s performance? In 1968, the Supreme
Court considered this issue as it arose under the Copyright Act of
1909, and held that cable companies did not perform works by
retransmitting television broadcasts of them:
The television broadcaster in one sense does less than the exhibitor of a
motion picture or stage play; he supplies his audience not with visible images
but only with electronic signals. The viewer conversely does more than a
member of a theater audience; he provides the equipment to convert
electronic signals into audible sound and visible images. Despite these
deviations from the conventional situation contemplated by the framers of
the Copyright Act, broadcasters have been judicially treated as exhibitors,
and viewers as members of a theater audience. Broadcasters perform. Viewers
do not perform. . . . When CATV [this was the designation for cable
television in the 1960’s – Eds.] is considered in this framework, we conclude
that it falls on the viewer's side of the line. Essentially, a CATV system no
more than enhances the viewer's capacity to receive the broadcaster's signals;
it provides a well-located antenna with an efficient connection to the
viewer's television set.

Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 398-99
(1968); see Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 415
U.S. 394 (1974) (using this analysis even when cable systems were
carrying broadcast signals to distant markets to which the signals
themselves didn’t reach.) Do you agree with the way the Court
viewed the issue? From an economic point of view, can you
imagine circumstances under which cable subscribers would end
up paying subscription fees that reflected, not just the cost of cable
transmission, but the value of the copyrighted movies and
television shows that they could get?
Believe it or not, litigation and subsequent legislative
negotiation over cable TV probably bore principal responsibility
delaying passage of the new Copyright Act – which might have
otherwise been the Copyright Act of, say, 1968 or 1972 – for many
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years. Ultimately, in the 1976 Act, Congress enacted a compromise:
a compulsory license. The activity of the cable company in carrying
broadcast TV was defined as “secondary transmission” – see the
definition in § 111(f) of the Copyright Act. Secondary transmissions
were to be treated as public performances, but they would have the
benefit of a statutory license created in § 111 of the Act. Cable
companies that transmitted broadcast TV signals containing
performances of copyrighted works would pay license fees set by a
government tribunal. In 1988, after other companies had begun to
carry broadcast television over satellite, a similar statutory license
was created for them in § 119 of the Act.
Cable and satellite TV have changed tremendously over the
last few decades. Most of you are probably familiar enough with
them to know that access to broadcast TV channels is now only a
minor feature of cable and satellite offerings.
Far more
programming is available on non-broadcast channels that are
provided under copyright licenses negotiated by the parties. In
2008, the Copyright Office concluded that the statutory licenses
were outmoded, and recommended their elimination. See U.S.
Copyright Office, Section 109 Study on the Cable and Satellite
Statutory Licenses under the Copyright Act (June 2008).
Congress, however, has not yet followed that recommendation.
That leads us to the answer to the question that we posed above.
Cable and satellite companies currently do have to pay a licensing
fee when they carry broadcast TV channels that perform
copyrighted works. However, they do not have to bargain with
copyright owners; they just pay a rate set by the Copyright Royalty
Board.
That rate, by the way, is calculated via a complex formula
and can vary from a few cents per subscriber per year, to up to
almost a dollar per subscriber per year. The aggregate amounts
involved are not trivial. If you click here, you will see, from the
chart on the second page, that the total royalties paid by cable
companies under the compulsory license in 2012 was in excess of
$200 million; the chart on page 4 shows that satellite companies
paid about $90 million.
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p. 905 – replace the current note 9 with the following:
9. “Pure Download” Transmissions: Not Performances? At the
other extreme, sound and video are sometimes transmitted in files
that must be fully copied onto your computer before you can start
to listen or view, and that are designed to remain permanently on
the computer, so that you can play and replay them as many times
as you want. Those transmissions have sometimes been called
“pure downloads.” Pure download transmissions, resulting in the
creation of new, permanent copies, clearly require reproduction
and distribution licenses, but are they also public performances
requiring performance licenses? Affirming a District Court ruling,
the Second Circuit held in 2010 that they were not: “The
downloaded songs are not performed in any perceptible manner
during the transfers; the user must take some further action to play
the songs after they are downloaded. Because the electronic
download itself involves no recitation, rendering, or playing of the
musical work encoded in the digital transmission, we hold that
such a download is not a performance of that work, as defined by §
101.” U.S. v. ASCAP, 627 F.3d 64, 73 (2d Cir. 2010). Since
reproduction and performance rights are typically licensed
through different entities in the U.S. (though not in many other
countries), the Southern District’s resolution has the virtue of
reducing licensing transaction costs: a company that sells pure
downloads (for instance iTunes) has one less licensing negotiation
to worry about.
p. 906 – insert after the end of note 10:

American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.
Supreme Court of the United States, 2014
2014 WL 2864485
Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Copyright Act of 1976 gives a copyright owner the “exclusive
righ[t]” to “perform the copyrighted work publicly.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(4).
The Act’s Transmit Clause defines that exclusive right as including the

COPYRIGHT : A Contemporary Approach

217

right to
“transmit or otherwise communicate a performance ... of the
[copyrighted] work ... to the public, by means of any device or
process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the
performance ... receive it in the same place or in separate places and
at the same time or at different times.” § 101.
We must decide whether respondent Aereo, Inc., infringes this
exclusive right by selling its subscribers a technologically complex
service that allows them to watch television programs over the
Internet at about the same time as the programs are broadcast over the
air. We conclude that it does.
I
A
For a monthly fee, Aereo offers subscribers broadcast television
programming over the Internet, virtually as the programming is being
broadcast. Much of this programming is made up of copyrighted
works. Aereo neither owns the copyright in those works nor holds a
license from the copyright owners to perform those works publicly.
Aereo’s system is made up of servers,
transcoders, and thousands of dimesized antennas housed in a central
warehouse. It works roughly as follows:
First, when a subscriber wants to watch
a show that is currently being broadcast,
he visits Aereo’s website and selects,
from a list of the local programming, the
show he wishes to see.

See It
To see a picture of these tiny
little antennas you can click
here, or here. For a handy
schematic diagram of how
the Aereo service works, you
can click here.

Second, one of Aereo’s servers selects an antenna, which it dedicates
to the use of that subscriber (and that subscriber alone) for the
duration of the selected show. A server then tunes the antenna to the
over-the-air broadcast carrying the show. The antenna begins to
receive the broadcast, and an Aereo transcoder translates the signals
received into data that can be transmitted over the Internet.
Third, rather than directly send the data to the subscriber, a server
saves the data in a subscriber-specific folder on Aereo’s hard drive. In
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other words, Aereo’s system creates a subscriber-specific copy—that
is, a “personal” copy—of the subscriber’s program of choice.
Fourth, once several seconds of programming have been saved, Aereo’s
server begins to stream the saved copy of the show to the subscriber
over the Internet. (The subscriber may instead direct Aereo to stream
the program at a later time, but that aspect of Aereo’s service is not
before us.) The subscriber can watch the streamed program on the
screen of his personal computer, tablet, smart phone, Internetconnected television, or other Internet-connected device. The
streaming continues, a mere few seconds behind the over-the-air
broadcast, until the subscriber has received the entire show. . . .
Aereo emphasizes that the data that its system streams to each
subscriber are the data from his own personal copy, made from the
broadcast signals received by the particular antenna allotted to him.
Its system does not transmit data saved in one subscriber’s folder to
any other subscriber. When two subscribers wish to watch the same
program, Aereo’s system activates two separate antennas and saves
two separate copies of the program in two separate folders. It then
streams the show to the subscribers through two separate
transmissions—each from the subscriber’s personal copy.
B
Petitioners are television producers, marketers, distributors, and
broadcasters who own the copyrights in many of the programs that
Aereo’s system streams to its subscribers. They brought suit against
Aereo for copyright infringement in Federal District Court. They
sought a preliminary injunction, arguing that Aereo was infringing
their right to “perform” their works “publicly,” as the Transmit Clause
defines those terms.
The District Court denied the preliminary injunction. 874 F.Supp.2d
373 (S.D.N.Y.2012). Relying on prior Circuit precedent, a divided panel
of the Second Circuit affirmed. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676
(2013) (citing Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121
(2008)). In the Second Circuit’s view, Aereo does not perform publicly
within the meaning of the Transmit Clause because it does not
transmit “to the public.” Rather, each time Aereo streams a program to
a subscriber, it sends a private transmission that is available only to
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that subscriber. . . .
II
This case requires us to answer two questions: First, in operating in
the manner described above, does Aereo “perform” at all? And second,
if so, does Aereo do so “publicly”? . . .
Does Aereo “perform”? See § 106(4) (“[T]he owner of [a] copyright ...
has the exclusive righ[t] ... to perform the copyrighted work publicly”
(emphasis added)); § 101 (“To perform ... a work ‘publicly’ means
[among other things] to transmit ... a performance ... of the work ... to
the public ...” (emphasis added)). Phrased another way, does Aereo
“transmit ... a performance” when a subscriber watches a show using
Aereo’s system, or is it only the subscriber who transmits? In Aereo’s
view, it does not perform. It does no more than supply equipment that
“emulate[s] the operation of a home antenna and [digital video
recorder (DVR) ].” Brief for Respondent 41. Like a home antenna and
DVR, Aereo’s equipment simply responds to its subscribers’ directives.
So it is only the subscribers who “perform” when they use Aereo’s
equipment to stream television programs to themselves.
Considered alone, the language of the Act does not clearly indicate
when an entity “perform[s]” (or “transmit[s]”) and when it merely
supplies equipment that allows others to do so. But when read in light
of its purpose, the Act is unmistakable: An entity that engages in
activities like Aereo’s performs.
A
History makes plain that one of Congress’ primary purposes in
amending the Copyright Act in 1976 was to overturn this Court’s
determination that community antenna television (CATV) systems
(the precursors of modern cable systems) fell outside the Act’s scope.
In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 88 S.Ct.
2084, 20 L.Ed.2d 1176 (1968), the Court considered a CATV system
that carried local television broadcasting, much of which was
copyrighted, to its subscribers in two cities. The CATV provider
placed antennas on hills above the cities and used coaxial cables to
carry the signals received by the antennas to the home television sets
of its subscribers. The system amplified and modulated the signals in
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order to improve their strength and efficiently transmit them to
subscribers. A subscriber “could choose any of the ... programs he
wished to view by simply turning the knob on his own television set.”
Id., at 392, 88 S.Ct. 2084. The CATV provider “neither edited the
programs received nor originated any programs of its own.” Ibid.
Asked to decide whether the CATV provider infringed copyright
holders’ exclusive right to perform their works publicly, the Court
held that the provider did not “perform” at all. . .
The Court reasoned that CATV providers were unlike broadcasters:
“Broadcasters select the programs to be viewed; CATV systems
simply carry, without editing, whatever programs they receive.
Broadcasters procure programs and propagate them to the public;
CATV systems receive programs that have been released to the
public and carry them by private channels to additional viewers.” Id.,
at 400, 88 S.Ct. 2084.
Instead, CATV providers were more like viewers, for “the basic
function [their] equipment serves is little different from that served by
the equipment generally furnished by” viewers. Id., at 399, 88 S.Ct.
2084. . . .
In Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 94
S.Ct. 1129, 39 L.Ed.2d 415 (1974), the Court considered the copyright
liability of a CATV provider that carried broadcast television
programming into subscribers’ homes from hundreds of miles away.
Although the Court recognized that a viewer might not be able to
afford amplifying equipment that would provide access to those
distant signals, it nonetheless found that the CATV provider was more
like a viewer than a broadcaster. Id., at 408–409, 94 S.Ct. 1129. . . .
B
In 1976 Congress amended the Copyright Act in large part to reject the
Court’s holdings in Fortnightly and Teleprompter. See H.R.Rep. No. 94–
1476, pp. 86–87 (1976) (hereinafter H.R. Rep.) (The 1976 amendments
“completely overturned” this Court’s narrow construction of the Act
in Fortnightly and Teleprompter ). Congress enacted new language that
erased the Court’s line between broadcaster and viewer, in respect to
“perform[ing]” a work. The amended statute clarifies that to “perform”
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an audiovisual work means “to show its images in any sequence or to
make the sounds accompanying it audible.” § 101; . . . Under this new
language, both the broadcaster and the viewer of a television program
“perform,” because they both show the program’s images and make
audible the program’s sounds. See H.R. Rep., at 63 (“[A] broadcasting
network is performing when it transmits [a singer’s performance of a
song] ... and any individual is performing whenever he or she ...
communicates the performance by turning on a receiving set”).
Congress also enacted the Transmit Clause, which specifies that an
entity performs publicly when it “transmit[s] ... a performance ... to the
public.” § 101; see ibid. (defining “[t]o ‘transmit’ a performance” as “to
communicate it by any device or process whereby images or sounds
are received beyond the place from which they are sent”). Cable
system activities, like those of the CATV systems in Fortnightly and
Teleprompter, lie at the heart of the activities that Congress intended
this language to cover. See H.R. Rep., at 63 (“[A] cable television
system is performing when it retransmits [a network] broadcast to its
subscribers”); see also ibid. (“[T]he concep[t] of public performance ...
cover[s] not only the initial rendition or showing, but also any further
act by which that rendition or showing is transmitted or
communicated to the public”). The Clause thus makes clear that an
entity that acts like a CATV system itself performs, even if when doing
so, it simply enhances viewers’ ability to receive broadcast television
signals.
Congress further created a new section of the Act to regulate cable
companies’ public performances of copyrighted works. See § 111.
Section 111 creates a complex, highly detailed compulsory licensing
scheme that sets out the conditions, including the payment of
compulsory fees, under which cable systems may retransmit
broadcasts. . . .
Congress made these three changes to achieve a similar end: to bring
the activities of cable systems within the scope of the Copyright Act.
C
This history makes clear that Aereo is not simply an equipment
provider. Rather, Aereo, and not just its subscribers, “perform[s]” (or
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“transmit[s]”). Aereo’s activities are substantially similar to those of
the CATV companies that Congress amended the Act to reach. See id.,
at 89 (“[C]able systems are commercial enterprises whose basic
retransmission operations are based on the carriage of copyrighted
program material”). Aereo sells a service that allows subscribers to
watch television programs, many of which are copyrighted, almost as
they are being broadcast. In providing this service, Aereo uses its own
equipment, housed in a centralized warehouse, outside of its users’
homes. By means of its technology (antennas, transcoders, and
servers), Aereo’s system “receive[s] programs that have been released
to the public and carr[ies] them by private channels to additional
viewers.” Fortnightly, 392 U.S., at 400, 88 S.Ct. 2084. It “carr[ies] ...
whatever programs [it] receive[s],” and it offers “all the programming”
of each over-the-air station it carries. Id., at 392, 400, 88 S.Ct. 2084. . . .
We recognize, and Aereo and the dissent emphasize, one particular
difference between Aereo’s system and the cable systems at issue in
Fortnightly and Teleprompter. The systems in those cases transmitted
constantly; they sent continuous programming to each subscriber’s
television set. In contrast, Aereo’s system remains inert until a
subscriber indicates that she wants to watch a program. Only at that
moment, in automatic response to the subscriber’s request, does
Aereo’s system activate an antenna and begin to transmit the
requested program.
This is a critical difference, says the dissent. It means that Aereo’s
subscribers, not Aereo, “selec[t] the copyrighted content” that is
“perform [ed],” post, at –––– (opinion of SCALIA, J.), and for that
reason they, not Aereo, “transmit” the performance. Aereo is thus like
“a copy shop that provides its patrons with a library card.” Post, at –––
–. A copy shop is not directly liable whenever a patron uses the shop’s
machines to “reproduce” copyrighted materials found in that library.
See § 106(1) (“exclusive righ [t] ... to reproduce the copyrighted
work”). And by the same token, Aereo should not be directly liable
whenever its patrons use its equipment to “transmit” copyrighted
television programs to their screens.
In our view, however, the dissent’s copy shop argument, in whatever
form, makes too much out of too little. Given Aereo’s overwhelming
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likeness to the cable companies targeted by the 1976 amendments, this
sole technological difference between Aereo and traditional cable
companies does not make a critical difference here. The subscribers of
the Fortnightly and Teleprompter cable systems also selected what
programs to display on their receiving sets. Indeed, as we explained in
Fortnightly, such a subscriber “could choose any of the ... programs he
wished to view by simply turning the knob on his own television set.”
392 U.S., at 392, 88 S.Ct. 2084. The same is true of an Aereo subscriber.
Of course, in Fortnightly the television signals, in a sense, lurked behind
the screen, ready to emerge when the subscriber turned the knob.
Here the signals pursue their ordinary course of travel through the
universe until today’s “turn of the knob”—a click on a website—
activates machinery that intercepts and reroutes them to Aereo’s
subscribers over the Internet. But this difference means nothing to the
subscriber. It means nothing to the broadcaster. We do not see how
this single difference, invisible to subscriber and broadcaster alike,
could transform a system that is for all practical purposes a traditional
cable system into “a copy shop that provides its patrons with a library
card.”
In other cases involving different kinds of service or technology
providers, a user’s involvement in the operation of the provider’s
equipment and selection of the content transmitted may well bear on
whether the provider performs within the meaning of the Act. But the
many similarities between Aereo and cable companies, considered in
light of Congress’ basic purposes in amending the Copyright Act,
convince us that this difference is not critical here. We conclude that
Aereo is not just an equipment supplier and that Aereo “perform[s].”
III
Next, we must consider whether Aereo performs petitioners’ works
“publicly,” within the meaning of the Transmit Clause. Under the
Clause, an entity performs a work publicly when it “transmit[s] ... a
performance ... of the work ... to the public.” § 101. Aereo denies that it
satisfies this definition. It reasons as follows: First, the “performance”
it “transmit[s]” is the performance created by its act of transmitting.
And second, because each of these performances is capable of being
received by one and only one subscriber, Aereo transmits privately,
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not publicly. Even assuming Aereo’s first argument is correct, its
second does not follow.
We begin with Aereo’s first argument. What performance does Aereo
transmit? Under the Act, “[t]o ‘transmit’ a performance ... is to
communicate it by any device or process whereby images or sounds
are received beyond the place from which they are sent.” Ibid. And “[t]o
‘perform’ ” an audiovisual work means “to show its images in any
sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible.” Ibid.
Petitioners say Aereo transmits a prior performance of their works.
Thus when Aereo retransmits a network’s prior broadcast, the
underlying broadcast (itself a performance) is the performance that
Aereo transmits. Aereo, as discussed above, says the performance it
transmits is the new performance created by its act of transmitting.
That performance comes into existence when Aereo streams the
sounds and images of a broadcast program to a subscriber’s screen.
We assume arguendo that Aereo’s first argument is correct. Thus, for
present purposes, to transmit a performance of (at least) an
audiovisual work means to communicate contemporaneously visible
images and contemporaneously audible sounds of the work. Cf. United
States v. American Soc. of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 627 F.3d 64, 73
(C.A.2 2010) (holding that a download of a work is not a performance
because the data transmitted are not “contemporaneously
perceptible”). When an Aereo subscriber selects a program to watch,
Aereo streams the program over the Internet to that subscriber. Aereo
thereby “communicate[s]” to the subscriber, by means of a “device or
process,” the work’s images and sounds. § 101. And those images and
sounds are contemporaneously visible and audible on the subscriber’s
computer (or other Internet-connected device). So under our assumed
definition, Aereo transmits a performance whenever its subscribers
watch a program.
But what about the Clause’s further requirement that Aereo transmit
a performance “to the public”? As we have said, an Aereo subscriber
receives broadcast television signals with an antenna dedicated to him
alone. Aereo’s system makes from those signals a personal copy of the
selected program. It streams the content of the copy to the same
subscriber and to no one else. One and only one subscriber has the

225

COPYRIGHT : A Contemporary Approach

ability to see and hear each Aereo transmission. The fact that each
transmission is to only one subscriber, in Aereo’s view, means that it
does not transmit a performance “to the public.”
In terms of the Act’s purposes, these differences do not distinguish
Aereo’s system from cable systems, which do perform “publicly.”
Viewed in terms of Congress’ regulatory objectives, why should any of
these technological differences matter? They concern the behind-thescenes way in which Aereo delivers television programming to its
viewers’ screens. They do not render Aereo’s commercial objective any
different from that of cable companies. Nor do they significantly alter
the viewing experience of Aereo’s subscribers. Why would a
subscriber who wishes to watch a television show care much whether
images and sounds are delivered to his screen via a large
multisubscriber antenna or one small dedicated antenna, whether they
arrive instantaneously or after a few seconds’ delay, or whether they
are transmitted directly or after a personal copy is made? And why, if
Aereo is right, could not modern CATV systems simply continue the
same commercial and consumer-oriented activities, free of copyright
restrictions, provided they substitute such new technologies for old? . .
.
The text of the Clause effectuates Congress’ intent. Aereo’s argument
to the contrary relies on the premise that “to transmit ... a
performance” means to make a single transmission. But the Clause
suggests that an entity may transmit a performance through multiple,
discrete transmissions. That is because one can “transmit” or
“communicate” something through a set of actions. Thus one can
transmit a message to one’s friends, irrespective of whether one sends
separate identical e-mails to each friend or a single e-mail to all at
once. So can an elected official communicate an idea, slogan, or speech
to her constituents, regardless of whether she communicates that idea,
slogan, or speech during individual phone calls to each constituent or
in a public square.
The fact that a singular noun (“a performance”) follows the words “to
transmit” does not suggest the contrary. One can sing a song to his
family, whether he sings the same song one-on-one or in front of all
together. Similarly, one’s colleagues may watch a performance of a
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particular play—say, this season’s modern-dress version of “Measure
for Measure”—whether they do so at separate or at the same
showings. By the same principle, an entity may transmit a
performance through one or several transmissions, where the
performance is of the same work.
The Transmit Clause must permit this interpretation, for it provides
that one may transmit a performance to the public “whether the
members of the public capable of receiving the performance ... receive
it ... at the same time or at different times.” § 101. Were the words “to
transmit ... a performance” limited to a single act of communication,
members of the public could not receive the performance
communicated “at different times.” Therefore, in light of the purpose
and text of the Clause, we conclude that when an entity
communicates the same contemporaneously perceptible images and
sounds to multiple people, it transmits a performance to them
regardless of the number of discrete communications it makes.
We do not see how the fact that Aereo transmits via personal copies
of programs could make a difference. The Act applies to transmissions
“by means of any device or process.” Ibid. And retransmitting a
television program using user-specific copies is a “process” of
transmitting a performance. A “cop[y]” of a work is simply a “material
objec[t] ... in which a work is fixed ... and from which the work can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated.” Ibid. So whether
Aereo transmits from the same or separate copies, it performs the same
work; it shows the same images and makes audible the same sounds.
Therefore, when Aereo streams the same television program to
multiple subscribers, it “transmit[s] ... a performance” to all of them.
Moreover, the subscribers to whom Aereo transmits television
programs constitute “the public.” Aereo communicates the same
contemporaneously perceptible images and sounds to a large number
of people who are unrelated and unknown to each other. This matters
because, although the Act does not define “the public,” it specifies that
an entity performs publicly when it performs at “any place where a
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family
and its social acquaintances is gathered.” Ibid. The Act thereby
suggests that “the public” consists of a large group of people outside of
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a family and friends.
Neither the record nor Aereo suggests that Aereo’s subscribers receive
performances in their capacities as owners or possessors of the
underlying works. This is relevant because when an entity performs to
a set of people, whether they constitute “the public” often depends
upon their relationship to the underlying work. When, for example, a
valet parking attendant returns cars to their drivers, we would not say
that the parking service provides cars “to the public.” We would say
that it provides the cars to their owners. We would say that a car
dealership, on the other hand, does provide cars to the public, for it
sells cars to individuals who lack a pre-existing relationship to the
cars. Similarly, an entity that transmits a performance to individuals in
their capacities as owners or possessors does not perform to “the
public,” whereas an entity like Aereo that transmits to large numbers
of paying subscribers who lack any prior relationship to the works
does so perform.
Finally, we note that Aereo’s subscribers may receive the same
programs at different times and locations. This fact does not help
Aereo, however, for the Transmit Clause expressly provides that an
entity may perform publicly “whether the members of the public
capable of receiving the performance ... receive it in the same place or
in separate places and at the same time or at different times.” Ibid. In
other words, “the public” need not be situated together, spatially or
temporally. For these reasons, we conclude that Aereo transmits a
performance of petitioners’ copyrighted works to the public, within
the meaning of the Transmit Clause.
IV
Aereo and many of its supporting amici argue that to apply the
Transmit Clause to Aereo’s conduct will impose copyright liability on
other technologies, including new technologies, that Congress could
not possibly have wanted to reach. We agree that Congress, while
intending the Transmit Clause to apply broadly to cable companies
and their equivalents, did not intend to discourage or to control the
emergence or use of different kinds of technologies. But we do not
believe that our limited holding today will have that effect.
For one thing, the history of cable broadcast transmissions that led to
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the enactment of the Transmit Clause informs our conclusion that
Aereo “perform [s],” but it does not determine whether different kinds
of providers in different contexts also “perform.” For another, an entity
only transmits a performance when it communicates
contemporaneously perceptible images and sounds of a work. See Brief
for Respondent 31 (“[I]f a distributor ... sells [multiple copies of a
digital video disc] by mail to consumers, ... [its] distribution of the
DVDs merely makes it possible for the recipients to perform the work
themselves—it is not a ‘device or process’ by which the distributor
publicly performs the work” (emphasis in original)).
Further, we have interpreted the term “the public” to apply to a group
of individuals acting as ordinary members of the public who pay
primarily to watch broadcast television programs, many of which are
copyrighted. We have said that it does not extend to those who act as
owners or possessors of the relevant product. And we have not
considered whether the public performance right is infringed when
the user of a service pays primarily for something other than the
transmission of copyrighted works, such as the remote storage of
content. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 31 (distinguishing
cloud-based storage services because they “offer consumers more
numerous and convenient means of playing back copies that the
consumers have already lawfully acquired” (emphasis in original)). In
addition, an entity does not transmit to the public if it does not
transmit to a substantial number of people outside of a family and its
social circle.
We also note that courts often apply a statute’s highly general
language in light of the statute’s basic purposes. Finally, the doctrine
of “fair use” can help to prevent inappropriate or inequitable
applications of the Clause. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 104 S.Ct. 774, 78 L.Ed.2d 574 (1984). . . .
3
In sum, having considered the details of Aereo’s practices, we find
them highly similar to those of the CATV systems in Fortnightly and
Teleprompter. And those are activities that the 1976 amendments sought
to bring within the scope of the Copyright Act. Insofar as there are
differences, those differences concern not the nature of the service that
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Aereo provides so much as the technological manner in which it
provides the service. We conclude that those differences are not
adequate to place Aereo’s activities outside the scope of the Act.
For these reasons, we conclude that Aereo “perform[s]” petitioners’
copyrighted works “publicly,” as those terms are defined by the
Transmit Clause. We therefore reverse the contrary judgment of the
Court of Appeals, and we remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice SCALIA, with whom Justice THOMAS and Justice ALITO
join, dissenting.
[W]e are here concerned with a single claim: that Aereo violates the
[petitioners’] “exclusive righ[t]” to “perform” their programs
“publicly.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(4). That claim fails at the very outset
because Aereo does not “perform” at all. The Court manages to reach
the opposite conclusion only by disregarding widely accepted rules for
service-provider liability and adopting in their place an improvised
standard (“looks-like-cable-TV”) that will sow confusion for years to
come.
I. Legal Standard
There are two types of liability for copyright infringement: direct and
secondary. As its name suggests, the former applies when an actor
personally engages in infringing conduct. See Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433, 104 S.Ct. 774, 78 L.Ed.2d
574 (1984). Secondary liability, by contrast, is a means of holding
defendants responsible for infringement by third parties, even when
the defendants “have not themselves engaged in the infringing
activity.” Id., at 435, 104 S.Ct. 774. It applies when a defendant
“intentionally induc[es] or encourag[es]” infringing acts by others or
profits from such acts “while declining to exercise a right to stop or
limit [them].” Metro–Goldwyn–Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.
913, 930, 125 S.Ct. 2764, 162 L.Ed.2d 781 (2005).
Most suits against equipment manufacturers and service providers
involve secondary-liability claims. For example, when movie studios
sued to block the sale of Sony’s Betamax videocassette recorder
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(VCR), they argued that Sony was liable because its customers were
making unauthorized copies. See Sony, supra, at 434–435, 104 S.Ct. 774.
Record labels and movie studios relied on a similar theory when they
sued Grokster and StreamCast, two providers of peer-to-peer filesharing software. See Grokster, supra, at 920–921, 927, 125 S.Ct. 2764.
This suit, or rather the portion of it before us here, is fundamentally
different. The Networks claim that Aereo directly infringes their
public-performance right. Accordingly, the Networks must prove that
Aereo “perform[s]” copyrighted works, § 106(4), when its subscribers
log in, select a channel, and push the “watch” button. That process
undoubtedly results in a performance; the question is who does the
performing. See Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d
121, 130 (C.A.2 2008). If Aereo’s subscribers perform but Aereo does
not, the claim necessarily fails.
The Networks’ claim is governed by a simple but profoundly
important rule: A defendant may be held directly liable only if it has
engaged in volitional conduct that violates the Act. See 3 W. Patry,
Copyright § 9:5.50 (2013). This requirement is firmly grounded in the
Act’s text, which defines “perform” in active, affirmative terms: One
“perform[s]” a copyrighted “audiovisual work,” such as a movie or
news broadcast, by “show[ing] its images in any sequence” or
“mak[ing] the sounds accompanying it audible.” § 101. And since the
Act makes it unlawful to copy or perform copyrighted works, not to
copy or perform in general, see § 501(a), the volitional-act requirement
demands conduct directed to the plaintiff’s copyrighted material, see
Sony, supra, at 434, 104 S.Ct. 774. Every Court of Appeals to have
considered an automated-service provider’s direct liability for
copyright infringement has adopted that rule. See Fox Broadcasting Co. v.
Dish Network LLC, 747 F.3d 1060, 1066–1068 (C.A.9 2014); Cartoon
Network, supra, at 130–131 (C.A.2 2008); CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc.,
373 F.3d 544, 549–550 (C.A.4 2004).1 Although we have not opined on
the issue, our cases are fully consistent with a volitional-conduct
requirement. For example, we gave several examples of direct
infringement in Sony, each of which involved a volitional act directed
to the plaintiff’s copyrighted material. See 464 U.S., at 437, n. 18, 104
S.Ct. 774.
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The volitional-conduct requirement is not at issue in most directinfringement cases . . . . But it comes right to the fore when a directinfringement claim is lodged against a defendant who does nothing
more than operate an automated, user-controlled system. See, e.g., Fox
Broadcasting, supra, at 1067; Cartoon Network, supra, at 131. Internet-service
providers are a prime example. When one user sends data to another,
the provider’s equipment facilitates the transfer automatically. Does
that mean that the provider is directly liable when the transmission
happens to result in the “reproduc[tion],” § 106(1), of a copyrighted
work? It does not. The provider’s system is “totally indifferent to the
material’s content,” whereas courts require “some aspect of volition”
directed at the copyrighted material before direct liability may be
imposed. CoStar, 373 F.3d, at 550–551.2 The defendant may be held
directly liable only if the defendant itself “trespassed on the exclusive
domain of the copyright owner.” Id., at 550. Most of the time that issue
will come down to who selects the copyrighted content: the defendant
or its customers. See Cartoon Network, supra, at 131–132.
A comparison between copy shops and video-on-demand services
illustrates the point. A copy shop rents out photocopiers on a per-use
basis. One customer might copy his 10–year–old’s drawings—a
perfectly lawful thing to do—while another might duplicate a famous
artist’s copyrighted photographs—a use clearly prohibited by § 106(1).
Either way, the customer chooses the content and activates the copying
function; the photocopier does nothing except in response to the
customer’s commands. Because the shop plays no role in selecting the
content, it cannot be held directly liable when a customer makes an
infringing copy. See CoStar, supra, at 550.
Video-on-demand services, like photocopiers, respond automatically
to user input, but they differ in one crucial respect: They choose the
content. When a user signs in to Netflix, for example, “thousands of ...
movies [and] TV episodes” carefully curated by Netflix are “available
to watch instantly.” See How [D]oes Netflix [W]ork?, online at
http://help.netflix.com/en/node/412 (as visited June 20, 2014, and
available in Clerk of Court’s case file). That selection and arrangement
by the service provider constitutes a volitional act directed to specific
copyrighted works and thus serves as a basis for direct liability.
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The distinction between direct and secondary liability would collapse
if there were not a clear rule for determining whether the defendant
committed the infringing act. See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d, at 132–133.
The volitional-conduct requirement supplies that rule; its purpose is
not to excuse defendants from accountability, but to channel the
claims against them into the correct analytical track. See Brief for 36
Intellectual Property and Copyright Law Professors as Amici Curiae 7.
Thus, in the example given above, the fact that the copy shop does not
choose the content simply means that its culpability will be assessed
using secondary-liability rules rather than direct-liability rules. See
Sony, supra, at 434–442, 104 S.Ct. 774; Cartoon Network, supra, at 132–133.
II. Application to Aereo
So which is Aereo: the copy shop or the video-on-demand service? In
truth, it is neither. Rather, it is akin to a copy shop that provides its
patrons with a library card. Aereo offers access to an automated
system consisting of routers, servers, transcoders, and dime-sized
antennae. Like a photocopier or VCR, that system lies dormant until a
subscriber activates it. When a subscriber selects a program, Aereo’s
system picks up the relevant broadcast signal, translates its audio and
video components into digital data, stores the data in a user-specific
file, and transmits that file’s contents to the subscriber via the
Internet—at which point the subscriber’s laptop, tablet, or other
device displays the broadcast just as an ordinary television would. The
result of that process fits the statutory definition of a performance to a
tee: The subscriber’s device “show[s]” the broadcast’s “images” and
“make[s] the sounds accompanying” the broadcast “audible.” § 101. The
only question is whether those performances are the product of
Aereo’s volitional conduct.
They are not. Unlike video-on-demand services, Aereo does not
provide a prearranged assortment of movies and television shows.
Rather, it assigns each subscriber an antenna that—like a library
card—can be used to obtain whatever broadcasts are freely available.
Some of those broadcasts are copyrighted; others are in the public
domain. The key point is that subscribers call all the shots: Aereo’s
automated system does not relay any program, copyrighted or not,
until a subscriber selects the program and tells Aereo to relay it.
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Aereo’s operation of that system is a volitional act and a but-for cause
of the resulting performances, but, as in the case of the copy shop, that
degree of involvement is not enough for direct liability. See Grokster,
545 U.S., at 960, 125 S.Ct. 2764 (BREYER, J., concurring) (“[T]he
producer of a technology which permits unlawful copying does not
himself engage in unlawful copying”).
In sum, Aereo does not “perform” for the sole and simple reason that it
does not make the choice of content. And because Aereo does not
perform, it cannot be held directly liable for infringing the Networks’
public-performance right. That conclusion does not necessarily mean
that Aereo’s service complies with the Copyright Act. Quite the
contrary. The Networks’ complaint alleges that Aereo is directly and
secondarily liable for infringing their public-performance rights (§
106(4)) and also their reproduction rights (§ 106(1)). Their request for a
preliminary injunction—the only issue before this Court—is based
exclusively on the direct-liability portion of the public-performance
claim . . . . Affirming the judgment below would merely return this
case to the lower courts for consideration of the Networks’ remaining
claims.
III. Guilt By Resemblance
The Court’s conclusion that Aereo performs boils down to the
following syllogism: (1) Congress amended the Act to overrule our
decisions holding that cable systems do not perform when they
retransmit over-the-air broadcasts;4 (2) Aereo looks a lot like a cable
system; therefore (3) Aereo performs. Ante, at –––– – ––––. That
reasoning suffers from a trio of defects.
First, it is built on the shakiest of foundations. Perceiving the text to
be ambiguous, ante, at ––––, the Court reaches out to decide the case
based on a few isolated snippets of legislative history, ante, at –––– – –
––– (citing H.R.Rep. No. 94–1476 (1976)). The Court treats those
snippets as authoritative evidence of congressional intent even though
they come from a single report issued by a committee whose members
make up a small fraction of one of the two Houses of Congress. . . .
Second, the Court’s reasoning fails on its own terms because there are
material differences between the cable systems at issue in Teleprompter
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Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 94 S.Ct. 1129, 39
L.Ed.2d 415 (1974), and Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.,
392 U.S. 390, 88 S.Ct. 2084, 20 L.Ed.2d 1176 (1968), on the one hand
and Aereo on the other. The former (which were then known as
community-antenna television systems) captured the full range of
broadcast signals and forwarded them to all subscribers at all times,
whereas Aereo transmits only specific programs selected by the user,
at specific times selected by the user. The Court acknowledges this
distinction but blithely concludes that it “does not make a critical
difference.” Ante, at ––––. Even if that were true, the Court fails to
account for other salient differences between the two technologies.
Though cable systems started out essentially as dumb pipes that
routed signals from point A to point B, see ante, at ––––, by the 1970’s,
that kind of service “ ‘no longer exist[ed],’ ” Brief for Petitioners in
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp., O.T. 1973, No. 72–
1633, p. 22. At the time of our Teleprompter decision, cable companies
“perform[ed] the same functions as ‘broadcasters’ by deliberately
selecting and importing distant signals, originating programs, [and]
selling commercials,” id., at 20, thus making them curators of
content—more akin to video-on-demand services than copy shops. So
far as the record reveals, Aereo does none of those things.
Third, and most importantly, even accepting that the 1976
amendments had as their purpose the overruling of our cable-TV
cases, what they were meant to do and how they did it are two
different questions—and it is the latter that governs the case before us
here. The injury claimed is not violation of a law that says operations
similar to cable TV are subject to copyright liability, but violation of §
106(4) of the Copyright Act. And whatever soothing reasoning the
Court uses to reach its result (“this looks like cable TV”), the
consequence of its holding is that someone who implements this
technology “perform[s]” under that provision. That greatly disrupts settled
jurisprudence which, before today, applied the straightforward,
bright-line test of volitional conduct directed at the copyrighted work.
If that test is not outcome determinative in this case, presumably it is
not outcome determinative elsewhere as well. And it is not clear what
the Court proposes to replace it. . . .

235

COPYRIGHT : A Contemporary Approach

Making matters worse, the Court provides no criteria for
determining when its cable-TV-lookalike rule applies. Must a
defendant offer access to live television to qualify? If similarity to
cable-television service is the measure, then the answer must be yes.
But consider the implications of that answer: Aereo would be free to
do exactly what it is doing right now so long as it built mandatory
time shifting into its “watch” function. Aereo would not be providing
live television if it made subscribers wait to tune in until after a show’s
live broadcast ended. . . .
Two other criteria come to mind. One would cover any automated
service that captures and stores live television broadcasts at a user’s
direction. That can’t be right, since it is exactly what remote storage
digital video recorders (RS–DVRs) do, see Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d, at
124–125, and the Court insists that its “limited holding” does not
decide the fate of those devices, ante, at –––– – ––––. The other
potential benchmark is the one offered by the Government: The cableTV-lookalike rule embraces any entity that “operates an integrated
system, substantially dependent on physical equipment that is used in
common by [its] subscribers.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae
20. The Court sensibly avoids that approach because it would sweep
in Internet service providers and a host of other entities that quite
obviously do not perform.
That leaves as the criterion of cable-TV-resemblance nothing but
th’ol’ totality-of-the-circumstances test (which is not a test at all but
merely assertion of an intent to perform test-free, ad hoc, case-by-case
evaluation). It will take years, perhaps decades, to determine which
automated systems now in existence are governed by the traditional
volitional-conduct test and which get the Aereo treatment. (And
automated systems now in contemplation will have to take their
chances.) The Court vows that its ruling will not affect cloud-storage
providers and cable-television systems, see ante, at –––– – ––––, but it
cannot deliver on that promise given the imprecision of its resultdriven rule. . . .
3
I share the Court’s evident feeling that what Aereo is doing (or
enabling to be done) to the Networks’ copyrighted programming

Fall 2016 Supplement

236

ought not to be allowed. But perhaps we need not distort the
Copyright Act to forbid it. As discussed at the outset, Aereo’s
secondary liability for performance infringement is yet to be
determined, as is its primary and secondary liability for reproduction
infringement. If that does not suffice, then (assuming one shares the
majority’s estimation of right and wrong) what we have before us
must be considered a “loophole” in the law. It is not the role of this
Court to identify and plug loopholes. It is the role of good lawyers to
identify and exploit them, and the role of Congress to eliminate them
if it wishes. . . .

A close-up image of Aereo’s array of mini-antennas

Notes and Questions
1. Is Imposing Liability for Retransmissions “Exacting Multiple
Tribute”? In Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151
(1975), the Court considered whether a business establishment’s
playing of the radio was a “performance” under the 1909 Act. It
stated that “generally copyright holders can and do receive royalties
in proportion to advertising revenues of licensed broadcasters, and
a broadcaster's advertising revenues reflect the total number of its
listeners, including those who listen to the broadcasts in public
business establishments.” Thus, the Court reasoned, “[t]o hold that
[the owner of a restaurant playing a radio station's broadcast as
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background music] ‘performed’ these musical compositions would
be to authorize the sale of an untold number of licenses for what is
basically a single public rendition of a copyrighted work. The
exaction of such multiple tribute would go far beyond what is
required for the economic protection of copyright owners . . . .”
The Copyright Act of 1976 repudiated this logic and made it clear
that someone who retransmitted free broadcast television or radio,
or who played it in a public place, was also publicly performing
whatever copyrighted works were contained in the broadcasts
(although, as we will see below, Congress also specifically and
controversially excepted small business owners like the defendant
in Aiken). But it did not articulate a theory for imposing such
liability. Is there a good theory, or was the Aiken Court correct that
it can only be described as “exacting multiple tribute”? Consider
and evaluate the following possible arguments:




Restaurant, bar and store owners who are playing background
music are effectively charging customers for listening to that
music. Though the owners may nominally be charging only for
the food, drinks, and other goods, customers are actually
interested in the entire experience of being in those
establishments, including the music they’re listening to, and
they are paying for that experience. When a commercial
establishment is extracting a different kind of value out of
music by bundling it with food, drink, decor, etc. and selling it,
the creator of the music should be able to receive some of that
value. That should be true even if the customers are listening to
advertisements, although they may not be listening as closely to
them in a busy restaurant, in conversation with friends.
Because there is imperfect competition between cable and
satellite companies, they are able to charge subscribers rates
that reflect, not just the bare cost of passing on broadcast TV
signals, but some of the value that the subscribers place on
viewing the copyrighted TV programs. If they are charging
viewers for watching programming that is under copyright,
then the owners of copyright should share in those revenues.

2. Distinguishing Public from Private Performances: Will
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Ownership and Possession of Copies Do the Trick? The Aereo
Court reasons that although each transmission from Aereo to a
subscriber may have been made using a copy that was individual to
that subscriber, that did not make the performances private,
because the subscribers did not own or possess the copies that
were used to effectuate the transmission. Does that change the
public performance holding in the Cartoon Network case, excerpted
on p. 897 of the casebook? Do Cablevision subscribers have
ownership or possession of the copies stored for them on
Cablevision’s Remote Storage DVR system? Do you have ownership
or possession of copies that you uploaded to a cloud storage
service?
3. Distinguishing Direct from Secondary Liability: Will “Volitional
Conduct” Work? Suppose that a company builds a traditional
cable television system that retransmits broadcast television signals
received by an antenna. However, it does not immediately turn the
system on. Rather, it builds an “off/on” switch for the entire system
that is turned on by a telephone call to a particular number. It then
takes pre-orders for service, and notifies all of those who have preordered service that any of them can call the telephone number and
turn the system on. According to the dissent, is the cable company
not directly liable for copyright infringement?
4. How Textualist is the “Volitional Conduct” Test? Justice Scalia
places a lot of weight on the requirement of “volitional conduct” to
distinguish direct and indirect infringement. The term “volitional
conduct” never appears in the Copyright Act. Scalia argues,
however, that the “requirement is firmly grounded in the Act’s
text,” because it “ defines ‘perform’ in active, affirmative terms.” Do
you agree?
5. Selection and Arrangement as Volitional Acts. Volitional acts
that trigger direct liability for infringement are ordinarily acts that
immediately implicate one of the exclusive rights, aren’t they? If
pressing the “start” button on the copier is a sufficient volitional act
to result in direct liability, for example, it is because it immediately
results in unauthorized copying of a protected work and therefore
violates the reproduction right. The dissent in Aereo distinguishes
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Aereo from Netflix on the ground that Netflix selects and arranges
the audiovisual works that subscribers can stream on demand.
Suppose that a company selects and arranges movies it will offer to
stream on demand, and builds a website with streaming
capabilities, but not a single person actually subscribes and streams
a movie. Assuming that the company did not make unauthorized
copies of the movies while preparing to stream (suppose that it was
going to stream from authorized DVDs it had purchased legally,
like zediva.com did), has its volitional selection and arrangement
made it directly liable for copyright infringement even in the
absence of any streaming? Suppose that a year later, the company’s
first subscriber finally decides to stream one of the movies that the
company decided a year earlier it would offer for streaming. Now
are both the subscriber and the company directly liable for
infringement of the public performance right?
6. How Passive was Aereo? If selection and arrangement are
sufficient volitional acts, are we sure that Aereo did not select and
arrange? Aereo did decide where it would place its antennas for
each market in which it operated, and thereby selected which
television channels would be available to its subscribers. The
Federal Communications Commission runs an online tool for
estimating the strength of digital television signals at locations
across the United States.
See DTV Transition Maps,
http://transition.fcc.gov/mb/engineering/dtvmaps/. Entering a zip
code for the Manhattan neighborhood of Harlem – 10027 – results
in a list of strong, moderate, weak, and missing signals that only
partially overlaps the list produced by entering the zip code for the
Brooklyn neighborhood of Park Slope – 11215 – even though they
are both in New York City. If Aereo made a decision about which
channels were likely more important to its target customers, and
sited its antennas accordingly, should that count as selection?
Aereo also provided an online program guide to its subscribers.
Doesn’t that count as arrangement?
7. Textualism. Justices Breyer and Scalia have been debating the
proper role of legislative history in statutory interpretation for over
two decades. See, e.g., Sherman, The Use of Legislative History: A Debate
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Between Justice Scalia and Judge Breyer, 16 Administrative Law News 1
(1991) (describing a March 11, 1991 debate between Scalia and
Breyer); Stephen G. Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in
Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 845 (1992). Are those different
views outcome-determinative here? In your opinion, does a
“textualist” interpretation of the Copyright Act lead to a ruling in
favor of Aereo, and a “purposive” reading resting on legislative
history lead to a ruling in favor of the plaintiffs?
8. Rules of Lenity and Preferences for Individual Responsibility. If
a statutory provision is ambiguous and it is wrong to look to
legislative history to resolve the ambiguity, but a judge has to
decide the case, what should he do? Other than flipping a coin, the
only possibility would seem to be to resort to “canons of
construction,” rules that prefer one reading of statutes over
another. Under the “rule of lenity,” for example, ambiguities in
criminal statutes are resolved in favor of the defendant, on the
theory that people deserve clear notice of potential criminal
liability, and that there should be a presumption in favor of liberty
and freedom of action. Should there also be a rule of lenity
applicable to civil statutes, and if so, how strong should it be? How
much does a presumption in favor of liberty and a concern about
notice motivate the dissenters? A concern for liberty is often
associated with a preference for individual liability for bad acts and
against prophylactic regulation. Does that preference also influence
the dissent? If the Court’s decision against Aereo stopped some
individuals from watching television programming that was in the
public domain, should we be worried about that loss of liberty?
10. Rules versus Standards. Justice Scalia has also long been on
record as strongly preferring clear rules over multi-factor standards
and balancing tests. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of
Rules, 56 U. Chicago L. Rev. 1175 (1989). Is he right to be worried
that the Court’s ruling in Aereo adopts a “looks-like-cable-TV” test
that is “merely assertion of an intent to perform test-free, ad hoc,
case-by-case evaluation”? Can you articulate clearer rules or factors
that constitute the holding of the Aereo Court?
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11. Aereo Suspends its Service, Tries to Qualify as a Cable
Company. Three days after the Supreme Court issued its decision
in Aereo, Aereo suspended its service indefinitely. See Emily Steel,
“Stung by Supreme Court, Aereo Suspends Service,” The New York
Times, June 28, 2014. Having failed in its attempt to retransmit
broadcast television without any license, Aereo then decided to
tender payment to the Copyright Office for a statutory license
under 17 U.S.C. § 111, arguing that it qualified as a cable television
company and was therefore entitled to the benefit of the § 111
statutory license. The Copyright Office responded in a letter to
Aereo dated July 16, 2014:
In the view of the Copyright Office, internet retransmissions
of broadcast television fall outside of the scope of the Section
111 statutory license. Significantly, in WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, inc., 691
F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2012), the Second Circuit deferred to and
agreed with the Office’s interpretation of Section 111. As
explained in that case, Section 111 is meant to encompass
“localized retransmission services” that are “regulated as cable
systems by the FCC.” Id. at 284 (quoting 57 Fed. Reg. 3284,
3292 (Jan. 29, 1992)).
Letter from Jacqueline C. Charlesworth,
General Counsel, United States
Copyright Office to Mr. Matthew
Calabro, Aereo, Inc., July 16, 2014. The
Copyright Office thus decided not to
process Aereo’s statements of account,
though it accepted them provisionally
in recognition of pending litigation and
administrative action. See id.

Go Online
To see the entire letter
responding to Aereo’s
submission of statements
of account and payment
for a § 111 license, click
here.
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Copyright in the Real World
Music on the Campaign Trail
When Donald Trump emerged to introduce his wife on the first night
of the 2016 Republican Convention, he did so to the strains of the song
We Are the Champions by Queen. Queen was not pleased and protested
publicly. A few days later when Trump’s daughter Ivanka emerged to
introduce her father, she did so to the strains of Here Comes the Sun by
the Beatles. The heirs of George Harrison were not pleased and
protested publicly. When Mike Huckabee travelled to Kentucky to
celebrate the release from jail of a local clerk who refused to issue
marriage licenses to gay couples, the song Eye of the Tiger by Survivor
blared in the background. Survivor was not pleased and sued. The
problem is not new. Jackson Browne sued John McCain for using
Running on Empty in commercials in 2008 and back in 1984 Bruce
Springsteen objected when Ronald Reagan wanted to use his Born in
the USA as a campaign theme song (Reagan was apparently either
indifferent to, or clueless about, the real meaning of the lyrics, which
are a bitter lament by a down-and-out Vietnam veteran).
Politicians (or the Millennials who work for them as part of their
advance teams) find using catchy popular music to energize voters
during the course of a campaign to be irresistible. The question that
might pop into the mind of a curious copyright student is whether this
is legal.
.For the most part the answer is yes, at least in terms of copyright law.
Before delving into details, recall the basic notion that a recording
usually will embody two works – a musical composition, and the
specific rendition or performance of that composition, known as a
sound recording. Recall further that the Copyright Act does not grant
a general performance right to sound recordings. As a result, the only
copyright issues that could arise with the unauthorized use of a song
during a campaign event would concern the underlying composition.
First, consider the easiest case – the performance of a particular song
at some indoor venue such as a stadium or auditorium. From the
perspective of copyright law this should not pose any issues. Virtually
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all such venues have blanket performing licenses from all of the
relevant Performing Rights Organizations (ASCAP, BMI, SESAC and
GMR), so they are allowed to perform any musical compositions they
wish.
It is possible, however that the composers or performers might feel
that the use of their music acts as a sort of claim of endorsement. A
claim of that sort is essentially an allegation that the candidate is
making a false claim of sponsorship.
Such a claim would be brought under a federal statute called the
Lanham Act – a statute that also brings us federal trademark law. To
prevail on such a claim the musicians would have to show that most
persons listening were likely to be confused into thinking that the
singers or composers supported the candidate, which is likely to be
difficult to prove if the song is merely played once as a candidate
walks on stage to greet the adoring masses. On the other hand, if the
song is used repeatedly throughout the campaign – as was the case, for
example, with the use of Fleetwood Mac’s Don’t Stop Thinkin’ About
Tomorrow during Bill Clinton’s 1992 campaign – the inference of
sponsorship might become considerably stronger. (In that specific
case, the Clinton campaign never requested permission to use the
song, but the band was generally sympathetic to Clinton’s candidacy
and never objected to the use).
If the song is played at an outdoor venue without a public
performance license – as was the case with Huckabee event in
Kentucky – then the campaign cannot fall back on PRO license to
immunize it from copyright infringement claims. However, in such a
case, the campaign could argue that the performance of the song was
either a fair use or came within the exception to the public
performance right for non-profit performances in § 110(4) of the
Copyright Act. If the event is being transmitted over the airwaves, the
non-profit exemption does not apply, because the performance must
be “otherwise than in a transmission to the public.” Assuming it is not
transmitted, the further issue would be whether there was any
compensation paid to any of the “organizers” of the performance.
Since the performance is presumably organized by paid campaign
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staffers you might think that is a problem, but the general rule is that
if employees are not paid primarily to organize performances, that
does not make the exemption unavailable.
In the case of Huckabee and Clerk Kim Davis, Survivor frontman
Frankie Sullivan was so incensed at the use of the band’s song that he
posted on Facebook the tart observation that ““I would not grant her
the rights to use Charmin!” His music publisher, Rude Music,
subsequently sued Huckabee for President, Inc. (you can read the brief
complaint by clicking here). The Huckabee campaign raised the nonprofit performance exception as an affirmative defense in its answer.
They also argued that the performance was exempt because the event
was a “religious assembly,” noting that “the most prominent artifacts
present and visible at the September 8, 2015, assembly in support of
Mrs. Davis were numerous Christian crosses or crucifixes and
occasional Bibles held by members of the public in attendance.” (you
can read the answer by clicking here). As yet a third defense, they
asserted that the performance of the song was protected by the fair use
doctrine. Eventually the Huckabee campaign settled for $25,000, so
we lack the guidance of a formal ruling on these three claims. While
your editors are dubious about the religious assembly defense, the
other two arguments seem far from frivolous.
Consequently in most cases, there should be no serious problems with
using music – at least occasionally – at campaign events from a
copyright point of view. Of course, if a politician wants to incorporate
a previously recorded song into a television commercial that would
implicate the reproduction rights of both the musical composition and
the sound recording that are involved. The unlicensed use of the
recording in that instance would be a clear case of infringement.
From a political and public relations point of view, however, most
candidates for office would rather not be taken off message by having
to respond to the protests of popular musicians who publicly object to
the use of their tunes. Without being too cynical, it is likely the case
that the musicians, in most instances, command greater public respect
and affection than the politicians.
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D. Performing Rights Organizations
p. 942 – Insert after first full sentence
In 2013 music executive Irving Azoff, in collaboration with Madison
Square Garden Entertainment, formed a new performing rights
organization called Global Music Rights. Although to date Global
Music Rights represents only a small group of fewer than 100
songwriters, these writers are among the most successful in the
industry, and their compositions have been recorded by a host of
music superstars including Beyonce, Kid Rock, Madonna and Taylor
Swift.
p. 946 – insert after Note 3:
4. Regulated versus Unregulated PROs. The two smaller PROs –
SESAC and GMR – do not operate under antitrust decrees. That
means that the royalty rates they charge are not subject to judicial
oversight. This has caused some writers and music publishers to
move from the larger more established organizations to the
unregulated entities in order to secure higher royalty payouts. One
recent example is Pharrell Williams, who left ASCAP in 2014 and
moved to GMR. While the nuances of antitrust law are well
beyond the scope of this copyright text, here is a quick brain teaser
-- if large numbers of songwriters migrate to SESAC and GMR,
should those groups be sued by the Justice Department under the
antitrust laws so that they, too, could be put under judicial rate
supervision? If that happens would a fifth or sixth PRO spring up?
If the number of PROs proliferates and music users need licenses
from all of them, does that defeat the purpose of having PROs in the
first place?
5. Should the Blanket Have Holes? With the rise of large digital
performing entities usually called “new media services” (think
Pandora, iHeart radio or Spotify), copyright owners of musical
compositions became quite eager to negotiate direct licensing deals
with these kinds of users rather than allow them to obtain blanket
licenses through the PROs at regulated rates. Toward that end,
starting in 2011 several large music publishers “withdrew” from
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ASCAP and BMI the right to license new media services. In 2012
Pandora, confronted with increased royalty demands from these
publishers, applied to the “rate court” for a ruling that the PRO’s
were obligated to offer them licenses. The rate court sided with
Pandora. Eventually, the Second Circuit sided with Pandora,
observing
Appellants contend that publishers may withdraw from
ASCAP its right to license their works to certain new media
music users (including Pandora) while continuing to license
the same works to ASCAP for licensing to other users. We
agree with the district court's determination that the plain
language of the consent decree unambiguously precludes
ASCAP from accepting such partial withdrawals. The decree's
definition of “ASCAP repertory” and other provisions of the
decree establish that ASCAP has essentially equivalent rights
across all of the works licensed to it. The licensing of works
through ASCAP is offered to publishers on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis. As ASCAP is required to license its entire repertory to all
eligible users, publishers may not license works to ASCAP for
licensing to some eligible users but not others.
Pandora Media, Inc. v. American Soc. of Composers, Authors and
Publishers, 785 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2015). The publishers then
petitioned the Justice Department seeking their consent to a
modification of the terms of the consent decree to allow “partial
withdrawals.” In June of 2016 the Justice Department refused to
agree to these requested amendments. See Jeff John Roberts, The
Music Industry Just Lost A Big Fight With the Government Over Royalties,
Fortune Online (June 30, 2016).
p. 960 – insert before “Epilogue: What is the Future of the
Exclusive Rights?”

F. State-Law Public Performance Rights for pre-1972 Sound
Recordings
When Congress granted federal copyright protection to sound
recordings in the Sound Recording Act of 1971, it expressly made that
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protection applicable only to sound recordings fixed on or after
February 15, 1972, while preserving existing state-law protection for
sound recordings fixed before that date. See Sound Recording Act of
1971 § 3, Pub. L. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391, 392 (1971). A few decades later, in
The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809
(1994), Congress conferred federal copyright protection on pre-1972
sound recordings that were of foreign origin and still under copyright in
their countries of origin, but it left domestic pre-1972 sound
recordings without federal protection. Current federal copyright law
will subject all sound recordings to federal copyright law on February
15, 2067. Until that date, the statute preserves state-law protection
for these recordings. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(c).
The preservation of state-law protection for pre-1972 sound
recordings leads to the question: what rights does the law of various
states provide for such recordings? Nearly all states now have
criminal statutes prohibiting piracy of sound recordings, which
became especially popular after the California record piracy statute
was upheld against a federal preemption challenge in Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973); but these kinds of laws are focused on
commercial reproduction and distribution.
See United States
Copyright Office, Federal Copyright Protection for Pre-1972 Sound
Recordings 20-28 (2011). A few states have civil laws that address the
protection of pre-1972 sound recordings, but these tend to be quite
general in nature, and do not specify the precise rights to be granted
to sound recording owners. For example,
Go Online
the California statute provides that “the
author of an original work of authorship If you are curious about the
consisting of a sound recording . . . has an music your older co-author
exclusive ownership therein,” but it does was listening to in high
school, you can click here
not outline the contours of that for a video of the Turtles
ownership, aside from providing that it performing Happy Together.
does not apply to sounds independently
fixed. Cal. Civ. Code § 980(a)(2) (West 2014). Thus, in most states,
the scope of protection for pre-1972 sound recordings is a matter of
common law, and even the statutes in those states that have them
require interpretation so extensive that it is quite similar to common-
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law adjudication.
For many decades, it was assumed that pre-1972 sound recordings
did not enjoy public performance rights under state law. You will
recall that this is the case for post-1972 recordings covered by the
current federal copyright statute, except in the case of digital
transmissions. Consequently, broadcasters did not pay royalties to
authors or owners of pre-1972 sound recordings when they broadcast
those recordings. The only royalties flowing from performances of
sound recordings were flowing to owners of musical works embodied
in those sound recordings, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(2), 106(4), and since
1996 to owners of copyright sound recordings fixed on or after
February 15, 1972 for digital audio transmission of those records. See 17
U.S.C. § 106(6).
Recently, however, a litigation campaign by two of the founding
members of the musical group “The Turtles” (whose biggest hit was
the 1967 song “Happy Together”) has seen some success. Two Federal
District courts, applying, respectively, New York and California law,
have come to the conclusion that pre-1972 sound recordings enjoy
state-law protection that includes public performance rights. See Flo &
Eddie Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 62 F.Supp.3d 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); on
motion for reconsideration, 2014 WL 7178134 (S.D.N.Y.); Flo & Eddie Inc. v.
Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 2014 WL 4725382 (C.D. Cal.). (Another District
Court in California has somewhat dubiously held that “remastering” a
pre-1972 recording – adjusting levels in the original recording, or
remixing original multitrack recordings, with enough creativity to
create a derivative work –removes all state-law protection, and makes
the recording subject entirely to federal copyright law. See ABS
Entertainment, Inc. v. CBS Corp., No. 2:15-cv-06257-PA-AGR (C.D.
Cal. May 30, 2016)).
The Southern District of New York noted that “the
conspicuous lack of any jurisprudential history confirms that not
paying royalties for public performances of sound recordings was an
accepted fact of life in the broadcasting industry for the last century.”
It also acknowledged that recognition of common-law copyright in
already existing pre-1972 sound recordings would not provide an
economic incentive to create new recordings, and that recognition of a
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general public performance right in pre-1972 sound recordings would,
somewhat paradoxically, protect pre-1972 recordings more broadly
than more recent recordings. However, it concluded that New York
law did not grant common law copyright protection only as an
incentive for the creation of new works, and that New York courts
might recognize a public performance right that was limited to digital
audio transmissions (which would apply to the defendant, Sirius XM
Radio, which engages in digital satellite broadcasts). As for the more
fundamental question, it held that
general principles of common law copyright dictate that public
performance rights in pre–1972 sound recordings do exist.
New York has always protected public performance rights in
works other than sound recordings that enjoy the protection of
common law copyright. Sirius suggests no reason why New
York—a state traditionally protective of performers and
performance rights—would treat sound recordings differently.
Id. at 344.
The Central District of California’s opinion in its Flo & Eddie
case is structured somewhat differently, because it has a statutory
provision to construe – the section of the California Civil Code
mentioned above, which grants “an exclusive ownership” in sound
recordings to their authors. That provision does contain one
exception, which tracks the wording of § 114(b) of the federal
Copyright Act. It provides that rights in sound recordings do not
extend to making or duplicating “another sound recording . . . that
consists entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even
though such sounds imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted
sound recording.” Cal. Civ. Code § 980(a)(2) (West 2014); 17 U.S.C. §
114(b). The court concludes “that the legislature intended ownership
of a sound recording in California to include all rights that can attach
to intellectual property, save the singular, expressly-stated exception
for making ‘covers’ of a recording.” The Southern District of New York
also makes use of this form of argument, contending that both New
York common law and the federal Copyright Act “suppor[t] the
notion that an express carve-out is required in order to circumscribe
the bundle of rights appurtenant to copyright.”
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By contrast, the Southern District of Florida held that Florida
law does not grant public performance rights to pre-1972 sound
recordings. The court reasoned that Florida did not have a statute like
California, nor did it have multiple judicial decisions granting other
public performance rights like New York. Thus, concluded the court,
ruling for the plaintiffs “would be creating a new property right in
Florida as opposed to interpreting the law,” and that should be an
issue “for the Florida legislature.” Flo & Eddie Inc., 2015 WL 3852692, at
*5. It noted that recognition of right of public performance would
raise many complicated issues that a legislature would be in a better
position to resolve, “including: (1) who sets and administers the
licensing rates; (2) who owns a sound recording when the owner or
artist is dead or the record company is out of business; and (3) what, if
any, are the exceptions to the public performance right.” Both the
New York and the Florida decisions were appealed, and the respective
appellate courts both decided to certify questions regarding the scope
of common-law protection of sound recordings to the highest state
courts. See Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 821 F.3d 265 (2d
Cir. 2016); Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 2016 WL
3546433 (11th Cir. June 29, 2016). As of this writing, we are still
awaiting the state courts’ responses.
Do you think that any of the District Courts comes to a better
conclusion, or a better supported conclusion, than the others? Can the
different outcome in the Florida case really be explained by the
different statutes and decisions in the states concerned, or did the
courts have fundamentally different attitudes towards judicial
lawmaking? Do you think it makes sense to refer to a default
“complete” bundle of rights in a sound recording as encompassing “all
rights that can attach to intellectual property,” as the California court
did? Would that default bundle include a right to prohibit private
performances of a sound recording, or a right to prohibit performances
of portions of the sound recording in a college music class made for the
purpose of analyzing the music in the recording? On the other hand, is
it really so hard for a court to create limitations to a right, and to
resolve ownership issues, once it recognizes that right? In the areas of
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real and personal property, courts have over time created a very rich
set of common law rules (sometimes now altered by statutes) that
include limitations on property rights, and that resolve issues of
ownership.
If courts decide to change the common law, should they come
out and say it, rather than pretending to find that the law was always
there? The Southern District of New York states that “acquiescence
by participants in the recording industry in a status quo where
recording artists and producers were not paid royalties while
songwriters were does not show that they lacked an enforceable right
under the common law—only that they failed to act on it.” Is it
possible that if owners of copyright in sound recordings had only
thought to file lawsuits claiming state law protection against
broadcasters eight or nine decades ago – instead of concentrating on
intensive and unsuccessful lobbying of legislatures, which they did –
sound recording copyright owners could have collected hundreds of
millions of dollars from broadcasters? Note also that on this
interpretation, when Congress adopted the 1976 Act it would have
been taking away a valuable economic right held by recording artists
in New York (because the new federal law specifically denies a general
performance right to sound recordings), but it would have done so
without any discussion in the legislative history.
In its 2011 report on federal copyright protection for pre-1972
sound recordings, the Copyright Office recommended that Congress
extend federal protection to those recordings. See United States
Copyright Office, Federal Copyright Protection for Pre-1972 Sound
Recordings 120-138 (2011). Do you think that is a good idea? Do the
differing outcomes in the Flo & Eddie cases create another reason for
favoring federal protection? In April, 2015, Representative Jerrold
Nadler (D-NY) introduced the “Fair Play Fair Pay Act of 2015” in the
House of Representatives. See H.R. 1733, 114th Cong. (2015). That
legislation would extend federal copyright protection to pre-1972
sound recordings, and would also grant a general public performance
right to all sound recordings under copyright, thus ending a nearly
century-long period during which analog broadcasters did not have to
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pay royalties for performing sound recordings. Similar bills have been
introduced over the past several years. As of this writing, no hearings
have been held on the Nadler bill and it has no co-sponsors.

Chapter 13 Remedies
A. Damages: Compensation and Restitution
1. Actual Damages
p. 968 – insert after Note 3:
3A. Lump Sum versus Per Unit Royalty. In negotiated copyright
license agreements, parties sometimes agree to a flat payment for
use of a work regardless of how many copies the licensee decides to
make, but in other cases, the licensee agrees to pay a per unit
royalty, which could be a specified amount per unit sold, or a
percentage of the sale price. If the work is being used without

The Stamp Featuring Mr. Gaylord’s Sculpture

permission and the court must determine damages, how should it
determine which approach is appropriate? In Gaylord v. United States,
777 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015) a sculptor named Frank Gaylord
created several statutes depicting a column of soldiers on the march
as a major component of the Korean War Veterans memorial. In
2002, to mark the 50th anniversary of the Korean conflict, the U.S.
Postal Service (USPS) decided to issue a commemorative stamp.
The stamp featured a photograph of Gaylord’s sculptures. The
USPS paid the photographer $1500 for rights to the photo, but they
did not obtain Gaylord’s permission to use the underlying

253

COPYRIGHT : A Contemporary Approach

sculptural images. Gaylord sued for copyright infringement in
2006. After several appeals, Gaylord prevailed and the case
returned to the Court of Federal Claims for an assessment of
damages.
The sticking point became how much he was owed for stamps
that had been purchased (presumably by stamp collectors) but
never used. The lower court found that USPS made $5.4 million

A picture of actual U.S. troops in Korea from the Official Blog
of the U.S. Army
http://armylive.dodlive.mil/index.php/2013/07/year-of-thekorean-war-veteran/

dollars from such sales, which it characterized as “almost pure
profit” and it awarded a 10% royalty on those sales as appropriate
damages. On appeal, the USPS argued that its own past practice
was never to pay a per-unit royalty, so that the award in question
did not represent the result of a hypothetical negotiation between
the parties – the supposed standard for fixing damages. However,
the lower court made a factual finding that the USPS would have
departed from its usual practice in this case because it had
determined that no other image would work for the stamp. The
Federal Circuit refused to disturb that finding on appeal. The
appellate court also noted that the 10% royalty rate was consistent
with what Gaylord had received from negotiated licensing
arrangements for use of pictures of the sculpture on such items as t-
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shirts and other collectables. Do you think most stamp collectors
bought the stamp because they thought Gaylord’s sculpture was
particularly artistic? What motivates stamp collectors to buy
stamps? Could the USPS have found a public domain photo of
troops in Korea – say one taken by a government employee – and
have used that instead? Should that have made a difference in
calculating the damage award?
2. Profits
p. 980 – Insert after Note 3:
3A. Copyright Profits and Sex Trafficking. Backpage.com is a
website that allows users to post classified advertisements for goods
and services in the same fashion as on Craigslist. It has frequently been
identified as a major venue for sex trafficking. In Jane Doe No. 1 v.
Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 28 (1st Cir. 2016), three women, suing
pseudonymously, alleged that Backpage facilitated sex trafficking by
allowing traffickers to advertise in the “Escorts” section of the site.
Their lawsuit included claims under the Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), the Massachusetts Anti–
Human Trafficking and Victim Protection Act (MATA), and several
other state and federal statutes. The factual allegations in the
complaint were truly horrific, including claims that
beginning at age 15, each of the appellants was trafficked
through advertisements posted on Backpage. Jane Doe # 1 was
advertised on Backpage during two periods in 2012 and 2013.
She estimates that, as a result, she was raped over 1,000 times.
Jane Doe # 2 was advertised on Backpage between 2010 and
2012. She estimates that, as a result, she was raped over 900
times. Jane Doe # 3 was advertised on Backpage from
December of 2013 until some unspecified future date. As a
result, she was raped on numerous occasions. All of the rapes
occurred either in Massachusetts or Rhode Island. Sometimes
the sex traffickers posted the advertisements directly and
sometimes they forced the victims to post the advertisements.

255

COPYRIGHT : A Contemporary Approach

Typically, each posted advertisement included images of the
particular appellant, usually taken by the traffickers (but
advertisements for Doe # 3 included some pictures that she
herself had taken).
Doe #3 asserted a claim for
copyright infringement with
To read the 2015 Congressional
regard to the unauthorized use
testimony of Yiota G. Souras, Vice
of the photos which she had
President of the National Center for
taken. Because the photos had
Missing and Exploited Children, you
not been registered prior to the
can click here. In that testimony, she
alleged acts of infringement
indicates: “A majority of the child sex
trafficking cases reported to NCMEC
statutory
damages
were
involve ads posted on Backpage.com.
unavailable. The court found
Of all the child sex trafficking reports
that she was not entitled to any
submitted by members of the public
recovery for actual damages
to the CyberTipline, more than
because it concluded that no
seventy-one percent (71%) relate to
facts
had
been
alleged
Backpage ads.”
suggesting that there had been a diminution in the value of the
photograph. It also rebuffed plaintiff’s claim for profits. Plaintiff
argued that some portion of Backpage’s profits were attributable to
the use of the photo, but the court found this argument unconvincing,
noting that “a generalized assertion that a publisher/infringer profits
from providing customers with the option to display photographs in
advertisements, standing alone, cannot plausibly be said to link the
display of a particular image to some discrete portion of the
publisher/infringer's profits.” (The court also rejected a claim for
injunctive relief finding that there was no substantial likelihood of
future infringements.)
Go Online

C. Attorneys’ Fees
p. 994-1000 – Replace Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. West
Publishing Co. and the accompanying notes with the following:

Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Supreme Court of the United States, 2016
136 S.Ct. 1979
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Justice KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 505 of the Copyright Act provides that a district court “may ...
award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party.” 17 U.S.C. §
505. The question presented here is whether a court, in exercising that
authority, should give substantial weight to the objective
reasonableness of the losing party’s position. The answer, as both
decisions below held, is yes—the court should. But the court must
also give due consideration to all other circumstances relevant to
granting fees; and it retains discretion, in light of those factors, to
make an award even when the losing party advanced a reasonable
claim or defense. Because we are not certain that the lower courts here
understood the full scope of that discretion, we return the case for
further consideration of the prevailing party’s fee application.
I
Petitioner Supap Kirtsaeng, a citizen of Thailand, came to the United
States 20 years ago to study math at Cornell University. He quickly
figured out that respondent John Wiley & Sons, an academic
publishing company, sold virtually identical English-language
textbooks in the two countries—but for far less in Thailand than in
the United States. Seeing a ripe opportunity for arbitrage, Kirtsaeng
asked family and friends to buy the foreign editions in Thai bookstores
and ship them to him in New York. He then resold the textbooks to
American students, reimbursed his Thai suppliers, and pocketed a tidy
profit.
Wiley sued Kirtsaeng for copyright infringement, claiming that his
activities violated its exclusive right to distribute the textbooks. See 17
U.S.C. §§ 106(3), 602(a)(1). Kirtsaeng invoked the “first-sale doctrine”
as a defense. That doctrine typically enables the lawful owner of a
book (or other work) to resell or otherwise dispose of it as he wishes.
See § 109(a). But Wiley contended that the first-sale doctrine did not
apply when a book (like those Kirtsaeng sold) was manufactured
abroad.
At the time, courts were in conflict on that issue. Some thought, as
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Kirtsaeng did, that the first-sale doctrine permitted the resale of
foreign-made books; others maintained, along with Wiley, that it did
not. And this Court, in its first pass at the issue, divided 4 to 4. See
Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 562 U.S. 40, 131 S.Ct. 565, 178
L.Ed.2d 470 (2010) (per curiam ). In this case, the District Court sided
with Wiley; so too did a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. See 654 F.3d 210, 214, 222 (2011). To settle the
continuing conflict, this Court granted Kirtsaeng’s petition for
certiorari and reversed the Second Circuit in a 6–to–3 decision, thus
establishing that the first-sale doctrine allows the resale of foreignmade books, just as it does domestic ones. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. ––––, ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1351, 1355–1356, 185 L.Ed.2d 392
(2013).
Returning victorious to the District Court, Kirtsaeng invoked § 505 to
seek more than $2 million in attorney’s fees from Wiley. The court
denied his motion. Relying on Second Circuit precedent, the court
gave “substantial weight” to the “objective reasonableness” of Wiley’s
infringement claim. See No. 08–cv–07834 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 20, 2013),
App. to Pet. for Cert. 18a, 2013 WL 6722887, *4. In explanation of that
approach, the court stated that “the imposition of a fee award against
a copyright holder with an objectively reasonable”—although
unsuccessful—“litigation position will generally not promote the
purposes of the Copyright Act.” Id., at 11a (quoting Matthew Bender & Co.
v. West Publishing Co., 240 F.3d 116, 122 (C.A.2 2001) (emphasis
deleted)). Here, Wiley’s position was reasonable: After all, several
Courts of Appeals and three Justices of the Supreme Court had agreed
with it. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 12a. And according to the District
Court, no other circumstance “overr[o]de” that objective
reasonableness, so as to warrant fee-shifting. Id., at 22a. The Court of
Appeals affirmed, concluding in a brief summary order that “the
district court properly placed ‘substantial weight’ on the
reasonableness of [Wiley’s] position” and committed no abuse of
discretion in deciding that other “factors did not outweigh” the
reasonableness finding. 605 Fed.Appx. 48, 49, 50 (C.A.2 2015).
We granted certiorari, 577 U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 890, 193 L.Ed.2d 783
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(2016), to resolve disagreement in the lower courts about how to
address an application for attorney’s fees in a copyright case.
II
Section 505 states that a district court “may ... award a reasonable
attorney’s fee to the prevailing party.” It thus authorizes fee-shifting,
but without specifying standards that courts should adopt, or
guideposts they should use, in determining when such awards are
appropriate.
In Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455
(1994), this Court recognized the broad leeway § 505 gives to district
courts—but also established several principles and criteria to guide
their decisions. See id., at 519, 114 S.Ct. 1023 (asking “what standards
should inform” the exercise of the trial court’s authority). The
statutory language, we stated, “clearly connotes discretion,” and
eschews any “precise rule or formula” for awarding fees. Id., at 533, 534,
114 S.Ct. 1023. Still, we established a pair of restrictions. First, a
district court may not “award[ ] attorney’s fees as a matter of course”;
rather, a court must make a more particularized, case-by-case
assessment. Id., at 533, 114 S.Ct. 1023. Second, a court may not treat
prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants any differently;
defendants should be “encouraged to litigate [meritorious copyright
defenses] to the same extent that plaintiffs are encouraged to litigate
meritorious claims of infringement.” Id., at 527, 114 S.Ct. 1023. In
addition, we noted with approval “several nonexclusive factors” to
inform a court’s fee-shifting decisions: “frivolousness, motivation,
objective unreasonableness[,] and the need in particular
circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and
deterrence.” Id., at 534, n. 19, 114 S.Ct. 1023. . . .
The parties here, though sharing some common ground, now dispute
what else we should say to district courts. . . . Wiley argues that giving
substantial weight to the reasonableness of a losing party’s position
will best serve the Act’s objectives. See Brief for Respondent 24–35. By
contrast, Kirtsaeng favors giving special consideration to whether a
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lawsuit resolved an important and close legal issue and thus
“meaningfully clarifie[d]” copyright law. Brief for Petitioner 36; see id.,
at 41–44.
We join both parties in seeing a need for some additional guidance
respecting the application of § 505. In addressing other open-ended
fee-shifting statutes, this Court has emphasized that “in a system of
laws discretion is rarely without limits.” Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491
U.S. 754, 758, 109 S.Ct. 2732, 105 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989); see Halo
Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., ––– U.S. ––––, ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1923,
1931, ––– L.Ed.2d ––––, 2016 WL 3221515 (2016). . . . At the least,
utterly freewheeling inquiries often deprive litigants of “the basic
principle of justice that like cases should be decided alike,” Martin, 546
U.S., at 139, 126 S.Ct. 704—as when, for example, one judge thinks the
parties’ “motivation [s]” determinative and another believes the need
for “compensation” trumps all else, Fogerty, 510 U.S., at 534, n. 19, 114
S.Ct. 1023. And so too, such unconstrained discretion prevents
individuals from predicting how fee decisions will turn out, and thus
from making properly informed judgments about whether to litigate.
For those reasons, when applying fee-shifting laws with “no explicit
limit or condition,” Halo, ––– U.S. at, ––––, ––– S.Ct., at ––––, ante, at 8,
we have nonetheless “found limits” in them—and we have done so,
just as both parties urge, by looking to “the large objectives of the
relevant Act,” Zipes, 491 U.S., at 759, 109 S.Ct. 2732 (internal quotation
marks omitted); see supra, at 1985 – 1986.
In accord with such precedents, we must consider if either Wiley’s or
Kirtsaeng’s proposal well advances the Copyright Act’s goals. . . .
The objective-reasonableness approach that Wiley favors [will
predictably encourage useful copyright litigation] passes that test
because it both encourages parties with strong legal positions to stand
on their rights and deters those with weak ones from proceeding with
litigation. When a litigant—whether plaintiff or defendant—is clearly
correct, the likelihood that he will recover fees from the opposing (i.e.,
unreasonable) party gives him an incentive to litigate the case all the
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way to the end. The holder of a copyright that has obviously been
infringed has good reason to bring and maintain a suit even if the
damages at stake are small; and likewise, a person defending against a
patently meritless copyright claim has every incentive to keep fighting,
no matter that attorney’s fees in a protracted suit might be as or more
costly than a settlement. Conversely, when a person (again, whether
plaintiff or defendant) has an unreasonable litigating position, the
likelihood that he will have to pay two sets of fees discourages legal
action. The copyright holder with no reasonable infringement claim
has good reason not to bring suit in the first instance (knowing he
cannot force a settlement and will have to proceed to judgment); and
the infringer with no reasonable defense has every reason to give in
quickly, before each side’s litigation costs mount. All of those results
promote the Copyright Act’s purposes, by enhancing the probability
that both creators and users (i.e., potential plaintiffs and defendants)
will enjoy the substantive rights the statute provides.
By contrast, Kirtsaeng’s proposal would not produce any sure benefits.
We accept his premise that litigation of close cases can help ensure
that “the boundaries of copyright law [are] demarcated as clearly as
possible,” thus advancing the public interest in creative work. Brief for
Petitioner 19 (quoting Fogerty, 510 U.S., at 527, 114 S.Ct. 1023). But we
cannot agree that fee-shifting will necessarily, or even usually,
encourage parties to litigate those cases to judgment. Fee awards are a
double-edged sword: They increase the reward for a victory—but also
enhance the penalty for a defeat. And the hallmark of hard cases is that
no party can be confident if he will win or lose. That means
Kirtsaeng’s approach could just as easily discourage as encourage
parties to pursue the kinds of suits that “meaningfully clarif[y]”
copyright law. Brief for Petitioner 36. It would (by definition) raise the
stakes of such suits; but whether those higher stakes would provide
an incentive—or instead a disincentive—to litigate hinges on a party’s
attitude toward risk. . . . And Kirtsaeng offers no reason to think that
serious gamblers predominate. [citations omitted] So the value of his
standard, unlike Wiley’s, is entirely speculative.
What is more, Wiley’s approach is more administrable than
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Kirtsaeng’s. A district court that has ruled on the merits of a copyright
case can easily assess whether the losing party advanced an
unreasonable claim or defense. That is closely related to what the
court has already done: In deciding any case, a judge cannot help but
consider the strength and weakness of each side’s arguments. By
contrast, a judge may not know at the conclusion of a suit whether a
newly decided issue will have, as Kirtsaeng thinks critical, broad legal
significance.
. . . Kirtsaeng claims that the reasonableness inquiry systematically
favors plaintiffs because a losing defendant “will virtually always be
found to have done something culpable.” Brief for Petitioner 29
(emphasis in original). But that conflates two different questions:
whether a defendant in fact infringed a copyright and whether he
made serious arguments in defense of his conduct. Courts every day
see reasonable defenses that ultimately fail (just as they see reasonable
claims that come to nothing); in this context, as in any other, they are
capable of distinguishing between those defenses (or claims) and the
objectively unreasonable variety. And if some court confuses the issue
of liability with that of reasonableness, its fee award should be
reversed for abuse of discretion.
All of that said, objective reasonableness can be only an important
factor in assessing fee applications—not the controlling one. As we
recognized in Fogerty, § 505 confers broad discretion on district courts
and, in deciding whether to fee-shift, they must take into account a
range of considerations beyond the reasonableness of litigating
positions. See supra, at 1985. That means in any given case a court may
award fees even though the losing party offered reasonable arguments
(or, conversely, deny fees even though the losing party made
unreasonable ones). For example, a court may order fee-shifting
because of a party’s litigation misconduct, whatever the
reasonableness of his claims or defenses. See, e.g., Viva Video, Inc. v.
Cabrera, 9 Fed.Appx. 77, 80 (C.A.2 2001). Or a court may do so to deter
repeated instances of copyright infringement or overaggressive
assertions of copyright claims, again even if the losing position was
reasonable in a particular case. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. WB Music
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Corp., 520 F.3d 588, 593–595 (C.A.6 2008) (awarding fees against a
copyright holder who filed hundreds of suits on an overbroad legal
theory, including in a subset of cases in which it was objectively
reasonable). Although objective reasonableness carries significant
weight, courts must view all the circumstances of a case on their own
terms, in light of the Copyright Act’s essential goals.
And on that score, Kirtsaeng has raised serious questions about how
fee-shifting actually operates in the Second Circuit. To be sure, the
Court of Appeals’ framing of the inquiry resembles our own: It calls for
a district court to give “substantial weight” to the reasonableness of a
losing party’s litigating positions while also considering other relevant
circumstances. See 605 Fed.Appx., at 49–50; Matthew Bender, 240 F.3d,
at 122. But the Court of Appeals’ language at times suggests that a
finding of reasonableness raises a presumption against granting fees,
see ibid.; supra, at 1983 – 1985—and that goes too far in cabining how a
district court must structure its analysis and what it may conclude
from its review of relevant factors. Still more, district courts in the
Second Circuit appear to have overly learned the Court of Appeals’
lesson, turning “substantial” into more nearly “dispositive” weight. As
Kirtsaeng notes, hardly any decisions in that Circuit have granted fees
when the losing party raised a reasonable argument (and none have
denied fees when the losing party failed to do so). See Reply Brief 15.
For these reasons, we vacate the decision below so that the District
Court can take another look at Kirtsaeng’s fee application. In sending
back the case for this purpose, we do not at all intimate that the
District Court should reach a different conclusion. Rather, we merely
ensure that the court will evaluate the motion consistent with the
analysis we have set out—giving substantial weight to the
reasonableness of Wiley’s litigating position, but also taking into
account all other relevant factors.

Notes
1. Certainty or Flexibility: What Will it Be? The Kirtsaeng Court
seems to be torn in two directions, doesn’t it? On the one hand, the
Court favors the “objective reasonability” standard because of its
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predictability and administrability. On the other hand, the Court
suggests that the objective reasonableness of the losing party’s
position should not even create a presumption against granting
fees. Instead, courts should feel free to consider a variety of other
factors. The Court does even not even purport to construct an
exhaustive list of those factors, but merely mentions a number of
nonexclusive examples. These include “frivolousness, motivation, . .
. and the need in particular circumstances to advance
considerations of compensation and deterrence,” and also
“litigation misconduct” and “repeated instances of copyright
infringement or overaggressive assertions of copyright claims, . . .
even if the losing position was reasonable in a particular case.”
Doesn’t that undermine predictability? As a District Court, how
much weight should you give objective reasonableness after this
decision? When are you giving too little, and when too much?
2. Litigation Misconduct: Do Prevailing Parties Have a License to
Misbehave? Although § 505 does not explicitly mention litigation
misconduct as a ground for awarding attorneys’ fees, the Kirtsaeng
Court is quite sure that it should be. Should the Court be so
confident? Consider the fact that a prevailing party could also
engage in misconduct during litigation. For example, its counsel
might not have been so sure it could win, and might have engaged
in various tactics solely to increase the litigation costs of the
defendant in order to pressure it into a settlement. Yet the
Copyright Act does not allow an award of attorneys’ fees to a
nonprevailing party for any reason. Should that be a sign that
Congress did not intend to award fees to either party on the basis of
litigation conduct, or did Congress intend to give prevailing parties
a free pass with regard to their improper litigation conduct, while
creating liability for such conduct for nonprevailing parties? Should
the litigation misconduct of a prevailing party be a reason for
denying it or reducing an award of attorneys’ fees even when the
position of the nonprevailing party was objectively unreasonable?
3. Should parties be punished in one case for their actions in other
cases? The Kirtsaeng Court states that one factor weighing in favor
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of an award of attorneys’ fees is “a pattern of infringing conduct or
overaggressive assertions of copyright claims on the part of a
nonprevailing party, even if in the particular case under
consideration, that party’s position was reasonable.” Is it really fair
to award attorneys fees against a party in a case in which its
position was objectively reasonable, just because it took
unreasonable positions in other cases? Shouldn’t that be dealt with
in those other cases? In the case that the Kirtsaeng Court cites in
support of the above statement, the nonprevailing party, Bridgeport
Music, Inc. continued to press a position on a legal issue after the
District Court hearing that case had rejected that position in a
companion case. In upholding a partial award of attorneys’ fees, the
Sixth Circuit found that “it was futile for Bridgeport to pursue the
factually similar claim under the same theory before the same judge
and thereby force [the ultimately prevailing party] to incur fees and
costs to prepare for trial.” Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. WB Music
Corp., 520 F.3d 588, 594 (6th Cir. 2008). The insistence on pursuing
that claim while knowing that it would be futile was “part of
[Bridgeport’s] overly aggressive litigation tactics and not in any
hope or expectation of actually surviving summary judgment.” Id. at
595. Isn’t that about what happened in the case at hand, and not
some other case?
4. Does the Registration Requirement for Statutory Damages and
Attorney’s Fees Create a Copyright Hierarchy? Although the
1976 Copyright Act and more recent amendments are widely
viewed as having drastically reduced the role of formalities such as
registration, in one important respect the 1976 Act increased the
significance of registration. Under the 1909 Act, timely registration
was not a prerequisite of obtaining statutory damages and
attorney’s fees. Under the 1976 Act, it is: successful copyright
plaintiffs cannot obtain statutory damages or attorney’s fees unless
they registered their works before the commencement of
infringement (with a three-month grace period after publication for
published works and a few other narrow exceptions). See 17 U.S.C.
§ 412. John Tehranian argues that this registration requirement
creates a stark hierarchy among copyright owners:
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Through formalities, the 1976 Copyright Act actually created
two distinct tiers of effective protection for copyrighted
works. Sophisticated, routine creators — generally
corporations in content creation industries — timely register
their works and therefore enjoy generous remedies against
infringers. These remedies include therecovery of reasonable
attorneys’ fees and the assessment of statutory damages —
which can rise to the draconian level of up to $150,000 per
willful act of infringement. Absent any proof of actual
damages, such plaintiffs can elect statutory damages that
quickly create the possibility of a multi-million dollar
judgment in their favor. By sharp contrast, unsophisticated
creators, like individual artists, typically do not timely register
their works and are often left with little except moral force
and the uncertain threat of injunctive relief to enforce their
intellectual property rights. The dichotomy between
sophisticated and unsophisticated creators thereby determines
the relative sanctity of copyrighted works.
John Tehranian, The Emperor Has No Copyright: Registration,
Cultural Hierarchy, and the Myth of American Copyright
Militancy, 24 Berkeley Tech L.J. 1399, 1407 (2009). Does the timely
registration requirement unfairly create favored and unfavored
classes? Or does it just ruthlessly, if imperfectly, distinguish
between those who need an enhanced incentive to create works,
and those who don’t?

Chapter 14 Invoking Judicial Power: Jurisdiction, Venue, Standing,
Limitations, Preemption, Choice of Law and Related Issues
B. Plaintiff Issues: Standing, Registration and Recordation
p. 1037 – an update to “Copyright in the Real World: A Copyright
Litigation Entrepreneur Runs Up Against Standing Rules”:
In Righthaven LLC v. Hoehn, 716 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2013), the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the ruling that Righthaven LLC did not have
standing to bring suits alleging copyright infringement of articles
originally published in the Las Vegas Review-Journal, because the
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agreements under which Righthaven claimed to have standing
invalidly attempted to assign Righthaven the bare right to sue
without transferring any exclusive rights in the articles.

D. Limitation on Actions and General Equitable Defenses
p. 1060 – insert after end of note 6:
7. Can Laches Apply During the Statutory Limitations Period? The
Supreme Court Speaks. In a case of continuing infringement, a
plaintiff might wait many, many years after a defendant’s first
infringing act to file an infringement suit. The Copyright Act’s
three-year statute of limitations, 17 U.S.C. § 507(b), would limit the
plaintiff to recovering damages for infringing acts that the
defendant committed within three years before the suit was filed.
Can the defendant argue further that the plaintiff is barred by
laches from any recovery, because the defendant was prejudiced by
plaintiff’s delay in filing suit? That was the issue in Petrella v. MetroGoldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014).
In 1963, Frank Petrella co-wrote a screenplay based on the life
of boxer Jake LaMotta and assigned copyright in it to MGM, which
made the film “Raging Bull” about LaMotta and released it in 1990.
Because Frank Petrella died during the initial 1909 Act copyright
term, the rights in the renewal term reverted to his heirs. (You may
recall that the case in which the Supreme Court decided that
renewal term owners had a copyright interest in derivative works
made during the initial term was Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207
(1990), presented in the casebook on p. 742.) His daughter Paula
Petrella (hereinafter Petrella) renewed the copyright in 1991 and
became its sole owner. Petrella first wrote to MGM in 1998,
claiming that MGM’s continuing exploitation of “Raging Bull”
infringed her copyright in the screenplay co-written by her father.
She did not file an infringement lawsuit until 2009, 18 years after
she gained copyright in the screenplay. MGM moved to dismiss
the lawsuit, arguing that Petrella’s delay in filing it was
unreasonable and prejudicial. The District Court granted the
motion, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court reversed. The Court held
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that laches may not be invoked to bar a claim for damages brought
within the three-year limitations period of 17 U.S.C. § 507(b). That
statute of limitations, it reasoned, already takes account of delay.
An infringement plaintiff cannot reach any returns on investment
that a defendant realized more than three years before the suit was
filed. Moreover, a defendant can deduct from profits made within
the three-year period any expenses incurred in generating the
profits, and can retain profits attributable to the derivative work it
created, as opposed to those attributable to the infringed work.
MGM argued that it was unfair for Petrella to wait and see whether
“Raging Bull” was profitable before suing, but the Court disagreed:
[T]here is nothing untoward about waiting to see whether
an infringer's exploitation undercuts the value of the
copyrighted work, has no effect on the original work, or
even complements it. . . . Even if an infringement is
harmful, the harm may be too small to justify the cost of
litigation.
Id. at 1976. As for possible evidentiary difficulties that might arise
after a long delay in filing suit, Congress must have taken those
into account when it created the limitations period that it did, and
in any event, evidentiary difficulties are as likely to hurt plaintiffs
as defendants. Id. at 1976-1977. “In extraordinary circumstances,”
held the Court, “the consequences of a delay in commencing suit
may be of sufficient magnitude to warrant, at the very outset of
the litigation, curtailment of [equitable] relief,” id. at 1977, even
though it cannot affect a claim for damages.
Justice Breyer, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Kennedy, dissented. Among other things, the dissenters agreed
with MGM about the potential unfairness of waiting to file suit,
and quoted with approval a passage from an opinion by Learned
Hand contending that it is
“inequitable for the owner of a copyright, with full notice
of an intended infringement, to stand inactive while the
proposed infringer spends large sums of money in its
exploitation, and to intervene only when his speculation
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has proved a success.”
Id. at 1979 (Breyer, J. dissenting)
(quoting Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc.,
234 F. 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y.1916)).
Which of the opinions, the
Opinion for the Court or the
dissent, do you think has the
more convincing view of the
fairness of waiting to sue for
infringement?
The prevailing view, at least
in the Ninth Circuit, was that
renewal term owners would
likely not be granted injunctive
relief
against
continued
exploitation of derivative works
made with authorization during the initial term, but only
damages. See Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988).
How do you think the likely inability to obtain injunctive relief
would have affected Paula Petrella’s decision about the timing of a
lawsuit against MGM?

F. Preemption
p. 1072 – replace Note 2 with the following:
2. Preemption and Performers’ Publicity Rights. Actors and athletes
routinely appear in copyrighted audiovisual works. Assume that
their employment contracts indicate that they are being paid solely
for their labor in showing up on the day of the filming or the day of
the game, and do not otherwise waive their state-law rights of
publicity. Does Toney mean that the copyright owner of the
resulting work cannot publicly exhibit it without being liable
under state law? If logic suggests that any such application of state
law should be preempted, how would you formulate an argument
to get to that result?
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In Dryer v. National Football
League, 814 F.3d 938 (8th Cir.
In its 2015 en banc opinion in the
2016), the Eighth Circuit held
case of Garcia v. Google, presented
that
the
Copyright
Act
above in Chapter 2, the Ninth
preempted football players’ right
Circuit held that an actor’s
performance in a film did not
of publicity claims based on
constitute
a
separate
their appearances in “themecopyrightable work, but it noted
based audio-visual productions .
that its holding did not prevent
. . describing significant games,
plaintiff Garcia from seeking
seasons, and players in the NFL’s
remedies under other legal
theories, such as right of
history.” Id. at 941. The Dryer
publicity or defamation. Under
court drew a distinction
the Dryer case, would right of
between “right-of-publicity suit
publicity likely provide a basis
challenging the use of a
for granting relief to Garcia?
copyrighted
work
in
a
commercial
advertisement”
and
“right-of-publicity
suit
challeng[ing] the expressive, non-commercial use of a copyrighted
work.” Id. at 943. While the former “could have purposes unrelated
to the aims of copyright law,” the latter “seeks to subordinate the
copyright holder’s right to exploit the value of that work to the
plaintiff’s interest in controlling the work’s dissemination.” Id. The
Eighth Circuit agreed with the District Court that the NFL films
were “expressive, rather than commercial, speech.” They were not
advertisements, because they did not propose a commercial
transaction; they did not reference the National Football League as
a specific product; and consumer demand for the films
demonstrated that they “represent[ed] speech of independent value
and public interest,” which meant that “the NFL’s economic
motivations alone cannot convert these productions into
commercial speech.” Id. at 943-944. Previous decisions holding
that the Copyright Act preempted right of publicity actions by
sports figures include Ray v. ESPN, 783 F.3d 1140 (8th Cir. 2015) and
Baltimore Orioles v. Major League Players Association, 805 F.2d 663 (7th
Cir. 1986). Academic commentary on the issue includes Thomas F.
Cotter & Irina Y. Dmitrieva, Integrating the Right of Publicity
With First Amendment and Copyright Preemption Analysis, 33
Make the Connnection
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Colum. J.L. & Arts 165 (2010) and David E. Shipley, Three Strikes
and They’re Out at the Old Ball Game: Preemption of Performers’
Rights of Publicity under the Copyright Act of 1976, 20 Ariz. St. L.J.
369, 384-88 (1988).

